Ransom v. State

• Docket Number: 22A-CR-3019
• Decision Date: 03 August 2023
• Parties: Richard Ransom, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

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Richard Ransom, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 22A-CR-3019

Court of Appeals of Indiana

August 3, 2023

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

Appeal from the Lake Superior Court The Honorable Gina Jones, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 45G03-2104-F4-75

Attorney for Appellant Maryam Afshar-Stewart Maryrachel Durso Stracci Law Group, P.C. Crown Point, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ellen H. Meilaender Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

KENWORTHY, JUDGE

Case Summary

[¶1] A juvenile court waived its jurisdiction over Richard Ransom-who, at that point, was twenty years old-for alleged delinquent conduct committed when Ransom was under the age of eighteen. The State brought criminal charges, which Ransom moved to dismiss, and the criminal court denied Ransom's motion. Ransom now brings this interlocutory appeal, alleging the criminal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because of procedural defects in (1) the juvenile court's recordkeeping associated with waiver, (2) the State's initiation of the criminal cause, and (3) the criminal court's acceptance of jurisdiction. Concluding the criminal court has subject-matter jurisdiction, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2] Ransom was born on April 18, 2000. When Ransom was twenty years old, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging Ransom committed delinquent acts "[b]etween January 1 2015[,] and April 18, 2018," when Ransom was over the age of fourteen and not yet eighteen years old. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 117. If committed by an adult, the alleged conduct would constitute Level 4 felony child molesting^[1] and Level 6 felony sexual battery.^[2] The State initiated the delinquency proceedings in the juvenile division of the Lake Superior Court.

[¶3] In March 2021, the State asked the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction, so the State could bring criminal charges against Ransom. The juvenile court held a hearing, and on April 16, 2021-two days before Ransom's twenty-first birthday-the juvenile court entered an order waiving its jurisdiction. In the written order, the court found probable cause to support the allegations. The court also found the alleged acts were "of a heinous or aggravated nature[.]" Id. at 104. In considering whether to waive its jurisdiction, the juvenile court referred to time-related constraints in the case at hand, in that a juvenile court lacks the statutory authority to offer rehabilitative services to individuals once they turn twenty-one years old. Pointing out Ransom was nearly twenty-one years old, the juvenile court ultimately decided to waive its jurisdiction, finding there was no available dispositional alternative "reasonably calculated to effect rehabilitation" of Ransom while ensuring the safety of the public. Id.

[¶4] On April 20, 2021-at which point Ransom was twenty-one-the State filed criminal charges. Ransom sought a discretionary interlocutory appeal of the waiver order, but this Court declined to accept jurisdiction over the appeal.

[¶5] In the criminal court, Ransom moved to dismiss the charges, alleging procedural irregularities resulted in a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The criminal court denied the motion to dismiss. Ransom then perfected this discretionary interlocutory appeal pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B).

Discussion and Decision

[¶6] Ransom re-asserts two grounds raised in his motion to dismiss, focusing on whether the criminal court was deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction due to (1) purportedly deficient recordkeeping at the juvenile court (a claim premised on a list of waiver-related documents identified in a 1975 appellate case) and (2) the State's alleged failure to file the waiver order when the State initiated criminal charges. Ransom also asserts a new ground, which is that the criminal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because it did not properly accept jurisdiction.

[¶7] Subject-matter jurisdiction "refers to a court's constitutional or statutory power to hear and adjudicate a certain type of case." D.P. v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1210, 1213 (Ind. 2020). Whenever a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, "any judgment it enters is void." Id. In criminal proceedings, "[a] motion to dismiss based upon lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be made at any time." I.C. § 35-34-1-4(b). Moreover, in general, "[l]ack of subject[-]matter jurisdiction may be raised as reversible error for the first time on appeal." Short v. State, 443 N.E.2d 298, 309 (Ind. 1982); see also, e.g., State ex rel. Young v. Noble Cir. Ct., 332 N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ind. 1975) ("Such awesome power may not be conferred by mere consent of the parties[.]").^[3] When pertinent facts are not in dispute, whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. D.P., 151 N.E.3d at 1213. To resolve jurisdictional questions, we at times engage in statutory interpretation. See, e.g., id. at 1217. The proper interpretation of a statute is also a question of law we review de novo. Id. at 1213.

