Rankert v. Storm (In re Z.S.)
Decision Date | 27 August 2021 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-JP-02301 |
Citation | 173 N.E.3d 1074 (Table) |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Parties | IN RE the PATERNITY OF Z.S.; Ryan M. Rankert, Appellant, v. Julie D. Storm, Appellee. |
Appellant Pro Se: Ryan M. Rankert, Kokomo, Indiana
[1] In this appeal, Ryan Rankert ("Father") contends that the trial court erred in two of its orders: first, when the trial court denied Father's motion to correct error with respect to a ruling that Father's parenting time for Z.S. ("Child") should be suspended; and second, when the trial court ruled that Father had failed to rectify the behaviors resulting in the suspension and denied his petitions for a modification of parenting time. With respect to the first order, the appeal is untimely, and the issue is waived. With respect to the second, Father's arguments, such as they are, are waived for failing to be cogent and for his failure to provide citation to any authority. Waiver notwithstanding, however, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.
[2] The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it suspended Father's parenting time and denied Father's petitions to modify parenting time.
[3] Child's mother is Julie Storm ("Mother"). The record does not reveal the age of the Child, though this case began with a petition to establish paternity in May 2008. On September 17, 2018, the trial court issued an order suspending Father's parenting time and ordering him to undergo a full psychological evaluation. Child was apparently already seeing a therapist at that time, and the trial court ordered continued counseling. The trial court further ordered that Father have no contact with the Child or Child's school.
[4] Father subsequently filed a "Motion for Relief from Judgment" on November 20, 2018. On February 24, 2019, the trial court—treating it as a motion to correct error in its September 17, 2018 order—denied Father's motion. The February 24, 2019 order contained findings of fact, including an unfortunate representative sampling as follows:
Appellant's App. Vol. IV pp. 4-9.
[5] Father moved to certify the order for interlocutory appeal on March 27, 2019, which the trial court denied on April 4, 2019.4 On July 31, 2019, the trial court once again ordered Father to complete a full psychological evaluation and sign releases to have the evaluation released to the courts. A report from Hamilton Center was filed with the trial court on August 30, 2019.5 On January 11, 2020, Father filed a petition to reinstate parenting time. On May 6, 2020, before his petition had been ruled upon, Father filed a "verified petition for modification of parenting time visitation." After a series of meandering filings, many of which appeared to be focused on a change of judge, a bench trial was held before a special judge.
[6] On November 12, 2020, the trial court denied Father's petitions for modification of parenting time. The trial court found that Father "failed to provide the Court with evidence showing that he has taken the necessary steps to address the issue which gave rise to the Court's prior orders." Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 3. Father now appeals.
[7] Father purports to be appealing both the trial court's February 24, 2019 order and the trial court's November 12, 2020 order. To the extent that Father attempts to appeal the trial court's February 24, 2019 order, the issue is waived as untimely; the date for filing an appeal of that order expired well over two years ago. See Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1).
[8] As for the trial court's November 12, 2020 order, Father contends that the trial court erred in denying his petitions to modify parenting time. We note two important aspects of this appeal at the outset. First, Father proceeds pro se, and we, therefore, reiterate that "a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented." Zavodnik v. Harper , 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). "This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so." Picket Fence Prop. Co. v. Davis , 109 N.E.3d 1021, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Basic v. Amouri , 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) ), trans. denied. Although we prefer to decide cases on their merits, arguments are waived where an appellant's noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors. Id.
[9] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that the argument section of a brief We will not consider an assertion on appeal when there is no cogent argument supported by authority and there are no references to the record as required by the rules. Id. " ‘We will not become an advocate for a party or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.’ " Picket Fence , 109 N.E.3d at 1029 (quoting Basic , 58 N.E.3d at 984 ).
[10] Second, Mother did not file an appellee's brief. "[W]here, as here, the appellee [ ] do[es] not submit a brief on appeal, the appellate court need not develop an argument for the appellee[ ] but instead will ‘reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.’ " Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery , 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones , 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014) ). "Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ " Id. This less stringent standard of review "relieves [us] of the burden of controverting arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with the appellee." Jenkins v. Jenkins , 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Wright v. Wright , 782 N.E.2d 363, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ). We are obligated, however, to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required. Id. (citing Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang , 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006) ).
[11] With those oft-cited axioms in mind, we do our best to turn to Father's arguments that the trial court erred in denying his petitions to modify parenting time.
This is ultimately a decision about parenting time, which requires us to "give foremost consideration to the best interests of the child." Marlow v. Marlow , 702 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. Parenting time decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.[6 ]Id. Judgments in custody matters typically turn on the facts and will be set aside only when they are clearly erroneous. Baxendale v. Raich , 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1257 (Ind. 2008). "We will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment." Id. 1257-58.
Perkinson v. Perkinson , 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013).
[12] Father's brief is devoid of the components we usually associate with arguments: premises, conclusions, and logical relationships between the two. We are disinclined to wade into the scattered jigsaw pieces that comprise the record and attempt to make some sense of the case...
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