Ransmeier v. Mariani
| Decision Date | 15 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 11–175–cv, 11–640–cv. |
| Citation | 718 F.3d 64 |
| Parties | John C. RANSMEIER, administrator of the Estate of Louis Neil Mariani, deceased, Plaintiff–Appellee, and Colgan Air Inc., a Virginia corporation, U.S. Airways, Inc., a Delaware corporation, L 3 Communications Corporation Security and Detection Systems, a Delaware corporation, L 3 Communications Corporation, a Delaware corporation, L 3 Communications Holdings, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Invision Technologies, Inc., state of incorporation unknown, Quantum Magnetics, Inc., state of incorporation unknown, Heimann Systems Corp., state of incorporation unknown, Air France, a French corporation, Delta Airlines, a corporation, Swiss, a Swiss corporation, Air Jamaica, a Jamaican corporation, Cape Air, Air Transport Association, a trade organization, Defendants, UAL Corporation, an Illinois corporation, United Airlines, Inc., an Illinois corporation, Huntleigh USA Corporation, a Missouri corporation, ICTS International NV, a Netherlands Business Entity of unknown form, Global Aviation Services, a Delaware Corporation, Burns International Security Services Corp., a Delaware corporation, Securitas AB, a Swedish business entity of unknown form, Massachusetts Port Authority, a government entity, The Boeing Company, an Illinois Corporation, Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., a Wisconsin Corporation, Continental Airlines, Inc., a corporation, Does, 1 through 100, inclusive, Midwest Airlines, Inc., Defendants–Appellees, v. Ellen MARIANI, Proposed Intervenor, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bruce Leichty, Clovis, CA, for Appellant.
Peter G. Beeson, Devine Millimet & Branch, Professional Association, Concord, New Hampshire, and Charles R. Capace, Zimble & Brettler, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Jeffrey J. Ellis, Quirk and Bakalor, P.C., New York, NY, and Michael R. Feagley, Mayer Brown, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.
Before HALL, CARNEY, Circuit Judges.1
On June 26, 2012, this panel issued a summary order (1) affirming the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Hellerstein, J.) denying Appellant's renewed motion to intervene, and (2) ordering Appellant and her attorney to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for their conduct before this Court. See Ransmeier v. Mariani, 486 Fed.Appx. 890, 893–94 (2d Cir.2012) (summary order). We have now reviewed their submissions, as well as the totality of their behavior in this case, in particular with respect to their Motion to Supplement the Record (the “Motion”). For the reasons set forth below, we invoke the inherent power of this Court and impose sanctions in the form of double costs jointly and severally on Appellant Ellen Mariani and her counsel, Bruce Leichty.
This case's lengthy procedural history is set out in detail in two prior decisions of this Court. See generally Ransmeier v. Mariani, 486 Fed.Appx. 890;N.S. Windows, LLC v. Minoru Yamasaki Assocs., Inc., 351 Fed.Appx. 461 (2d Cir.2009) (summary order) (“N.S.Windows ”).
Briefly, Ellen Mariani is the widow of Louis Mariani, who died in one of the planes involved in the tragic September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. See N.S. Windows, 351 Fed.Appx. at 465. Mariani and her step-daughter, Lauren Peters, both filed related wrongful death suits against various airlines and other parties in the Southern District of New York. Id. In 2004, Mariani and Peters entered into an agreement in New Hampshire probate court, pursuant to which Mariani resigned as administrator of her late husband's estate, and a neutral administrator was appointed to replace Mariani. The administrator was “to act to dismiss with prejudice” Mariani's suit and pursue only the step-daughter's suit (“the Peters suit”). Id.
After entering into that agreement, Mariani apparently had second thoughts. Starting in 2005, she has repeatedly attempted to intervene in the Peters suit, arguing primarily that her probate court agreement did not divest her of what she calls her “independent loss of consortium claim.” Mariani Br. at 4. In each of these proceedings, our Court and the district court concluded that “Mariani's probate court agreement with Peters demonstrated [Mariani's] clear intention and commitment to abandon all her claims, including her loss of consortium claims.” Ransmeier, 486 Fed.Appx. at 892 (emphasis added).
