Raper v. State of Iowa, Civil No. 4-94-CV-10237.

• Decision Date: 21 June 1996
• Docket Number: Civil No. 4-95-CV-10913.,Civil No. 4-94-CV-10487.,Civil No. 4-94-CV-10237.,Civil No. 4-96-CV-10123.
• Citation: 940 F.Supp. 1421
• Parties: Clifford Daniel RAPER, and All Other Similarly Situated Employees, Plaintiffs, v. The STATE OF IOWA and the Iowa Department of Public Safety, Defendants. John M. VARNUM, Larry W. Pottridge, and All Other Similarly Situated Employees, Plaintiffs, v. The STATE OF IOWA and Iowa Department of Transportation, Defendants. Clinton PHILLIPS, Kurt Gunther, Larry Farrington, Steve Faber, Richard Rewis, and All Other Similarly Situated Employees, Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and the State of Iowa, Defendants. Duane KENNEDY, and All Other Similarly Situated Employees, Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES and the State of Iowa, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Page 1421

940 F.Supp. 1421

Clifford Daniel RAPER, and All Other Similarly Situated Employees, Plaintiffs, v. The STATE OF IOWA and the Iowa Department of Public Safety, Defendants.

John M. VARNUM, Larry W. Pottridge, and All Other Similarly Situated Employees, Plaintiffs, v. The STATE OF IOWA and Iowa Department of Transportation, Defendants.

Clinton PHILLIPS, Kurt Gunther, Larry Farrington, Steve Faber, Richard Rewis, and All Other Similarly Situated Employees, Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and the State of Iowa, Defendants.

Duane KENNEDY, and All Other Similarly Situated Employees, Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES and the State of Iowa, Defendants.

Civil No. 4-94-CV-10237.

Civil No. 4-94-CV-10487.

Civil No. 4-95-CV-10913.

Civil No. 4-96-CV-10123.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa Central Division.

June 21, 1996.

Pamela J. Prager, Finley, Alt, Smith, Scharnberg, May & Craig, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs.

Jeffrey D. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.

LONGSTAFF, District Judge.

The Court has before it defendants' motions for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss. Specifically, the defendants in Kennedy v. Department of Natural Resources, 4-94-CV-10123 ("Kennedy"), moved for summary judgment on April 19, 1996; the defendants in Raper v. State, 4-94-CV-10237 ("Raper"), moved for summary judgment on April 26, 1996; the defendants in Phillips v. Department of Corrections, 4-95-CV-10913 ("Phillips"), joined in the above motions for summary judgment on May 23, 1996; and the defendants in Varnum v. State, 4-94-CV-10487 ("Varnum"), filed a motion to dismiss on May 24, 1996. All of the above motions are based on the United States Supreme Court's recent ruling in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) ("Seminole").

On May 15, 1996, this Court granted plaintiff's motion to temporarily consolidate the four cases for the purpose of ruling on the above motions. Plaintiff filed a joint resistance to the motions on May 20, 1996,¹ and defendants filed a reply brief June 11, 1996. A hearing was held before the Court June 19, 1996. The motions are now fully submitted.

I. BACKGROUND

The above cases were filed by supervisory employees of four Iowa State departments or agencies: Iowa Department of Public Safety (Raper); the Department of Transportation (Varnum); the Department of Corrections (Phillips); and the Department of Natural Resources (Kennedy). Plaintiffs in each case seek overtime compensation they allege is owed to them pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Generally, the FLSA requires employers to pay overtime compensation to employees for a working week of longer than forty hours. 29 U.S.C. § 207. However, "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative or professional capacity" is exempt from the overtime pay provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Congress has given the Secretary of the Department of Labor the authority to promulgate rules defining executive, administrative or professional employees. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The Secretary of Labor has established regulations which provide a "salary test" and "duties test" for determining whether an employee is an executive, administrative or professional employee and therefore, exempt under the statute. The exemption is applicable if the employee meets both the "duties" and "salary" requirements set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(1)-(f).² On October 28, 1995, this Court held the salary test is valid with respect to public employees.

On March 27, 1996, however, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Seminole. The Supreme Court held that the Indian Commerce Clause — which it found indistinguishable from the Interstate Commerce Clause for purposes of the issue at bar — does not grant Congress the authority to abrogate a State's sovereign immunity. Defendants claim Seminole prevents this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the cases. Accordingly, defendants seek dismissal from this Court of all cases.

II. APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION

A. Whether Cases can be Dismissed on Summary Judgment

The defendants in three of the four cases styled their Seminole-based motions as motions for summary judgment.³ Plaintiffs contend the proper motion to resolve an alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs are correct. See e.g., Broussard v. United States, 989 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1993) (court should dismiss case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than grant motion for summary judgment). The Court will therefore consider all motions as motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir.1986). Any dismissal entered will be without prejudice. Id.

B. Whether Eleventh Amendment Precludes Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction over These Cases

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI.

The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to ban almost entirely suits in federal court against unconsenting States. Seminole, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1122 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 507, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)).

Congress may abrogate the States' sovereign immunity if it "`unequivocally express[es] its intent to abrogate the immunity,'" and in doing so, is acting "`pursuant to a valid exercise of power.'" Id. (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 425, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985)); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 2277, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ("Union Gas") (citing Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985)). In Seminole, an Indian tribe sued the State of Florida and its Governor, Lawton Chiles, in federal district court pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"). Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1120. The IGRA, which was passed pursuant to the "Indian Commerce Clause,"⁴ imposes upon the States a duty to negotiate in good faith to enter into an Indian gaming compact. The statute expressly authorizes a tribe to bring a suit to compel negotiation in federal court. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7). Despite Congress' clear intention to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, however, both the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court determined the Indian Commerce Clause did not vest Congress with the authority to do so. The federal courts therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action. Seminole, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1119, 1121. As explained by the Court, "Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting states." Seminole, ___ U.S. at ___-___, 116 S.Ct. at 1131-32.

In so holding, the Seminole Court expressly overruled the Court's earlier decision in Union Gas, in which a plurality of the Court held the Interstate Commerce Clause⁵ did grant Congress the power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity. Seminole, ___ U.S. at ___-___, 116 S.Ct. at 1125-28. The Seminole Court found "no principled distinction" ... to be drawn between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1126.

In the present case, plaintiffs' suits are brought pursuant to the FLSA. Neither party disputes that the FLSA expresses Congressional intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. The FLSA itself defines an employer as including "any person directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). "Public agency" is defined in the FLSA as:

the Government of the United States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of the United States ..., a State or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate governmental agency.

29 U.S.C. § 203(x).

Under Seminole, however, an intent to abrogate immunity is not sufficient. The Interstate Commerce Clause does not grant Congress with the authority to do so.

Plaintiffs contend that although Congress may have stated that it enacted the FLSA pursuant to its Commerce Clause power,⁶ this Court must determine whether Congress could have enacted the FLSA pursuant to another provision of the Constitution. According to plaintiffs, Congress could have acted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, under which Congress clearly has the authority to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Seminole, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1128; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976).

In support of their argument, plaintiffs cite to EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983), which challenged a Wyoming state law under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. Specifically, the law required Wyoming State Game Division Supervisors to retire at the age of 55, unless they obtain approval from their employer to remain on the job. Id. at 234, 103 S.Ct. at 1059. The Supreme Court held that extension of the ADEA to state and local government employees was an appropriate exercise of power under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 243, 103 S.Ct. at 1064. The Court then held it "need not decide whether it [the extension of the ADEA] could also be upheld as an exercise of Congress' powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. In dicta, the...