Statutory Background

[¶8] The Indiana General Assembly "has enacted an extensive statutory framework in Indiana Code [C]hapter 31-30-3 pursuant to which cases involving delinquent acts may be waived into adult court to be tried as criminal cases." Kedrowitz v. State, 199 N.E.3d 386, 404 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022), trans. denied. With few exceptions, a juvenile court has "exclusive original jurisdiction" when the State alleges a person committed a delinquent act. I.C. § 31-30-1-1(a). A delinquent act is an act (1) committed while a person was under the age of eighteen (2) that would have been a crime if committed by an adult. I.C. §§ 3137-1-1-2. Our legislature has authorized juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction in certain scenarios. See I.C. §§ 31-30-3-2-6. When the juvenile court waives its exclusive original jurisdiction, the court "waives the case to a court that would have jurisdiction had the act been committed by an adult." I.C. § 31-30-3-1.

[¶9] Of course, to waive jurisdiction, the court must have "jurisdiction over the alleged conduct in the first place." State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152, 157 (Ind. 2022). And a juvenile court has jurisdiction only when the accused is a "child"-i.e., a person under the age of twenty-one. See I.C. § 31-9-2-13(d); D.P., 151 N.E.3d at 1216. Thus, when a juvenile court attempts to waive its jurisdiction, the order on waiver will be effective-if at all-only if issued before the accused turns twenty-one years old. See id.; cf. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d at 157 (identifying a "jurisdictional gap" where the accused was "older than twenty-one" and the allegations arose from conduct "before turning eighteen").

1. Validity of the Waiver Order

[¶10] Where-as here-the legislature has given a juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction, a criminal court does not assume jurisdiction until the juvenile court waives jurisdiction. See, e.g., Neukam, 189 N.E.3d at 157 (discussing the interplay between the juvenile code and the criminal code, noting "[t]he effect of . . . waiver is a criminal court may then exercise its own jurisdiction").

[¶11] Before the State filed charges in this case, the juvenile court entered a waiver order consistent with Indiana Code Section 31-30-3-2. This statute provides:

Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after full investigation and hearing, the juvenile court may waive jurisdiction if it finds that:

(1) the child is charged with an act that is a felony:

(A) that is heinous or aggravated, with greater weight given to acts against the person than to acts against property; or

(B) that is a part of a repetitive pattern of delinquent acts, even though less serious; (2) the child was at least fourteen (14) years of age when the act charged was allegedly committed;

(3) there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act;

(4) the child is beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile justice system; and

(5) it is in the best interests of the safety and welfare of the community that the child stand trial as an adult.

I.C. § 31-30-3-2.

[¶12] In asserting the criminal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the allegations, Ransom argues the juvenile court never entered a valid waiver order. In so arguing Ransom does not allege the juvenile court failed to comply with the foregoing waiver statute or that Ransom-twenty years old at the time of waiver-was not subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Rather, Ransom directs us to Seay v. State, 337 N.E.2d 489 (Ind.Ct.App. 1975). Ransom argues Seay contains a list of documents that "must be included in the record of the juvenile waiver proceeding for the criminal court to properly acquire jurisdiction[]" Appellant's Br. at 24-25 (citing Seay, 337 N.E.2d at 498). He asserts Seay "has not been overturned" and remains good law. Id. at 25. He further asserts that, without "[s]trict adherence" to Seay, there is "[a]n improper waiver of jurisdiction . . . void[ing] any subsequent criminal action." Id. [¶13] As the State points out, our juvenile code has changed since Seay was decided in 1975. For example, Ransom's list of purportedly necessary documents includes an order of the juvenile court directing the probation officer to file a delinquency petition. But, as the code stands today, the juvenile court does not direct a probation officer to file a delinquency petition. See I.C. § 31-37-10-1. Instead, the applicable statute-titled "Standing"-identifies only "[t]he...