Rapinoe v. Gore
| Decision Date | 08 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-CV-1779 TWR (WVG) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | BRIAN JAMES RAPINOE, Booking #20944774 Plaintiff, v. BILL GORE, Sheriff, DR. MONTGOMERY, VISTA DETENTION FACILITY DOCTORS, GEORGE BAILEY DETENTION FACILITY DOCTORS Defendants. |
ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, (2) DISMISSING ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b), AND (3) DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (ECF Nos. 2, 3)
Plaintiff Brian James Rapinoe, an inmate currently detained at George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”), located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See generally ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).) He has also filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (“IFP Mot., ” ECF No. 2) and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (“Motion for Counsel, ” ECF No. 3).
All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $402.[1] See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The Prison Litigation Reform Act's (“PLRA”) amendments to § 1915, however require that all prisoners who proceed IFP to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments ” Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 83-84 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1), (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).
Section 1915(a)(2) requires all persons seeking to proceed without full prepayment of fees to file an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets possessed and demonstrates an inability to pay. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In support of this affidavit, the PLRA also requires prisoners to submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1), (4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84.
In support of his IFP Motion, Rapinoe has submitted a copy of his Inmate Trust Account Statement as well as a Prison Certificate completed by an accounting officer at GPDF. (See IFP Mot. at 5-7; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119.) These statements show Plaintiff maintained an average monthly balance of $0.47 and had $41.99 in average monthly deposits credited to his account over the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. His available balance as of October 12, 2021, was $0.00. (See IFP Mot. at 5.) Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's IFP Motion (ECF No. 2); declines to exact any initial filing fee because his prison certificates indicate he may have “no means to pay it, ” Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84; and directs the Watch Commander at George Bailey Detention Facility, or his designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b)
Because Rapinoe is a detainee and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.'” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
In deciding whether to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a claim, the court is generally bound by the facts and allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint. Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2007). But, if the plaintiff has supplemented the complaint by attaching documents, the court may consider these documents as part of the complaint when determining whether the plaintiff can prove the allegations asserted in the complaint. During v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987).
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
Finally, while a plaintiff's factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt, ” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Even before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations” were not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.
In his Complaint, Rapinoe alleges “medical staff at George Bailey Detention Facility, San Diego Central Jail and Vista Detention Facility have engaged in a systematic denial of medical care.” (See Compl. at 3.) Rapinoe contends that in 2017, while he was a detainee in the custody of the San Diego County Sheriff's Department (“SDSD”), Defendant Sheriff Bill Gore “enacted policies and procedures concerning how and what a doctor contracted by the County, working as a primary care physical for the facilities Sheriff Gore oversees, may treat.” (See id.) Rapinoe alleges Defendant Montgomery, as the Chief Medical Officer, was tasked with “ensur[ing] the polices were put into practice . . . in 2017.” (See id.) Rapinoe asserts that under the policies enacted in 2017, “all treatment for any illness that [is] not literally life or death were and still are treated as elective in nature.” (See id.)
Rapinoe contends that due to these policies, medical staff for the SDSD were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs related to a knee injury which required surgery. Specifically, Rapinoe alleges that in early 2017, while out of custody, he suffered a “sudden knee dislocation.” (See Id. at 4.) Rapinoe was being treated for an “inflamed and deteriorating ACL and meniscal tear” at a San Diego clinic prior to entering San Diego jail. (See id.) He had been prescribed a variety of pain medications, including Percocet and Gabapentin[2] and was “scheduled for surgery;” but he was returned to SDSD custody on February 22, 2017, before the surgery could take place. (See id.) Rapinoe alleges that after entering SDSD custody, he was “denied treatment at every level.” (See Id. at 5.) Prior to the 2017 policy changes, Rapinoe states that he had received Norco[3]...
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