Rapid Transit Advocates, Inc. v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist.

• Decision Date: 18 January 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. 83-6149,83-6150,s. 83-6149
• Citation: 752 F.2d 373
• Parties: RAPID TRANSIT ADVOCATES, INC., a California non-profit corporation; and Wilshire Homeowners Alliance, an unincorporated association, Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT; Urban Mass Transportation Administration of the United States Department of Transportation; Theodore Lutz, as Administrator of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration of the United States Department of Transportation and Neil Goldschmidt, as Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees. RAPID TRANSIT ADVOCATES, INC., a California non-profit corporation; and Wilshire Homeowners Alliance, an unincorporated association, Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT; Urban Mass Transportation Administration, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 373

752 F.2d 373

53 USLW 2382

RAPID TRANSIT ADVOCATES, INC., a California non-profit

corporation; and Wilshire Homeowners Alliance, an unincorporated association, Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT; Urban Mass

Transportation Administration of the United States

Department of Transportation; Theodore Lutz, as

Administrator of the Urban Mass Transportation

Administration of the United States Department of

Transportation and Neil Goldschmidt, as Secretary of the

United States Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees.

RAPID TRANSIT ADVOCATES, INC., a California non-profit

corporation; and Wilshire Homeowners Alliance, an unincorporated association, Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT; Urban Mass

Transportation Administration, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 83-6149, 83-6150.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 6, 1984.

Decided Jan. 18, 1985.

William D. Ross, Charles R. Hartman, III, Robert D. Donaldson, Rogers & Wells, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Joseph F. Butler, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., Vincent J. Marella, Dorothy Wolpert, Nutter, Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert & Matz, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before BROWNING, Chief Judge, GOODWIN and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Rapid Transit Advocates and Wilshire Homeowners Alliance, organizations of residents and potential mass transit users in Los Angeles, California, challenge the decision of the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMT Administration) to grant federal funds to the Southern California Rapid Transit District (District) to design and engineer a mass transit system for the City of Los Angeles. Appellants allege violations of various provisions of the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMT Act), 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1601 et seq. (1982), and of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4321 et seq. (1982).

The district court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, holding that a private cause of action under the UMT Act could not be implied, and that appellants had failed to demonstrate sufficient injury to confer standing to challenge agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 701 et seq. (1982). We affirm.

I.

The UMT Act provides for federal assistance in the planning and development of local mass transit systems. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1602. The Act was passed in 1964 following lengthy hearings at which numerous groups testified to the need for federal financial assistance to solve the serious national problem of inadequate public transportation in urban areas. See H.R.Rep. No. 204, 88th Cong.2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2569, 2570-80. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to make grants or loans to assist states and local agencies in financing the planning, development, construction and improvement of mass transportation facilities. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(a)(1). The Act also forbids the Secretary from approving funds for a project unless stated restrictions and conditions have been met. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. Secs. 1602(a)(2), (c)-(h); 1603(a); 1604(e), (h)-(j), (l )-(m); 1604a; 1606; 1609(a), (c); 1610(b)-(c); 1611(b).

The Act is administered by the UMT Administration, which operates under a delegation of authority from the Secretary of Transportation. See 49 C.F.R. Sec. 1.51 (1984). The Administration has developed a two-step procedure for reaching funding decisions. See the Administration's September 22, 1976 Statement of Policy, 41 Fed.Reg. 41,512-14 (1976). In the first stage, the local transit authority analyzes alternatives and prepares a "first-tier" environmental impact statement (EIS). Following this "alternatives analysis," the applicant designates the "preferred alternative" it proposes to implement. A public hearing is then held. Following the hearing the UTM Administration may grant federal funds to the local applicant for design and engineering of the preferred alternative.

The second stage follows completion of the preliminary design and engineering plan. The applicant prepares a site-specific, "second-tier" EIS analyzing the effects of the chosen alternative. After the UMT Administration circulates the final EIS for comments, the applicant prepares a capital grant application for the construction of the preferred alternative and holds a public hearing thereon. The UMT Administration then decides whether to provide funds for the actual construction of the transit system.

