Rankin v. Sykes

• Decision Date: 15 January 2019
• Docket Number: 1:18cv550,1:18cv353
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: NIGEL MARQUELL RANKIN, Plaintiff, v. RUFFIN SYKES, et al., Defendants.

NIGEL MARQUELL RANKIN, Plaintiff, v. RUFFIN SYKES, et al., Defendants.

1:18cv353

1:18cv550

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

January 15, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

These cases come before the Court on Plaintiff's Applications to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (the "Applications") filed in Case Numbers 1:18cv353 and 1:18cv550 (Docket Entry 1) in conjunction with his pro se Complaints (Docket Entry 2).¹ For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Plaintiff's instant Applications for the limited purpose of recommending dismissal of these actionsunder 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) as frivolous, for failing to state a claim, and as barred by various immunity doctrines.

LEGAL STANDARD

"The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892 [and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the costs." Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit." Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To address this concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that "the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

As to the first of these grounds, "a complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or infact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "The word 'frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition. . . . The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim." Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256-57 (some internal quotation marks omitted). In determining frivolousness, the Court may "apply common sense." Nasim, 64 F.3d at 954.

As to the second ground, a plaintiff "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), when the complaint does not "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). This standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. In other words, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of theelements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.²

The third ground for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) generally applies to situations in which doctrines established by the United States Constitution or at common law immunize government entities and/or government personnel from liability for damages. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (discussing eleventh-amendment immunity of states and state officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (describing interrelationship between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common-law immunity doctrines); cf. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that, even where "damages are theoretically available under [certain] statutes . . ., in some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude orseverely limit the damage remedy" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff initiated the first action against six defendants: (1) "Ruffin Sykes" ("ADA Sykes"), (2) "Martin McGhee" ("Judge McGhee"), (3) "Patrice Hennit" ("Judge Hennit"), (4) "Catherine McCormick" ("Attorney McCormick"), (5) "Valerie Thomas" ("Deputy Clerk Thomas"), and (6) "Abigail Smith" ("Deputy Clerk Smith"). (Rankin v. Sykes, No. 1:18cv353, Docket Entry 2 (the "First Complaint") at 1 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 30, 2018).) In the second action, Plaintiff again named the original six defendants and added eight other defendants: (7) "Susan Frye" ("Clerk Frye"), (8) "Kalesha Barrino" ("Bondsman Barrino"), (9) "Officer Ferguson, P.D." ("Officer Ferguson"), (10) "Forsyth County Hall of Justice" (the "Hall of Justice"), (11) "City of Winston-Salem" ("Winston-Salem"), (12) Forsyth County District Attorney's Office," (13) "The Superior Court Clerk of Courts [sic] office" (the "Clerk's Office"), and (14) "personal capacity defendants [sic] bond insurer companies" (the "Insurance Companies"). (Rankin v. Sykes, No. 1:18cv550, Docket Entry 2 (the "Second Complaint") at 1 (M.D.N.C. June 25, 2018).)³ The Second Complaint effectively incorporates theallegations of the First Complaint. (Compare Rankin, No. 1:18cv353, Docket Entry 2 at 3-14, with Rankin, No. 1:18cv550, Docket Entry 2 at 1-17.)⁴

DISCUSSION

Although often hard to understand, the Complaints' allegations apparently relate to "[e]vents, occurrences, and transactions . . . [Plaintiff] affirms took place in Forsyth County in February, March, May and June of 2018 that give rise to [Plaintiff's] cry and supplication" (Docket Entry 2 at 2); more specifically, events that occurred in Forsyth County Superior Court on February 5, 2018, and March 26, 2018, and events leading up to and including Plaintiff's subsequent "arrest[s] and detainment on March 2, 2018, and June 1,2018" (id. at 11). The Court "cannot shoulder the full burden of fashioning a viable complaint for a pro se plaintiff," Simon v. Shawnee Corr. Ctr., Civ. Action No. 13-521-GPM, 2013 WL 3463595, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 9, 2013) (unpublished), but liberal construction permits the conclusion that the Complaints seek relief, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, for Defendants' alleged conspiracy which deprived Plaintiff of certain constitutional rights. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 2 at 2, 6-12.)⁵ Even liberally construed, however, Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law.

A. Sections 241 and 242 Claims

As an initial matter, two of the statutes on which Plaintiff relies - Sections 241 and 242 - do not provide for a private cause of action. Any claims predicated on Sections 241 and 242 thus fail as a matter of law, because "[o]nly the United States as prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (the criminal analogue of 42 U.S.C. § 1983)," Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2(1st Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). See Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[D]ismissal of [plaintiff's] claims . . . alleging violations of [Section 241 and other statutes in Title 18 and Title 26 of the United States Code] was proper because these are criminal statutes that do not provide for a private right of action and are thus not enforceable through a civil action."); Tribble v. Reedy, No. 89-6781, 888 F.2d 1387 (table), 1989 126783 (4th Cir. Oct. 20, 1989) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of civil action "alleg[ing] violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1341 and 1343 . . . [because u]nless there is a clear Congressional intent to provide a civil remedy, a plaintiff cannot recover civil damages for an alleged violation of a criminal statute"). Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims to the extent they rely on those statutes.

B. Section 1983 Claim

Next, to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must assert "that [he was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law." American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).⁶ Toplead a civil conspiracy under Section 1983, Plaintiff must show that (1) Defendants acted jointly in concert, (2) to commit some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, which (3) resulted in the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996). In this regard, courts can treat a private party acting in concert with state officials in a conspiracy as acting under color of law for Section 1983 purposes — even if the state officials possess immunity. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980).

However, Plaintiff must raise his Section 1983 claims "against a 'person'" capable of committing a violation of his constitutional rights. Conley v. Ryan, 92 F. Supp. 3d 502, 519 (S.D. W. Va. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). As "Congress did not exercise its power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983," Coffin v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs., 562 F. Supp. 579, 585 (D.S.C. 1983), "a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983," Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).

Construed liberally, the Complaints allege that Defendants conspired together to deprive Plaintiff of his

Constitutional rights under United States Constitutional Amendment 14 section 1 privileges and immunities clause, the equal protection clause, the due process clause was violated such as the right to be given a specific trial date and time and assistance adequate notice, the right to have [his] appearance record[ed] like other defendant[s] who made

...