Ranjel v. City of Lansing
| Decision Date | 28 October 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 19333.,19333. |
| Parties | Augustine L. RANJEL, Asencion de Leon, Jr., Virginia Arriaga Williams, Macedonia Ayala, Betty Basey, Ira Q. Miller, Antonio M. Lira, Geraldine Hicks and Ruby Mack, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF LANSING, Gerald W. Graves, Mayor, and Theo Fulton, Clerk, City of Lansing, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Thomas C. Mayer, Detroit, Mich., for appellants; Oskar M. Hornbach, City Atty., Lansing, Mich., Norman C. Farhat, Special Asst. City Atty., Farhat, Burns & Luoma, Lansing, Mich., on brief; Mayer & Mayer, Detroit, Mich., of counsel.
Michael Davidson, New York City, for appellees; Jack Greenberg, New York City, Paul Rosen, William Goodman, Detroit, Mich., on brief.
Jerold Lax, Avern Cohn, Detroit, Mich., on brief as amicus curiae of the American Jewish Committee.
Robert R. Soltis, Cleveland, Ohio, on brief as amicus curiae for the American Independent Party of Ohio.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., William F. Bledsoe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Detroit, Mich., on brief as amicus curiae for Michigan Civil Rights Commission.
Before WEICK and PECK, Circuit Judges, and MACHROWICZ, District Judge*.
The suit was brought in the District Court by poor black and Mexican-Americans to enjoin a referendum on a "spot" zoning ordinance enacted by the Council of the City of Lansing, which ordinance rezoned a twenty-acre site at Jolly and Cedar Streets in a white neighborhood in said City, from a zoning classification of "A" One Family Residential district to a community unit plan which would consist of one hundred low rent town-house units and a low rent five-story apartment building containing one hundred fifty units for the elderly.
The rezoning had been applied for by a private developer who had been selected by the Lansing Housing Commission to build the units with funds supplied by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The rezoning ordinance was not of general application. It provided only a "spot" zoning variance from the general zoning classification.
The City Council granted the application of the developer and passed the spot zoning ordinance. In the approved plans for the project the density of the housing for low income families was 8.05 families per acre. The housing for the elderly raised density for the development above the average density allowed in single-family districts.
Acting under the Charter of the City of Lansing, an organization known as Committee For Individual Homes circulated a referendum petition on the spot rezoning ordinance. The petition was signed by more than 15% of the electors of the city and was presented to the City Clerk, but he refused to accept it.
A mandamus action was brought against the City Clerk, the City Council and the City of Lansing in the Circuit Court of Ingham County, Michigan, to compel them to process the petition in accordance with the Charter provisions. The Circuit Court, after hearing, issued its writ of mandamus. The case was appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court. Parr v. Fulton, 9 Mich. App. 719, 158 N.W.2d 35 (1968).
The City Council then determined to submit the proposal to the electorate and scheduled the election for August 6, 1968.
Upon the filing of the present action in the District Court, the Court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the City from conducting the election, and later made it permanent. Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F.Supp. 301 (D.C.W.D. Mich.1969). The defendants appealed to this Court. We reverse.
A goodly portion of the opinion of the District Court was devoted to a vivid portrayal of the tragic conditions affecting the poor black and Mexican-Americans living in the slum areas in Lansing, and the need to alleviate these conditions by moving them out of the slums to more desirable neighborhoods. These conditions, however, concerning the plight of the poor, were not peculiar to Lansing nor indeed to the United States, but have existed for centuries in many places throughout the world.
It would seem to us that there should be a better way to achieve this worthy goal without enjoining an election and thereby depriving the citizens of a community of their right of suffrage.
The District Judge based his decision on two grounds, (1) the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, and (2) his finding that the motivation behind the circulation of the referendum petition was in part racial and that the rights of the plaintiffs under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were thereby violated.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is applicable only when a state law conflicts with a valid federal law, and in such event the latter controls. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962).
The District Court relied on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. and Regulations of HUD pursuant thereto, particularly 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.4(b) and 205.1(g) of HUD's Low Rent Housing Manual, as requiring "that sites be selected outside areas of racial concentration." We find no such provision in Title VI of the Civil Right Act of 1964. § 2000d-1 of the Act does enable Federal Departments extending federal financial assistance to issue rules, regulations or orders of general applicability, which shall not become effective unless and until approved by the President.
Likewise, 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b) contains no provision relative to selection of sites outside of areas of racial concentration. The only place where such provision appears is in paragraph 4(g) of HUD's Low Rent Housing Manual, Sec. 205.1.
Appellant did stipulate that HUD's Low Rent Housing Manual was a regulation, but later found that was incorrect. It did not feel bound by that stipulation since it involved a mistake of law. The manual is not contained in the Federal Regulations, nor was it shown that it had presidential approval.
While HUD's manual contains guidelines concerning the conditions under which housing projects may obtain federal financing, in our judgment the manual does not rise to the dignity of federal law; but even if it did, the Charter of the City of Lansing providing for initiative and referendum does not conflict with it. As we will show below, the referendum was not discriminatory but was founded on neutral principles.
The District Court also relied on the Kerner Commission Report, but obviously such report is not a federal regulation. Thus the provisions of Lansing's Charter conflict with no federal law.
It must have been a "shock" to the City for plaintiffs to claim, and for the District Court to hold, "that the conducting of this referendum makes the City of Lansing a partner in discrimination in violation of the Constitution," (293 F.Supp. at 311 (1969)) for it was the City that established the Housing Commission; that originated the project and applied to HUD for the financing of it; that enacted the ordinance providing for the variance in the zoning; that approved the plans and specifications of the developer; that refused to accept the referendum petition; that resisted the mandamus action in the Circuit Court; that appealed the adverse decision of the Circuit Court to the Michigan Court of Appeals; that co-operated in every respect with the housing project until the mandamus decision became final, when the City had no choice but to place the issue on the ballot as ordered by the Court or take the consequences of being held in contempt.
The only purpose in naming the City as a partner was to establish state action inasmuch as private acts of discrimination are not unconstitutional.
In holding that the referendum was motivated by racial factors, the District Court necessarily had to reach that conclusion by searching...
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