Ranta v. Rake

• Decision Date: 21 December 1966
• Docket Number: No. 9796,9796
• Citation: 91 Idaho 376,421 P.2d 747
• Parties: Werner Edward RANTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clarence C. RAKE and Janet F. Rake, his wife, and Charles Rake, a minor, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 747

421 P.2d 747

91 Idaho 376

Werner Edward RANTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clarence C. RAKE and Janet F. Rake, his wife, and Charles Rake, a minor, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 9796.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Dec. 21, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 16, 1967.

Rapaich & Knutson, Lewiston, for appellant.

Clements & Clements, Lewiston, for respondents.

SPEAR, Justice.

This appeal presents the issue whether an honest release, irrespective of its terms, may be avoided where it later appears that unknown injuries existed at the time it was executed.

On April 8, 1962, appellant (Werner Edward Ranta) sustained injuries in an automobile accident for which he seeks damages against Charles Rake, a minor, the driver of the other car, and his parents, Charles C. and Janet F. Rake. The accident occurred at an intersection in the Lewiston Orchards, near the City of Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. Both Ranta and his wife, Eva Jean Ranta, were, as a result of the accident, taken to the hospital in Lewiston for treatment. Mrs. Ranta sustained a cut on her right knee and was otherwise bruised and shaken up. The record discloses that when appellant was admitted to the emergency room at the hospital he was suffering from a contusion of the left eye, a laceration of the left check, a laceration under the left arm and a back injury. The injuries however seemingly were only minor in nature and within a few days following the accident Ranta returned to work.

Dr. John E. Carssow, the Ranta family physician for more than fifteen years, treated appellant at the hospital and for a month following the accident at his office in Lewiston. The doctor X-rayed and otherwise treated the back injury which appellant had sustained but was unable to diagnose the injury as anything more serious than a lumbar strain or pulled muscle.

Charles P. Burch, an independent adjuster representing respondents' insurance carrier, visited the Ranta home within two or three days after the accident and secured from each a written statement which detailed the facts of the collision as known by them and the nature of the injuries each had sustained. There was no discussion of a settlement at this time. The parties intended to ascertain the full extent of the injuries sustained by appellant and his wife before attempting to settle. Subsequently appellant told his physician that he had been contacted by an insurance adjuster and that he was going to sign a release based on the results of the doctor's diagnosis. Dr. Carssow told appellant it was his opinion that appellant would 'probably get better' and that he expected him to 'get better.' Appellant, in fact, continued to show improvement. One month after the accident, on May 8, 1962, appellant and Mrs. Ranta, at their request, again met with Mr. Burch at their home. They now agreed to settle and compromise, for $1,114.50, any claim they had against Charles Rake, or his parents as owners of the car their son was driving, arising out of the accident. The couple executed a general release, and the consideration set forth in the release subsequently was paid to them, and a receipt therefor given by them. The payment of $1,114.50 was apportioned to appellant's car damage in the amount of $285.00, to Mrs. Ranta's general and special damages of $223.00, and the balance to appellant's general and special damages. The figures used to arrive at the amount of the settlement were submitted by appellant and his wife and were agreed to as such by Charles Burch, the adjuster. The release, a form instrument, is broadly worded and is a release for all known and unknown injuries which may have resulted from the accident of April 8th. Its terms are as follows:

'RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS

'KNOWN ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

'That the undersigned, being of lawful age, for the sole consideration of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN AND 50/100 .......... DOLLARS ($1,114.50) to the undersigned in hand paid, receipt whereof is thereby acknowledged, do/does hereby and for my/our/its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns release, acquit and forever discharge Charles E. Rake and Clarence Rake and his, her, their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators and all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or partnerships of and from any and all claims actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service, expenses and compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property damage and the consequences thereof resulting or to result from the accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the 8th day of April, 1962, at or near Lewiston, Idaho.

'It is understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that the payment made is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the party or parties hereby released, and that said releasees deny liability therefor and intend merely to avoid litigation and buy their peace.

'The undersigned hereby declare(s) and represent(s) that the injuries sustained are or may be permanent and progressive and that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making this Release it is understood and agreed, that the undersigned rely(ies) wholly upon the undersigned's judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent, affect and duration of said injuries and liability therefor and is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of the party or parties hereby released or their representatives or by any physician or surgeon by them employed.

'The undersigned further declare(s) and represent(s) that no promise, inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been made to the undersigned, and that this Release contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and that the terms of this Release are contractual and not a mere recital.

'THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT.

'Signed, sealed and delivered this 8th day of May, 1962.

CAUTION: READ BEFORE SIGNING BELOW'

Appellant had been in constant touch with his physician prior to the execution of the release and had been informed the injuries which he had received were relatively minor. However, on June 15th, more than a month following the execution of the release, appellant experienced severe pain in the area of his left hip, which radiated down his left leg. He secured treatment from two doctors in Lewiston, and one in Spokane, Washington. Dr. Colburn concluded appellant was suffering from an intervertebral herniated disc, which he removed by surgery on September 2, 1962. It was Dr. Colburn's opinion that the immediate and initiating cause of the herniated disc was the car accident of April 8th. Appellant had experienced low back pain and trouble while in high school particularly in the year 1948 or 1949 and had some disc pathology prior to April 8, 1962, but Dr. Colburn concluded the accident of that day aggravated or triggered the pain which appellant experienced on or about June 15th, and which resulted in the subsequent surgical procedure.

On December 19, 1963, appellant filed an action against respondents, in which he alleged that the respondent Charles Rake was negligent in operating the automobile owned by his parents and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident of April 8, 1962, which resulted in the injuries he sustained. Respondents entered the affirmative defense that appellant had executed a general release which barred further recovery and precluded the action against respondents. The matter, in accord with the stipulation of the parties, was tried on the sole issue of respondents' affirmative defense. The trial court specifically found that the appellant intended in executing the release to effect a complete release as to any condition in his back which existed at or prior to the execution of the release and as to any subsequent development of that condition. The court further found that appellant had released respondents from any and all causes of action he had against them on or prior to May 8, 1962, or any subsequent development known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated. From these findings the trial court concluded that at the time of the release, appellant understood the entire terms, covenants and conditions of the release, and that any mistake as to appellant's condition or health was a unilateral mistake and not a mutual mistake as between appellant and his releasees. The court further concluded that the release was binding and valid and afforded respondents a complete defense to the action. Judgment was entered thereupon for the respondents dismissing the action with prejudice. From this judgment this appeal was taken.

The judgment must be reversed.

There is an irreconcilable split of authority on this question in the opinions of sister states which have had the occasion to rule thereon. The minority view is aptly expressed in Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Oregon, 229 Or. 360, 366 P.2d 527 (1961). After recognizing the existence of the majority rule and the reasons ordinarily given to substantiate it, the Oregon court rejected the rule and, in part, stated:

'Heretofore this court has considered the settlement of claims prior to litigation to be in the publie interest. In the redress of wrongs between motorists, we follow adversary procedure in court when settlement is not otherwise made. There is no reason in principle why an improvident settlement made before trial is any more to be set aside than a judgment rendered upon a verdict that hindsight later proves to have been obtained too soon and for too little. No one has suggested that judgments in personal injury cases should be kept open like claims under the Workmen's...