Rankin v. State
| Decision Date | 03 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 47517 |
| Citation | 512 P.3d 161 |
| Parties | Steven Michael RANKIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Andrea W. Reynolds argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jeffery D. Nye, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jeffery D. Nye argued.
SUBSTITUTE OPINION THE COURT'S OPINION DATED FEBRUARY 3, 2021, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN.
Steven Michael Rankin appeals from the district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely under Idaho Code § 19-4902(a). Rankin asserts the court erroneously concluded his out-of-state incarceration did not equitably toll the statute of limitation. We affirm.
A jury convicted Rankin of numerous charges including burglary, robbery, and attempted second degree murder. The district court imposed concurrent sentences, which in combination equaled an indeterminate life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of fifteen years. State v. Rankin , Docket No. 38974, 2012 WL 9494168 (Ct. App. Jul. 18, 2012) (unpublished). Rankin appealed his sentences, and this Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and the sentences and issued a remittitur in August 2012. Id. At some point, the Idaho Department of Correction transferred Rankin to a facility in Colorado for incarceration.
While incarcerated in Colorado, Rankin filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on September 25, 2014--more than one year after the statute of limitation had expired in August 2013. Rankin's petition alleges various claims, including that the judge slept through part of the trial; a juror should have been disqualified because the juror's employer also employed the victim's son; and the jury was allowed to discuss the trial outside the courtroom. Further, the petition alleges Rankin's trial counsel was ineffective because counsel never investigated any witnesses; never investigated whether the prosecutor persuaded a victim-witness to change her story; failed to address the prosecutor's statement about Rankin's DNA, which Rankin contends was contrary to the evidence; did not cross-examine any of the State's witnesses; and refused to allow Rankin to testify.
The district court filed a notice of intent to dismiss Rankin's petition as untimely. Thereafter, the State filed a motion to dismiss Rankin's petition as barred by the statute of limitation. Rankin responded, conceding his petition was untimely, but he argued due process required the one-year statute of limitation to be equitably tolled because he was denied "access to Idaho legal materials" while in Colorado.
The district court denied the State's motion to dismiss and ordered an evidentiary hearing to address whether the statute of limitation should be equitably tolled. Rankin was the only witness who testified at the hearing. After the hearing, the court entered an order dismissing Rankin's petition as untimely under I.C. § 19-4902(a). The court ruled Rankin failed to establish a valid basis to equitably toll the statute of limitation. In support of this ruling, the court found that Rankin was imprisoned in Idaho for fourteen months before being transferred to Colorado; Rankin was transferred to Colorado sometime "subsequent to the entry" of this Court's remittitur in his direct appeal; and "the evidence does not [establish] Rankin was denied sufficient access to the courts."
Rankin timely appeals.
When reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) ; Dunlap v. State , 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) ; Russell v. State , 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Dunlap , 141 Idaho at 56, 106 P.3d at 382 ; Larkin v. State , 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). We exercise free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Baxter v. State , 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 2010). Further, our review of the district court's construction and application of the time limitation for filing a petition for post-conviction relief is a matter of free review. Kriebel v. State , 148 Idaho 188, 190, 219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009).
On appeal, Rankin challenges the district court's ruling that he failed to establish a basis to equitably toll the statute of limitation. The statute provides a petition for post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the expiration of the time for an appeal; from the determination of an appeal; or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. I.C. § 19-4902(a). The appeal referenced in the statute means the appeal in the underlying criminal case. Gonzalez v. State , 139 Idaho 384, 385, 79 P.3d 743, 744 (Ct. App. 2003). When the determination of an appeal or of a proceeding following an appeal triggers the statute of limitation, "[t]he one-year period begins to run when the appellate court issues a remittitur." Windom v. State , 162 Idaho 417, 421, 398 P.3d 150, 154 (2017). The failure to file a timely petition is a basis for dismissal of the petition. Kriebel , 148 Idaho at 190, 219 P.3d at 1206.
Equitable tolling of the statute of limitation in a post-conviction case is allowed if necessary to protect the petitioner's due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present his claims. Schultz v. State , 151 Idaho 383, 385-86, 256 P.3d 791, 793-94 (2011). "The standard for application of equitable tolling in post-conviction actions is a stringent one." Id. at 386, 256 P.3d at 794 ; see also Mahler v. State , 157 Idaho 212, 215, 335 P.3d 57, 60 (2014) (). The petitioner bears the burden of showing the circumstances warrant the tolling of the one-year statute of limitation. Kriebel , 148 Idaho at 190, 219 P.3d at 1206.
Equitable tolling is allowed if a petitioner is unable to timely file a petition for post-conviction relief due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his effective control or if some unlawful state action has hidden from the petitioner the facts underlying the claim. Schultz , 151 Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d at 794 ; see also Mahler , 157 Idaho at 215, 335 P.3d at 60 (). Idaho courts have recognized equitable tolling of the statute of limitation for filing a post-conviction petition in two circumstances: (1) where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction "without legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials"; and (2) where a mental disease or psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents him from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction. Kriebel , 148 Idaho at 190, 219 P.3d at 1206 ; Schultz , 151 Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d at 794. Equitable tolling, however, is not allowed for "a petitioner's own inaction." Schultz , 151 Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d at 794. Further, that an attorney discouraged a petitioner from seeking post-conviction relief is not a valid basis to toll the statute of limitation. Kriebel , 148 Idaho at 190, 219 P.3d at 1206.
Even when a petitioner is incarcerated out-of-state without legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials, the imposition of the statute of limitation does not necessarily violate a petitioner's due process rights. If the petitioner had adequate access to Idaho courts at some point during his incarceration before the expiration of the one-year statute of limitation, then equitable tolling may not be necessary to protect the petitioner's due process rights. The Idaho Supreme Court reached this conclusion in Evensiosky v. State , 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001). In that case, Evensiosky believed his counsel had filed a notice appealing his underlying conviction. Id . at 191, 30 P.3d at 969. Unbeknownst to Evensiosky, however, no direct appeal had been filed. Id. As a result, Evensiosky's deadline to file his petition for post-conviction relief expired on July 3, 1997. Id.
Before Evensiosky's July 3 deadline to file his petition, he learned for the first time on May 15 that his counsel had failed to file an appeal on Evensiosky's behalf. Id. Thereafter--but also before the July 3 deadline to file his petition--Evensiosky was transferred from Idaho to Louisiana for incarceration on June 26. Id. at 190, 30 P.3d at 968. On September 17, Evensiosky filed a pro se petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to file a direct appeal. Id. The district court dismissed Evensiosky's petition as untimely. Id. This Court reversed the dismissal, determining Evensiosky's out-of-state incarceration tolled the deadline to file his petition. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court granted review, disagreed with this Court's decision that equitable tolling applied, and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evensiosky's petition as untimely. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Evensiosky rejected Evensiosky's argument that his transfer to Louisiana deprived him of access to Idaho courts and prevented him from timely filing his petition. Id. at 191, 30 P.3d at 969. The Court assumed Evensiosky did not have access to the Idaho district court after his transfer to Louisiana, noted the record established he discovered his counsel had not filed a direct appeal before the one-year statute of...
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