In deciding Mariani's second appeal, we became deeply concerned by two aspects of the case as framed by Mariani's counsel Bruce Leichty. First was its apparent frivolousness. In N.S. Windows we had affirmed the district court's holding that, by virtue of her agreement with Peters, Mariani had no legal status in the federal action and that any arguments she cared to make regarding her individual loss of consortium claim were properly addressed only to the New Hampshire probate court. N.S. Windows, 351 Fed.Appx. at 466–67. In appealing once again to this Court, Mariani persisted in making arguments that we had clearly rejected, and others that were irrelevant.
Our other concern with Mariani's second appeal was the disturbing manner in which she and her counsel prosecuted it. We noted, in particular, the “discreditable tone” of her filings. Ransmeier, 486 Fed.Appx. at 893. We also wrote that her briefs featured “an escalating series of ad hominem attacks on opposing counsel and bombastic challenges to the integrity of the district court,” id., which culminated with the particularly offensive Motion to Supplement the Record to introduce “newly-discovered evidence” of the district court's alleged partiality. Id. This purported “evidence” consisted of little more than a series of offensive insinuations, unmistakably anti-Semitic, about Judge Hellerstein, his family members, their professional work and some of their personal charitable activities.
We therefore ordered Mariani and her counsel to show cause why they should not be sanctioned in the amount of double costs.
Our authority to impose sanctions is grounded, first and foremost, in our inherent power to control the proceedings that take place before this Court. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–44, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). “These powers are governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Thus a federal court—any federal court—may exercise its inherent power to sanction a party or an attorney who has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46, 111 S.Ct. 2123. We may impose sanctions nostra sponte. Id. at 42 n. 8, 111 S.Ct. 2123;see also Gallop v. Cheney (Gallop I), 642 F.3d 364, 370 (2d Cir.2011).
Beyond our inherent power, two additional sources provide authority to impose sanctions. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “[a]ny attorney ... who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” Further, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides that, after providing notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, a court of appeals may “award just damages and single or double costs” if it determines that an appeal is frivolous. Both of these rules, however, are supplementary. Neither “displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for [litigants'] bad-faith conduct.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47, 111 S.Ct. 2123.
Although perhaps the most common reason for a sanctions award may be the “patently frivolous” nature of an appeal, see, e.g., Gallop I, 642 F.3d at 370, we also impose sanctions where the conduct of the sanctioned litigant or attorney evinces bad faith or an egregious disrespect for the Court or judicial process. We recently sanctioned attorneys who “repeatedly and in bad faith accused the Court of bias, malice, and general impropriety.” Gallop v. Cheney (Gallop III), 660 F.3d 580, 584 (2d Cir.2011) (per curiam), vacated in part on other grounds, Gallop v. Cheney (Gallop IV), 667 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir.2011). In Gallop III, we imposed sanctions on an attorney who had demanded the recusal of the panel and “any other members of [our Court] who share their feelings,” noting in Gallop II that the attorney's actions appeared “malicious” and “intended, in bad faith, to use his position as an attorney of record to harass and disparage the Court.” Gallop v. Cheney (Gallop II), 645 F.3d 519, 521 (2d Cir.2011) (); see also Gallop III, 660 F.3d at 586 (imposing sanctions).
These two justifications for imposing sanctions—patently frivolous legal argument and egregious conduct—may emerge in the same case. We are especially likely to impose sanctions on an attorney for offensive conduct where such conduct suggests that the attorney allowed antagonism toward the Court to “undermine his legal judgment and interfere with his duty to provide thoughtful and reasoned advice to his client.” Gallop III, 660 F.3d at 585. Indeed, an appeal or motion is more likely frivolous where it is motivated by bad faith or an attorney's desire to “air personal grievances against the Court” as opposed to a sincere belief that the particular motion or appeal will be successful. Id. Frivolous appeals and motions of this sort waste judicial resources and undermine the integrity of the judicial process.
It is well settled that an attorney's conduct on appeal as well as the arguments he makes may expose him to sanctions both under our inherent power and under the proscriptions of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. See Gallop I, 642 F.3d at 370. We therefore begin with...
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