Rankin v. Industrial Contractors, Inc., 868A137
Decision Date | 17 April 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 868A137,868A137 |
Citation | 246 N.E.2d 410,144 Ind.App. 394 |
Parties | Timothy RANKIN, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTORS, INC., Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Sidney L. Berger, John C. Cox, Evansville, for appellant.
Robert H. Hahn, Evansville, for appellee; Bamberger, Foreman, Oswald & Hahn, Evansville, of counsel.
This is an appeal from an award of the Full Industrial Board of Indiana denying compensation to Appellant, Timothy Rankin.
Appellant filed his claim for benefits under the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act on Form No. 9, wherein he stated that on March 8, 1966, he was rendered permanently and totally disabled as a result of an accident which allegedly arose out of and in the course of his employment with Appellee. Hearing was had before a single member of the Industrial Board, who found for the Appellant and against the Appellee on his claim. Appellee appealed the award of the single member to the Full Industrial Board, and the Full Board reversed the award of the single member. It is from the award of the Full Board that this appeal is taken, Appellant assigning as error that the award of the Full Board is contrary to law.
The sole issue for determination by this court is whether there is such a showing that the award is not supported by evidence of probative value as will compel us to hold as a matter of law that the finding of the Full Board does not rest upon a foundation of fact.
The evidence discloses that Appellant was employed by Appellee as an operating engineer and as of the date in question had been operating a fork lift truck for two or three days at a specific job site. Appellant testified that the job required that he drive the truck over ruts left by delivery trucks and as a result of the occurring jolts he developed a pain his back and left leg.
Defendant's (Appellee's) Exhibit A, which is a letter written by one Dr. James C. Ploch, a chiropractor, to The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, discloses that on March 10, 1966, Appellant went to the said Dr. Ploch for treatment, complaining that his lower back was bothering him. After failing to respond to treatment, Dr. Ploch suggested hospitalization. Said exhibit also discloses that Appellant had previously on November 13, 1964, gone to Dr. Ploch for professional services for a backache, and after ten treatments was released on February 27, 1965.
Dr. William C. Fisher examined the Appellant and the essential part of his report dated May 31, 1966, is as follows:
'With respect to the question as to whether or not repeated vibrations or jolting by reason of riding a fork lift truck could cause the problem, it can only be stated that since everyday use of the spiral joints results in similar vibrations and jolting and since they can in due course result in subsequent collapse of the discs, it would not seem unreasonable that prolonged riding in said truck could result in said condition.'
Dr. William C. Fisher testified on direct examination that Appellant was referred to him for treatment in March 1966 by Dr. Henry Leibundguth and that an operation was performed on Appellant March 30, 1966, to remedy a herniated vertebral disc between the fourth and fifth lumbar vertebrae on the left side. On cross-examination Dr. Fisher testified as follows:
In an earlier case our court in Standard Cabinet Co. v. Landgrave, 76 Ind.App. 593, 596, 132 N.E. 661, 662 (1921), stated:
'It has been repeatedly held by this court that the words 'by accident arising out of and in the course of employment,' as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, should be liberally construed in harmony with the humane purposes of the act, and that the word 'accident' means an unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, not expected or designed.'
See also, Marshall v. Tribune-Star Publishing Co., Ind., 243 N.E.2d 761 (1969), for Appellate Court opinion, see Ind.App., 236 N.E.2d 508 (1968).
The decision of the Hearing Member was consistent with this broad mandate. In reversing the Hearing Member and denying an award in this case the Full Industrial Board has acted contrary to the mandate of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
We conclude that the evidence in this case was not in conflict in any real sense. It appears that this evidence, together with all reasonable inferences which could be drawn thereof, supports the conclusion that the injury to the plaintiff was in the course of his employment. In reading the Appellee's brief, it appears that the Appellee would require the claimant in a workmen's compensation case to negative the possibility of any other cause for claimant's disability. We do not think this is the law.
In the case of Steele v. Anderson Co., 126 Ind.App. 445, 451, 133 N.E.2d 896, 899 (1956), this court stated:
'We further recognize that where an accidental injury, arising out of and in the course of the employment, aggravates, accelerates or activates a pre-existing condition of or injury to an employee, the right is compensable.'
Considering the testimony of Dr. Fisher, supra, and favorable to the Appellee, one cannot escape the conclusion that there was an aggravation directly resulting from a condition of employment. While there could have been other causes for the Appellant's injuries, there is absolutely no evidence of other causes in the record of this proceeding.
In Tom Joyce 7 Up Company v. Layman, 112 Ind.App. 369, 374, 44 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (1942), this court stated:
To this same effect, see Jeffries v. Pitman-Moore Co., 83 Ind.App. 159, 147 N.E. 919 (1925).
The testimony of Dr. Fisher on cross-examination leads inescapably to the conclusion that the Appellant's back injury was causally connected with his employment. Our court has certainly rejected the concept that any external violence or would is necessary as a causative factor. See United States Steel Corp. v. Douglas, 125 Ind.App. 212, 123 N.E.2d 899 (1955).
In Stanley v. Riggs Equipment Co., Inc., 133 Ind.App. 86, 92, 178 N.E.2d 766, 769 (1961), this court stated:
'(I)t is not sufficient to merely show the employment and an injury during the period of employment, but the claimant must go further and show by evidence having probative value that the injury had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and that it flowed from that source as a rational consequence.'
It is our belief that the Appellant has done precisely what this court required in Stanley, supra.
In Bendix Products Div. v. Kolberg, 133 Ind.App. 405, 408, 172 N.E.2d 589, 591 (1961), this court stated:
'The rule is well settled in Indiana that an injury which hastens or accelerates a pre-existing disease or infirmity to the state of disablement is compensable though the employee's condition may have made him more susceptible to the injury.'
See also, Small, Workmen's Compensation Law of Indiana, § 8.41, page 216.
The Bendix case, supra, is perfectly consistent with an earlier Indiana...
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