Rannells v. Gerner

• Decision Date: 31 October 1883
• Citation: Rannells v. Gerner, 80 Mo. 474 (Mo. 1883)
• Parties: RANNELLS, Appellant, v. GERNER.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

80 Mo. 474

RANNELLS, Appellant,

v.GERNER.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1883.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Appeals.

REVERSED.

Plaintiff's petition states substantially that she is the widow of Charles S. Rannells, deceased, and that during their marriage he was seized of certain real estate in the city of St. Louis, and the owner thereof in fee simple; that said real estate was conveyed to defendant's grantor in October, 1867, by the guardian of Charles S. Rannells, the said Rannells being in March, 1866, declared to be a person of unsound mind; that plaintiff never relinquished her dower in said premises, and that she has been wrongfully deprived and deforced thereof by defendant and his grantor, and prays that she may be seized of her dower and allowed $200 damages.

Defendant's answer admits the allegations of the petition, except that Charles S. Rannells was, in March, 1866, declared to be of unsound mind, and that plaintiff, as his widow, is entitled to dower in the premises in question. The remainder of the answer necessary to an understanding of the questions decided, avers in substance that Charles S. Rannells, in March, 1866, was duly found incapable of managing his own affairs, because of habitual drunkenness, that a guardian was appointed for him; that the guardian, in October, 1867, sold the premises described; that it was announced to the bidders at the sale that the same would be as effectual as if made by Charles S. Rannells, himself, and that plaintiff would join with her husband in the deed for the purpose of relinquishing her dower in the premises sold; that these announcements were made with plaintiff's knowledge and consent. That the deed was executed by the guardian of Charles S. Rannells, and by said Rannells and his wife, the plaintiff, the said Rannells having a lucid interval on that day, and that the deed was acknowledged by Charles S. Rannells and plaintiff, his wife, in the usual manner. It is further averred in the answer, that the full consideration, $1,335, was paid for said premises, and that plaintiff has had the use and benefit thereof, or a part of the same, and that it is inequitable and unjust in her to claim dower in said land, and that she ought to be held to be estopped from so doing.

Plaintiff moved in the circuit court that judgment be entered in her favor upon defendant's answer, which was done. Defendant appealed to the St. Louis court of appeals, where that judgment was reversed, and plaintiff appealed to this court.

George A. Castleman with Andrew Mackay, Jr., and Julian J. Laughlin appellant.

A femme covert can convey her estate and relinquish her inchoate right of dower only in the manner provided by statute. R. S., §§ 669, 678, 680; Hill v. West, 8 Ohio 226; Martin v. Dwelly, 6 Wend. 9. As a general rule the deed of a femme covert, unless joined by her husband, or authorized by statute, in respect to her sole property, is vo. Washb. on Real Prop., (4Ed.) 224, 248; 2 Kent's Com., 168; 2 Bla. Com., 293; Lowell v. Daniels, 2 Gray 161; Baxter v. Bodkin, 25 Ind. 172; Bressler v. Kent, 61 Ill. 426; Moore v. Tuesdale, 5 B. Mon. 356. Neither married women nor infants can estop themselves, either by covenant or by matter in pais. Bemis v. Call, 10 Allen 512; Big. on Estop., 485; Drury v. Foster, 3 Wall. 34; Morrison v. Wilson, 13 Cal. 494; Rangely v. Spring, 21 Mo. 130; Jackson v. Vanderhayden, 17 Johns. 167; Hempstead v. Eastin, 33 Mo. 142. A deed made by a person of unsound mind, who has for that reason been placed under guardianship, will be void. And the same is true of a person under guardianship for incapacity to manage his affairs, though not in fact insane, even though with the approbation of his guardian. 3 Wash. on Real Prop., 224, b. 3, chap. 4, 51, § 14, and note; Imhoff v. Butler, 31 Pa. St. 243. A femme covert is not estopped by the covenant of her deed, except so far as being executed in accordance with law, it passes her title, and she may claim a subsequently acquired title against the covenant. Jackson v. Stevens, 16 Johns. 110; Urguart v. Clarke, 2 Rand. 549; Chauvin v. Wagner, 18 Mo. 551. The alienation of real estate by the husband, whether voluntary, or by deed or will, or involuntary as by proceedings against him, or otherwise, will confer no title on the alienee as against the wife in respect to her dower. Grady v. McConkle, 57 Mo. 172. The extinguishment of the right of dower in a deed which conveys no title to lands, will not pass the right of dower as a separate substantive estate. Douglass v. McCoy, 5 Ohio 522. A wife who has released her dower in a conveyance which is afterward set aside as fraudulent as to creditors, is not thereby estopped from claiming dower as against such creditors. Lowry v. Fisher, 2 Bush. 70; Robinson v. Bates, 3 Met. 40; Maloney v. Horan, 53 Barb. 29.

Lucien Eaton with M. L. Gray and Jacob Klein for respondent.