The grant of funds for the preliminary design and engineering phase at the conclusion of the first stage is explicitly independent of the action taken at the conclusion of the second stage; approval by the UMT Administration of a grant for design and engineering of the preferred alternative does not commit the Administration to approve the final design or to fund construction.

The District conducted a study of various alternatives for mass transit in the Los Angeles area, prepared a first-tier EIS, held public hearings, and selected a preferred alternative--the Wilshire Subway (Alternative II). The UMT Administration granted the District 12 million dollars for the preliminary design and engineering phase of the Wilshire Subway. The Administration has not approved funding for the actual construction of the project.

II.

A. Implied Private Right of Action Under the UMT Act

The Act does not expressly authorize private suits to challenge violations of its requirements. The principles applicable in this situation are well-settled. Whether a private right of action should be implied is a matter of statutory construction; the ultimate question is simply whether Congress intended to create a private remedy. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15, 100 S.Ct. 242, 245, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979); Osborn v. American Ass'n of Retired Persons, 660 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir.1981). In determining Congressional intent, the language of the statute and its legislative history should first be examined. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297-98, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1781, 68 L.Ed.2d 101 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, 444 U.S. at 23-24, 100 S.Ct. at 249; Osborn, 660 F.2d at 742. If they do not suggest the Act was intended to create federal rights for the especial benefit of a particular class of persons, it is unnecessary to inquire into such other factors as whether availability of a private remedy would further the statutory purpose. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 297-98, 101 S.Ct. at 1781.

The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between statutes whose language focuses on a right granted to a benefitted class of persons--where a private cause of action is generally found--and statutes framed as a "general prohibition or command to a federal agency"--where a cause of action is seldom implied. In Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 772, 101 S.Ct. 1451, 1462, 67 L.Ed.2d 662 (1981), the Court declined to imply a private right of action under the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires contracts for government work to contain minimum wage stipulations, because, though clearly intended to benefit employees, the statute did not confer rights directly on the employees but instead imposed obligations on federal contracting agencies. In the words of the Court, the statute was "simply 'phrased as a directive to federal agencies engaged in the disbursement of public funds.' " 450 U.S. at 772, 101 S.Ct. at 1462, quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 693 n. 14, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1955 n. 14, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Our decision in Osborn is to the same effect. See 660 F.2d at 744. Conversely, in Cannon, the Supreme Court found a private right implied in statutory language focusing explicitly on the civil rights of benefitted persons. The Court noted "[t]here would be far less reason to infer a private remedy ... if Congress ... had written it simply as a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practices." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690-93, 99 S.Ct. at 1954-55.

The provisions of the UMT Act appellants allege were violated do not focus on the rights of particular persons but on the duties of the federal administrators of the program and of the applicants for assistance. The first of these provisions, section 2(b)(2), 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1601(b)(2), simply states that one of the purposes of the Act is to encourage the planning and establishment of areawide urban mass transportation systems needed for economical and desirable urban development. Appellants apparently contend that the initial design and engineering grant by the UMT Administration to the District is inconsistent with this purpose. We agree with the district court that this provision merely identifies the general purposes of federal aid to local transit authorities. It does not purport to confer on local residents private rights in the development of mass transit systems.

Appellants claim appellees violated the requirement of sections 3(d)(2) and (3) of the UMT Act, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1602(d)(2) and (3), that each grant application certify that the applicant has considered the economic and social effects of the project and its impact on the environment, and has found the project to be consistent with official plans for the comprehensive development of the urban area. Although these subsections impose duties upon grant applicants for the benefit of the public, we agree with the district court that they focus not on the substantive rights of local residents but rather on the obligations of applicants and the Secretary. They are primarily spending directives to the Secretary of Transportation, specifying conditions under which grants may be made.

Appellants conten...