Rapid Motor Lines Inc. v. Cox.

• Decision Date: 03 December 1947
• Citation: 56 A.2d 519,134 Conn. 235
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: RAPID MOTOR LINES, Inc. v. COX.

134 Conn. 235

56 A.2d 519

RAPID MOTOR LINES, Inc.

v.COX.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 3, 1947.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Daly, Judge.

Action by Rapid Motor Lines, Inc., against William J. Cox, highway commissioner, to recover for damages to plaintiff's truck, alleged to have been caused by a defective highway, brought to the Superior Court where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and, plaintiff failing to plead further, judgment was rendered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

No error.

John J. Kinney, Jr., of New Haven (Edward L. Reynolds, of New Haven, on the brief), for appellant.

Morris Tyler, of New Haven, for appellee.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS and DICKENSON, JJ.

BROWN, Judge.

This is an action brought under § 1481 of the General Statutes to recover for damage to the plaintiff's truck alleged to have been caused by a defective state highway. The defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained. Upon the plaintiff's failure to plead over, judgment was rendered for the defendant and the plaintiff has appealed. The gist of the material allegations of the complaint, as amended, is that on March 27, 1944, the defect in the highway caused damage to the plaintiff's truck and that ‘on May 26, 1944, the plaintiff sent the defendant a notice * * * in accordance with the previsions of the statute, which notice was received by the * * * defendant, at Hartford on May 27, 1944.’ The defendant demurred on the ground that ‘the notice required by statute was not received by the defendant until May 27, 1944, which is not within the period of time allowed under the Provisions of section 1481 of the General Statutes.'

Section 1481, which authorizes an action against the highway commissioner to recover damages sustained from such a defect, provides that ‘no such action shall be brought * * * unless notice’ of the nature, cause, place and time of the injury ‘shall have been given within sixty days thereafter to the highway commissioner.’ Compliance with this requirement as to notice is a condition precedent to recovery by the plaintiff. Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 187, 198 A. 746, 116 A.L.R. 1031; Shirlock v. MacDonald, 121 Conn. 611, 613, 186 A. 562. In computing the sixty-day period, the day of the injury is excluded and the sixtieth day thereafter is fixed as the final day upon which by the terms of the statute the notice ‘shall have been given.’

Lamberti v. Stamford, 131 Conn. 396, 398, 40 A.2d 190. Since March 27, 1944, was the date of the accident, the final day for so giving notice in this case was May 26, 1944. The specific question for decision therefore is whether the sending of a notice to the defendant on May 26, 1944, which he did not receive until May 27, 1944, satisfied the requirement of the statute.

One meaning of the verb ‘give’ is ‘to make over or bestow.’ Another is ‘to deliver or transfer; to * * * hand over.’ The idea of delivery is predominant in other meanings of the word. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.). It is obvious from the context of the statute that ‘give’ was not used in the former sense. To accord it the latter meaning is the reasonable and natural interpretation, in view of the purpose of the provision, which, it must be held, is to fix a definite limit upon the time within which notice shall be received by the highway commissioner. Any other construction would give rise to needless and undesirable uncertainty. Under § 1420 of the General Statutes, imposing like liability upon municipalities for defects in highways which they are bound to maintain, the clause ‘notice * * * shall * * * be given’ requires a completed act within the number of days prescribed by the statute. Lamberti v. Stamford, supra. A fortiori must this hold true under § 1481, in which the legislature resorted to the future perfect tense by its use of the words ‘shall have been given.’ It is our conclusion that these words require that the notice shall be delivered to the commissioner within the sixty-day period specified in the statute, and that sending on the sixtieth day a notice which is not received by him until the sixty-first day does not constitute compliance with the statute.

This conclusion finds support in two decisions by the Supreme...