Ransom v. Melegi
Decision Date | 30 July 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 1,Docket No. 5404,1 |
Citation | 171 N.W.2d 482,18 Mich.App. 476 |
Parties | Paul A. RANSOM, a minor by his next friend, Paul E. Ransom, and Paul E. Ransom, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John MELEGI and Leola Melegi, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Earl T. Prosser, Detroit, for appellants.
George F. Clark, Detroit, for appellee.
Before FITZGERALD, P.J., and BURNS and LEVIN, JJ.
The plaintiff was 12 years old when a collision with the defendant's car which resulted in his injuries occurred at the intersection of Southfield and Austin in the City of Lincoln Park, Michigan.
There is a dispute as to how the accident happened. Plaintiff claims to have been standing alongside his bicycle in the left turn lane waiting to cross the remainder of the street. The defendant claims the plaintiff rode out in front of him from the side street.
The plaintiff contends that the trial judge committed reversible error by refusing to give an instruction that a 12-year-old plaintiff's standard of care is to be measured by the standard of care of an ordinary child of similar age, experience, judgment, and physical and mental development.
It first must be noted that, contrary to defendant-appellee's contention, the charge as to standard of care given by the trial judge was objected to by plaintiff's counsel in a proper and timely manner. GCR 1963, 516.2; 6 Callaghan, Michigan Pleading & Practice (2d Ed.), § 38.133. Therefore, the objection was preserved on the record and is properly before this Court.
The trial court in instructing the jury as to the definition of negligence said:
The court further instructed the jury as to the meaning of contributory negligence saying:
Based on the above charge, it is defendant-appellee's position that since the jury were told that they were to determine the standard of care, and that the jury both saw and heard the child and his testimony, that they necessarily took into account the minor plaintiff's age, experience, judgment, physical and mental development. The trial judge took the same approach in his opinion after hearing argument for a motion for a new trial.
The plaintiff contends that he was entitled to the Child Standard of Care Instruction. We agree.
For as we said in DeNoyer v. City of Ann Arbor (1967), 9 Mich.App. 26, 29, 155 N.W.2d 689, 690:
When the plaintiff is an infant, the Child Standard of Care Instruction must be given. Harris v. Crawley (1912), 170 Mich. 381, 136 N.W. 356; Denman v. Youngblood, Supra, and cases cited therein; DeNoyer v. City of Ann Arbor, Supra.
We further find that the statute commonly referred to as the Bicycle Act, M.C.L.A....
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... ... Tamborini, 68 Ill.App.2d 190, 215 N.E.2d 303 (App.Ct.1966); Bixenman v. Hall, 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837 (1968); Ranson v. Melegi, 18 Mich.App. 476, 171 N.W.2d 482 (Ct.App.1969); 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, § 16.8 at 927 (1956); but see Neumann v. Shlansky, 58 Misc.2d ... ...
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Schomp v. Wilkens by Leen
...while a bicycle "poses no threat of serious injury to anyone except the child himself." Id. Similarly, in Ransom v. Melegi, 18 Mich App. 476, 171 N.W.2d 482 (Ct.App.1969), the issue was the standard of care governing the behavior of a 12 year old bicyclist who was struck by defendant's car.......