Rapisardi v. Democratic Party of Cook County

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: Elizabeth J. Cohen, Asst. State's Atty., Peter Fitzpatrick, Chicago, Ill., for defendants
• Citation: Rapisardi v. Democratic Party of Cook County, 583 F.Supp. 539 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
• Decision Date: 09 April 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 81 C 1546.
• Parties: Roland RAPISARDI, Plaintiff, v. DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF COOK COUNTY, George W. Dunne, as Chairman of the Democratic Party of Cook County and as President of the Cook County Board; Donald F. Eslick, as Democratic Party Committeeman of Northfield Township; Hyman Tucker, Supervisor of Employment of the Cook County Department of Highways, Defendants.

583 F. Supp. 539

Roland RAPISARDI, Plaintiff, v. DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF COOK COUNTY, George W. Dunne, as Chairman of the Democratic Party of Cook County and as President of the Cook County Board; Donald F. Eslick, as Democratic Party Committeeman of Northfield Township; Hyman Tucker, Supervisor of Employment of the Cook County Department of Highways, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 81 C 1546.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

April 9, 1984.

Gerald A. Goldman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Elizabeth J. Cohen, Asst. State's Atty., Peter Fitzpatrick, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROBSON, Senior District Judge.

This cause is before the court on the plaintiff's specific objections to the amounts claimed as attorney's fees by counsel for the defendants. The defendants' motion for attorney's fees was granted in this court's Memorandum and Order entered June 20, 1983; however, determination on the amount to be awarded was deferred to allow the plaintiff the opportunity to file specific objections to the amounts claimed. On October 24, 1983, the court made an oral ruling as to the amount of fees to be awarded. This memorandum supports that ruling.

BACKGROUND

This was an action in which the plaintiff alleged that his civil rights were violated when he was fired from his job with the Cook County Highway Department in 1978. The plaintiff maintained that his dismissal was for reasons connected with his political activity as a precinct captain rather than based upon his work performance. By agreement of the parties, a decision on the merits was rendered on the basis of the stipulated record. In an order entered February 24, 1983, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to meet his initial burden of proving that political considerations motivated his termination.

As prevailing parties, the defendants petitioned the court for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Finding that the plaintiff's claim was sufficiently groundless and unreasonable to justify such an award, the court granted the defendants' motion for attorney's fees, but did not set the amount of the award, pending filing of the plaintiff's objections. On October 24, 1983, the court ruled in open court on the plaintiff's specific objections to the amount of attorney's fees claimed, granting $1,500.00 in fees and $85.75 in costs to defendants George W. Dunne and Hyman Tucker, and $1,500.00 in fees and $220.40 in costs to defendants Democratic Party of Cook County and Donald Eslick. The factors considered by the court in determining the amounts awarded are set forth in this opinion.

DISCUSSION

The determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. In Re Illinois Congressional Districts Reapportionment Cases, 704 F.2d 380, 382 (7th Cir.1983); Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201, 1211 (7th Cir. 1983); Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 579 (7th Cir.1980). A formula applying "`hours spent times billing rate'" is a factor to be considered in making the ultimate award, but it is only a starting point from which adjustments can be made for various other elements. Muscare, 614 F.2d at 579, citing Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997, 96 S.Ct. 2214, 48 L.Ed.2d 823 (1976). The court in Muscare went on to hold that the eight factors set out in the Code of Professional Responsibility, as adopted by the American Bar Association, are pertinent and are to be considered in an award of fees under this statute:

Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:

(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.

(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.

(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.

(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.

(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.

(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.

(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.

(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Disciplinary Rule 2-106.

Id.

Unlike the present case, however, the Seventh Circuit cases applying the above factors to the determination of reasonable attorney's fees involve an award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff. See Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir.1983); Strama v. Peterson, 689 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1982); Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.1980); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997, 96 S.Ct. 2214, 48 L.Ed.2d 823 (1976). While attorney's fees have been liberally awarded to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases, certain "`policy considerations which support an award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not present in the case of a prevailing defendant.'" Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 418, 98 S.Ct. 694, 699, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), quoting E.E. O.E. v. Christiansburg Garment Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 949, 951 (4th Cir.1977). The plaintiff is the "chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate `a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority,'" and where the plaintiff prevails and is awarded attorney's fees, those fees are being awarded against a violator of federal law. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418, 98 S.Ct. at 698-99, quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968).

When the defendant prevails, however, an award of attorney's fees is based upon quite different equitable considerations. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418-19, 98 S.Ct. at 698-99. In creating a private cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to encourage vindication of its policy of social equality through the adversary judicial process. Id., at 419, 98 S.Ct. at 699. By providing that attorney's fees could be obtained by the prevailing party, Congress desired to both make it easier for suits to be brought under the Act and also to discourage groundless and harassing litigation. Id., at 420, 98 S.Ct. at 699-700. The Christiansburg court's balancing of these considerations resulted in its holding that in order to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant, a District Court must find that "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Id., at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700. The Supreme Court subsequently held that its analysis of these underlying policy considerations in Christiansburg applied also to an award of attorney's fees to prevailing defendants in civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15, 101 S.Ct. 173, 178-79, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980), quoting Christiansburg, id. Thus, the same stringent standard applies when attorney's fees are sought by prevailing defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Equitable principles have traditionally governed a court's discretion in awarding attorney's fees, Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 1945-46, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973), even when the award is made pursuant to statute. See Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 721, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2021, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 517 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir.1975). "An express grant of Congressional authority to award fees presumes continued application of equitable considerations in appropriate cases, both to effectuate the broader legislative purpose and to do justice in the particular case." Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028 (2d Cir.1979). Thus, the same equitable considerations which give rise to a high barrier of fee shifting where the defendant has been successful also should be given consideration in fixing the amount of the award. Id.

Most of the published decisions discussing the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant since the Christiansburg case are from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The equitable concerns discussed in Christiansburg are embodied in the broad standard applied to the determination of fee amounts in these cases, which go beyond the more limited approach of the Seventh Circuit prevailing plaintiff cases (holding that fee awards be based upon reasonable compensation for work done tempered by a concern for the difficulty of the case and the quality of the advocacy). As the court stated in Colucci v. New York Times Co.:

The assessment of fees must be fair and reasonable based upon the particular circumstances of the case. The factors to be considered in fixing the fee include the plaintiff's earning capacity, his financial resources and ability to pay the sum awarded; the relative financial status of the defendant may also be taken into account—in sum, the equities of the situation are to be considered to assure that although the deterrent purpose of the statute is enforced, a losing party is not subjected to financial ruin.

533 F.Supp. 1011, 1012-13 (S.D.N.Y.1982). Accord, Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d at 1028; Spence v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 547 F.Supp. 204, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Woods v. State of New York, 494 F.Supp. 201, 205 (S.D.N.Y.1980); Fisher v. Fashion Institute of Technology, 491 F.Supp. 879, 888 (S.D.N.Y.1980). The fact that the fee awards in these cases were granted pursuant to the provisions of Title VII rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not negate their applicability here, as the same underlying policy considerations have been held to be relevant to fee awards under both statutes. Hughes v. Rowe, 449...