Rankins v. Carey
| Decision Date | 01 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. EDCV 00-650 RT (E).,EDCV 00-650 RT (E). |
| Citation | 141 F.Supp.2d 1231 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Randolph RANKINS, Petitioner, v. Tom CAREY, Warden Respondent. |
Randolph Rankins, Tehachapi, CA, In Pro Per.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of the State of California, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch, Deputy Attorney General, Karl T. Terp, Deputy Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondent.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
The court, Judge Robert J. Timlin, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 has read and considered petitioner Randolph Rankins ("Petitioner")'s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("§ 2254") ("Petition"), respondent Tom Carey ("Respondent")'s answer, and Petitioner's traverse. The court has also read and considered the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation ("R & R"), Respondent's Objections to the R & R, and the Supplemental Report and Recommendation ("Supplemental R & R"). Based on such consideration, the court adopts the magistrate judge's recommendation to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus. However, the court does not agree entirely with the magistrate judge's analysis and concludes as follows:
I.
Petitioner was tried and convicted of robbery in violation of Cal.Penal Code § 211 in RSC No. PEF-000564 of the Consolidated Municipal/Superior Courts of Riverside County, California ("state court"). During jury selection, the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to strike Patsean Malbrough ("Malbrough"), an African-American prospective juror. Counsel for Petitioner raised a Batson objection, contending that the prosecutor excused the prospective juror because she was African-American, the same race as the defendant.1
When a defendant raises a Batson objection, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor excused the prospective juror in question because of his or her race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721-23. If the defendant makes such a showing, the prosecutor then must offer a race neutral reason for exercising the peremptory challenge. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. If the prosecutor satisfies this burden, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving intentional discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
Although the trial court concluded that Petitioner had not made a prima facie showing of a discriminatory challenge as to Malbrough, it invited the prosecutor to state reasons for challenging her in order to create a record for appeal. The prosecutor stated he excused Malbrough because (1) and (2) "four people [including Malbrough] have not given any other information other than what's on the blue form, I have excluded all of them as well ... as I find these people aren't very forthcoming with answers." Counsel for Petitioner argued that these reasons were pretextual because there was no evidence that Malbrough was a teacher and that Malbrough was not less forthcoming than other potential jurors during voir dire, but the trial court found that the prosecutor's decision to strike Malbrough was rational and not racially motivated.
Petitioner appealed his conviction and the California Court of Appeal ("Court of Appeal") affirmed. Petitioner argued on appeal that by inviting the prosecutor to state his reasons for striking Malbrough and by finding those reasons to be rational and not racially motivated, the trial court implicitly found that Petitioner made a prima facie case. The Court of Appeal, relying on People v. Welch, 20 Cal.4th 701, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754 (1999), rejected this contention. In Welch, the California Supreme Court held that when a trial court finds no prima facie showing but nonetheless invites the prosecutor to justify the use of the peremptory challenge, there is no implied finding of a prima facie case. Id. at 746, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d at 232, 976 P.2d 754. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that Petitioner's Batson challenge failed because he did not demonstrate a prima facie case. Alternatively, it held that the prosecutor's reasons for striking Malbrough were adequate, race neutral and not discriminatory.
Petitioner filed his Petition in this court pursuant to § 2254. The Petition was assigned to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 194 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The magistrate judge concluded in his R & R that because the trial court proceeded through all the stages of the Batson analysis, the Court of Appeal should have considered moot the question whether Petitioner demonstrated a prima facie case. Addressing the merits of the Batson challenge, the magistrate judge determined that Petitioner met his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's findings that the prosecutor did not purposefully discriminate in exercising his challenge to Malbrough were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
In the R & R, the magistrate judge did not address whether the Court of Appeal's holding that the prima facie case was not moot resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).2 After reviewing the R & R, the court recommitted the matter to the magistrate judge to address this issue. In his Supplemental R & R, the magistrate judge concluded under federal law as clearly established in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995); United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), that the prima facie showing becomes moot once the prosecutor offers explanations for the peremptory challenge in question and the trial court has determined whether the challenge is motivated by intentional discrimination.
II.
To grant a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the court must find that the Court of Appeal, in affirming the trial court's decision, acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or made an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As an independent ground for upholding the trial court's denial of the Batson challenge, the Court of Appeal held that even though the record contained the prosecutor's reasons for striking Malbrough, the issue of the prima facie case was not moot and Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination.
The court's first task is to determine whether the holdings of Hernandez, Purkett, and Aikens create a body of clearly established federal law, and if so, whether the Court of Appeal's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of such law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court either (1) applies a rule of law that is contrary to the law as stated by the Supreme Court; or (2) "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519-20, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
A state court's decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law if either the state court (1) unreasonably applies the governing legal rule to the facts of the case; or (2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principal to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09, 120 S.Ct. at 1521). Although clearly established federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision," Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1523, Ninth Circuit cases are instructive in determining what law is clearly established. See Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1154.
In Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. at 1866, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that "[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot." The magistrate judge refers to Stubbs v. Gomez, 189 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir.1999), which cites Hernandez, as evidence that the Ninth Circuit considers Hernandez to be clearly established law.3 In the Ninth Circuit, plurality opinions of the Supreme Court are not binding. Jacobsen v. U.S. Postal Service, 993 F.2d 649, 655 (9th Cir. 1992). The Stubbs court was free to accept or reject the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hernandez. The fact that the Ninth Circuit in Stubbs followed Hernandez establishes only that the Ninth Circuit accepts the principle that the prima facie showing is moot when the prosecutor explains his or her decision to peremptorily challenge a prospective juror and the trial court has ruled on the question of intentional discrimination. It does not convert a non-binding Supreme Court plurality opinion into clearly established law.
The magistrate judge's reliance on Purkett is also misplaced. In Purkett,...
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