The deed made by the guardian in conformity to aw and joined in by C. S. Rannells and plaintiff, being acknowledged in due form, released and barred plaintiff's inchoate right of dower. The husband was not insane, but incapable of managing his affairs from habitual drunkenness. His contract was not void. Darby v. Cabanne, 1 Mo. App. 126; Lewis v. Jones, 50 Barb. 670. But our statutes cover the case. 1 Wag. Stat., 715, §§ 30, 32; Ib., 54, § 13; Rannells v. Gehner, 9 Mo. App. 506; Lee v. Lindell, 22 Mo. 202. There is a complete equitable estoppel in pais. The legal effect of the answer is to charge plaintiff with claiming dower in the face of her own fraud. Coverture is not a weapon for fraud in intent or result; it is only a shield for the protection of the weak. 1 Story's Eq., § 385; Big. on Estop., 488, and cases cited; Cord on Mar. Wom., § 24; Savage v. Foster, 9 Modern 35; Beckett v. Cordley, 1 Brown Ch. 357; Schwartz v. Sanders, 46 Ill. 18; Wright v. Arnold, 14 B. Mon. 638; Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 390; Malony v. Horan, 53 Barb. 29, 40; Dann v. Cudney, 13 Mich. 239; Bien v. Heath, 6 How. (U. S.) 238, 248. The rule applied to infants should be applied to married women. Let them at least refund their ill-gotten gains. Kerr v. Bell, 44 Mo. 120; Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo. 82; Sweany v. Mallory, 62 Mo. 485. A married woman's covenants so far estop her that she cannot assert claims that repudiate those covenants. Hill v. West, 8 Ohio 222; Collard v. Swan, 7 Mass. 291; Massie v. Sebastian, 4 Bibb 433; Connolly v. Branstler, 3 Ky. 702; McCullough v. Wilson, 21 Pa. St. 436; Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382.

SHERWOOD, J.

The deed of a non-sane person, after being placed under guardianship, will be absolutely void. Tiedman Real Prop., § 792; Wait v. Maxwell, 5 Pick. 217; Pearl v. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh 658; Griswold v. Butler, 3 Conn. 227; Martindale Law Convey., §§ 26, 311; White v. Palmer, 4 Mass 147; Ingraham v. Baldwin, 9 N. Y. 45; Wilcox v. Fitzhugh, 12 Barb. 235. And guardianship is conclusive respecting the disability of the ward. Wadsworthv. Sherman, 14 Barb. 169; Leonard v. Leonard, 14 Pick. 280; White v. Palmer, supra; McDonald v. Morton, 1 Mass. 543. And the same rule holds whether the person placed in the care of a guardian is insane or not. It is sufficient that the inquisition finds him to be of unsound mind and incapable of managing his own affairs, in consequence of habitual drunkenness. 14 Barb., supra. Although neither an idiot nor a lunatic, the person in ward is dealt with as if of that character, whether his incapacity result from old age, sickness or other cause whatever. The putting him in the control of a guardian, is in the nature of a commission on the writ of de lunatico inquirendo. Barker's case, 2 Johns. Ch. 232; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 273; Ridgeway v. Darwin, 8 Ves. 65; Ex parte Cranmer, 12 Ves. 445; Imhoff v. Witmer, 31 Pa. St. 243; 3 Washb. Real Prop., 248. And the assent of the guardian of such incapacitated person to the latter's deed, confers on that instrument no element of validity. Griswold v. Butler, 3 Conn. 231.

In the case at bar no distinction is to be taken between the circumstances which gave origin to Rannells, the husband, being placed under guardianship, and those of an ordinary inquisition of lunacy. The authorities cited and our statutes recognize no difference between a person incapacitated on account of habitual drunkenness, and incapacitated from anv other cause. 1 Wag. Stat., pp. 712, 718, §§ 1, 52.

In Imhoff v. Witmer, supra, where the obligor of the bond in suit had been found and decreed an habitual drunkard, five years prior to the execution of such bond, and a committee appointed to take charge of his estate, the supreme court of Pennsylvania say: “The object of the statute was protection and guardianship over the persons and estates of parties wanting capacity to take proper care of either, and to preserve the property of such from being squandered, or imprudently used to their own injury and that of their families, if they have any. It is not necessary to adduce reasons to prove the self-evident proposition, that to admit the capacity of control to exist in the lunatic or habitual drunkard over his estate, after inquisition settling his condition in this respect, or submit it to be controverted by evidence of lucid intervals or sobriety at the moment of contracting, would leave the estates of these unfortunate classes about as much exposed as before proceedings had in regard to them. The inquisition and decree standing of record, was intended for notice to all the world of the incapacity of the particular party to contract. It is the judgment of the law to this effect, and as a consequence, his acts in regard to his property are absolutely void while the condition exists. He can make no contract that will bind or render it liable to take effect, either in his lifetime or after death, for the reason that the law has settled that the important element of a valid contract does not exist, namely, the capacity to contract.”

The statute to which...