Rank v. Township of Annville

• Decision Date: 20 April 1994
• Citation: 641 A.2d 667,163 Pa.Cmwlth. 492
• Parties: , 9 IER Cases 1371 Randy L. RANK, Appellant v. The TOWNSHIP OF ANNVILLE and Annville Township Board of Directors.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 667

641 A.2d 667

163 Pa.Cmwlth. 492, 9 IER Cases 1371

Randy L. RANK, Appellant v. The TOWNSHIP OF ANNVILLE and Annville Township Board of Directors.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Feb. 25, 1994.

Decided April 20, 1994.

Daniel F. Wolfson, for appellant.

Roger T. Margolis, for appellees.

Before McGINLEY and KELLEY, JJ., and KELTON, Senior Judge.

KELTON, Senior Judge.

Randy L. Rank (Rank) appeals from the June 29, 1993 final order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County (trial court) which sustained the Township of Annville and the Annville Township Board of Directors' (Township) demurrer to Rank's amended complaint. We affirm.

The complaint states as follows: that in January of 1989, the Township hired Rank as an equipment operator; that on October 21, 1990, Rank was involved in a automobile accident; that as a result of the accident, Rank was charged with possession of controlled substances; that those charges were dismissed; and that the Township terminated Rank's employment effective January 7, 1991.

On January 7, 1993, Rank filed a praecipe for the issuance of a writ of summons. On January 28, 1993, he filed a complaint alleging that the Township wrongfully discharged him from his employment. Rank then filed an amended complaint on February 16, 1993, to which the Township filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. On June 29, 1993, the Honorable Robert J. Eby, in a well-reasoned opinion sustained the Township's preliminary objections and dismissed Rank's amended complaint. Rank appealed. Rank only raises one issue on appeal: whether his termination as an at-will public employee violated public policy and his presumption of innocence.

Our scope of review from an order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is to determine whether, on the facts alleged, the law states with certainty that no recovery is possible. Hawks by Hawks v. Livermore, 157 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 243, 246 n. 3, 629 A.2d 270, 271 n. 3 (1993). We must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and material facts averred in the complaint as well as inferences reasonably deducible therefrom and any doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling the demurrer. Id.

Rank argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his complaint based upon the Township's demurrer for failure to state a claim. He argues that he states a claim for wrongful termination based upon a public policy exception to the "at will" employment rule. In his complaint, Rank avers the following:

10. There is a long standing public policy in favor of a person charged with a criminal offense that there is a presumption of innocence until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

11. No such presumption of innocence was extended to the Plaintiff herein; rather his guilt was presumed on the basis of the charge alone.

12. Plaintiff was wrongfully discharge [sic] in violation of the aforementioned policy.

(Supp.R.R. at A-14.)

It is a well-established principle in Pennsylvania law that an "at will" employee may be terminated for good cause, bad cause or no cause at all unless that termination violates a provision of a written employment contract or statute. Hershberger v. Jersey Shore Steel Company, 394 Pa.Superior Ct. 363, 575 A.2d 944 (1990). One exception to this rule is when employment is terminated for reasons which result in violations of "significant and recognized public policies." Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corporation, 401 Pa.Superior Ct. 467, 474, 585 A.2d 1022, 1026, petition for allowance of appeal denied, 529 Pa. 623, 600 A.2d 539 (1991).

Rank contends that his employment was terminated in violation of the public policy that one is presumed innocent until proven guilty. He cites Hunter v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 277 Pa.Superior Ct. 4, 419 A.2d 631 (1980) in support of his argument. In that case, an appellant was denied public employment based on a twelve-year-old assault and battery conviction for which he had been fully pardoned.

In Hunter, the Superior Court found that the appellant had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Pennsylvania Legislature enacted a statute limiting an employer's reliance upon criminal records when making employment decisions. Denying someone public employment based upon a prior conviction for which one had been pardoned violates that statute. Further, Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania State Constitution prohibits the government from interfering in an employee's right to engage in an occupation without a reasonable relationship to a governmental objective. The employment decision directly affected Hunter's constitutional right. In Rank's case, however, his right to be presumed innocent in the face of a criminal prosecution until proven guilty in a court of law was not affected.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth the law of wrongful discharge in Geary v. United States Steel Corporation, 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974):

Absent a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary, the law has taken for granted the power of either party to terminate an employment relationship for any or no reason. This power of termination is explicitly recognized in the Restatement of Torts, § 762, Privilege of Selecting Persons for Business relations....

Id. at 171, 319 A.2d at 176 (footnote omitted).

We hold only that where the complaint itself discloses a plausible and legitimate reason for terminating an at-will employment relationship and no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby, an employee at will has no right of action against his employer for wrongful discharge.

Id. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180.

Cases involving clear public policy violations include Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir.1979) (employee terminated for...