Rankin v. Rankin
Citation | 323 So.3d 1073 |
Decision Date | 12 August 2021 |
Docket Number | NO. 2019-CT-00238-SCT,2019-CT-00238-SCT |
Parties | Kemily RANKIN v. Kelvin RANKIN |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: KIMBERLY WALKER NAILOR, Vicksburg, JAMI L. CREWS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: DAVID M. SESSUMS, Vicksburg
EN BANC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
GRIFFIS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This certiorari case considers whether the Court of Appeals’ decision is in conflict with a prior published decision of this Court. Because we find that the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts not only with a recently published decision of this Court but also with longstanding principles of appellate review, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and we reinstate and affirm the judgment of the chancery court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Kemily and Kelvin Rankin were married in July 2007 and had two children during the course of their marriage. In December 2017, Kemily filed a complaint for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences.
Rankin v. Rankin , No. 2019-CA-00238-COA, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 5905077, at *1-2 (Miss. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2020) (footnote omitted).
¶4. At the conclusion of Kemily's case-in-chief, Kelvin moved to dismiss the complaint for divorce and argued that the evidence "wholly, completely, [and] totally fail[ed] to make out a case for habitual cruel and inhuman treatment." The chancellor took that motion under advisement, as well as similar motions advanced following Kelvin's case and Kemily's rebuttal.
¶5. Later, the chancellor entered a fifteen-page memorandum opinion and final judgment that denied Kemily's complaint for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. After recounting the evidence presented at trial and the applicable legal standards for a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, including a 2017 amendment to Mississippi Code Section 93-5-1 (Rev. 2018),5 the chancellor found "that the evidence presented [wa]s insufficient to grant [Kemily] a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment." Kemily timely appealed.
¶6. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that "there was sufficient evidence to support granting the divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment" and therefore reversed the chancellor's judgment and remanded the case "for further findings in accordance with [its] opinion." Rankin , ––– So.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 5905077, at *1.
¶7. Kelvin filed a petition for writ of certiorari and argued that the Court of Appeals’ decision was (1) in direct conflict with well-established law regarding appellate review and (2) in direct conflict with a prior decision of this Court. We granted the petition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8. "When reviewing a decision of a chancellor, this Court applies a limited abuse of discretion standard of review." Mabus v. Mabus , 890 So. 2d 806, 810 (Miss. 2003) (citing McNeil v. Hester , 753 So. 2d 1057, 1063 (Miss. 2000) ). "This Court will not disturb the chancellor's opinion when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied." Holloman v. Holloman , 691 So. 2d 897, 898 (Miss. 1996) (citing Mount v. Mount , 624 So. 2d 1001, 1004 (Miss. 1993) ). "A chancellor's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo." Lowrey v. Lowrey , 25 So. 3d 274, 285 (Miss. 2009) (citing Chesney v. Chesney , 910 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Miss. 2005) ).
ANALYSIS
¶9. A divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment requires the following to be shown by a preponderance of the evidence:
[C]onduct that either (1) endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering the relationship unsafe for the party seeking relief, or (2) is so unnatural and infamous as to make the marriage revolting to the nonoffending spouse and render it impossible for that spouse to discharge the duties of marriage, thus destroying the basis for its continuance.
Wangler v. Wangler , 294 So. 3d 1138, 1143 (Miss. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Osborne v. Osborne , 202 So. 3d 639, 641 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) ). "Divorces based upon habitual cruel and inhuman treatment are necessarily fact-intensive and require a case-by-case analysis." Littlefield v. Littlefield , 282 So. 3d 820, 827 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing James Shelson, Mississippi Chancery Practice § 38.5 (2019)). "The offending spouse's conduct ... ‘must be shown to have been systematic and continuous.’ " Wangler , 294 So. 3d at 1143 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baggett v. Baggett , 246 So. 3d 887, 892 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) ). "The conduct must consist of something more than unkindness or rudeness or mere incompatibility or want of affection." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Osborne , 202 So. 3d at 641 ). Additionally, "the offended spouse must show a causal connection between the offending spouse's conduct and the impact on the offended spouse." Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Baggett , 246 So. 3d at 892 ).
¶10. The Court of Appeals found that the chancellor "erred in summarily concluding there was insufficient evidence of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment ...." Rankin , ––– So.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 5905077, at *4 (emphasis added). According to the court, "Kemily presented sufficient evidence, which if believed , established that Kelvin's behavior negatively affected her overall demeanor and caused her physical harm (e.g., migraines and elevated blood pressure)." Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at –––– n.3, 2020 WL 5905077 at *4 n.3 (emphasis added).
¶11. Kelvin asserts that the Court of Appeals’ decision "ignores clear, well-established and longstanding principles of [appellate] review and [is] in direct conflict with ... the presumption required on review." He further asserts that the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with this Court's prior decision in Wangler , 294 So. 3d 1138. We agree.
¶12. The Court of Appeals’ decision is based on the absence of an express finding by the chancellor regarding Kemily's credibility. See Rankin , ––– So.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 5905077, at *4 n.3. It is true that the chancellor did not make a specific finding...
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