Rappleye v. Rappleye, 910512-CA

• Decision Date: 15 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 910512-CA,910512-CA
• Parties: Marilyn RAPPLEYE, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant, v. George Bryce RAPPLEYE, Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

Page 260

855 P.2d 260

Marilyn RAPPLEYE, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant, v. George Bryce RAPPLEYE, Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee.

No. 910512-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

June 15, 1993.

Stephen L. Henriod and Clark R. Nielsen (argued), Henriod, Henriod & Nielsen, Salt Lake City, for appellant George Rappleye.

Merrill F. Nelson (argued), Kirton, McConkie & Poelman, Salt Lake City, for appellee Marilyn Rappleye.

Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ.

RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge:

George Bryce Rappleye and Marilyn Rappleye appeal the trial court's divorce decree, challenging several property and support provisions. We affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.

FACTS

The Rappleyes were married January 7, 1984. At that time, Mrs. Rappleye had $74,006 in premarital assets, which included proceeds from the sale of her former home and the conversion of a retirement account that she was awarded from a previous marriage.

Prior to the couple's marriage, Mr. Rappleye operated a hardware store that he had purchased in 1981 for $80,000. During their marriage, both Mr. and Mrs. Rappleye worked at the hardware store. While neither of the parties was paid a wage or salary for working there, the funds generated by the store were used to pay the couple's living expenses. In June 1988, Mr. Rappleye sold the store for $315,000.

In January 1989, the Rappleyes separated, and Mrs. Rappleye filed a complaint seeking a decree of divorce. On April 26, 1991, following trial, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce wherein it: (1) awarded each party one-half of the Merrill Lynch cash account and the Franklin Federal Fund account; (2) granted Mr. Rappleye all proceeds from the sale of the hardware store; (3) awarded Mrs. Rappleye alimony of $800 per month for two years from April 1, 1991, and attorney fees in the amount of $5000; and (4) ordered both parties to pay their respective accounting fees and other costs.

Mr. Rappleye appeals, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the Merrill Lynch cash account at the time of separation and not at the time of trial. ¹ Mrs. Rappleye cross-appeals, challenging the court's (1) failure to award her a partnership or equitable interest in the proceeds from the sale of the hardware store, (2) award of $800 per month alimony for two years, and (3) failure to award her accounting fees. Both parties challenge the court's attorney fee award. Additionally, Mrs. Rappleye seeks attorney fees on appeal.

MERRILL LYNCH CASH ACCOUNT

Mr. Rappleye claims that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the Merrill Lynch cash account at the time of the parties' separation and not at the time of the trial itself. He argues that since the Merrill Lynch cash account had declined from a positive balance of $58,456 at the time of the parties' separation to a negative balance of $20,244 at the time of trial, the court's valuation of that account at the time of separation was improper. Mrs. Rappleye responds that because Mr. Rappleye dissipated and mismanaged the funds in the Merrill Lynch account, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the account as of the time of the parties' separation.

As a general rule, the marital estate is valued at the time of the divorce decree. Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); accord Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980). Moreover, any deviation from the general rule must be supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the trial court's basis for such deviation. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah App.1990) (Morgan I ).

In the case at bar, the uncontroverted evidence before the trial court indicated that the Merrill Lynch cash account had a negative balance of $20,244 at the time of trial. However, the trial court, without any subsidiary findings to support its determination, valued that account at $58,456, the value of the account at the time of the parties' separation two years prior to trial. Because such valuation is contrary to the general rule that the marital estate is valued at the time of the divorce decree, we vacate the trial court's valuation of the Merrill Lynch cash account and remand this issue to the trial court for more detailed findings regarding the date at which the account should be valued, as well as its basis for valuing it as of such date. See id.

SALE OF THE HARDWARE STORE

Mrs. Rappleye claims that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award her a partnership or equitable interest in the proceeds from the sale of the hardware store. She argues that the proceeds from the sale of her home, as well as the funds from the converted retirement account that she was awarded from a prior marriage, were commingled and used in the operation of the hardware store, and therefore she is entitled to an interest in the proceeds from the sale of the store. Mr. Rappleye replies that since the hardware store was his premarital asset, the court's award of all the proceeds to him was proper.

There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of assets in a divorce action. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App.1992); accord Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 562-63 (Utah App.1993) (Morgan II ). "Determining and assigning values to marital property is a matter for the trial court, and this Court will not disturb those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion." Morgan II, 854 P.2d at 563 (quoting Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 84 (Utah App.1987)). "In making such orders, the trial court is permitted broad latitude, and its judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so long as it exercises its discretion in accordance with the standards set by this court." Id. (quoting Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987)). However, there must be adequate factual findings to reveal how the court reached its conclusions. Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah App.1987); accord Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah App.1990).

As a general rule, premarital property is considered separate property and will be retained by the party who brought it into the marriage. Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320. "Exceptions to this general rule include whether the property has been commingled, whether the other spouse has by his or her efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the separate property, and whether the distribution achieves a fair, just, and equitable result." Id. (citing Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah App.1990); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988)).

In the case at bar, the trial court awarded all of the proceeds from the sale of the hardware store to Mr. Rappleye as a premarital asset. However, the court's findings are insufficient to support such award. At trial, there was evidence that a portion of Mrs. Rappleye's premarital assets were commingled in the hardware store operations and that Mrs. Rappleye worked at the store during the marriage without a wage or salary. The trial court, however, in awarding all of the proceeds from the sale of the store to Mr. Rappleye, apparently never considered Mrs. Rappleye's contributions in determining what financial benefits, if any, accrued to the hardware store by virtue of her contributions, financial or otherwise, during the period of the marriage. Furthermore, the trial court made no finding as to the value of the hardware store at the time of the parties' marriage, which finding is crucial to determining whether the value of that asset increased during the parties' marriage. ² Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's award of the all the proceeds from the sale the hardware store to Mr. Rappleye and remand this issue for more detailed findings regarding the division of such proceeds.

ALIMONY

Mrs. Rappleye claims that the trial court abused its discretion in only awarding her alimony of $800 per month for two years. Mr. Rappleye responds that, given the short term of the marriage, the trial court properly limited the amount and duration of such award.

We have previously held that:

In awarding alimony, appellate courts require the trial court to consider each of the following three factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. If these three factors have been considered, we will not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.

Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 567 (Utah App.1993) (quoting Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App.1989)) (citation omitted). Further, we have noted that the length of the marriage may also be relevant in formulating an alimony award. See Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah App.1987) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying alimony to wife following a short-term marriage).

Our review of the record reveals that the trial court properly considered the requisite factors in formulating Mrs. Rappleye's alimony award. With respect to Mrs. Rappleye's need and ability to produce sufficient income, the trial court found:

8. [Mrs. Rappleye] is unemployed and other than working in the said Timberline Ace Hardware during the marriage without salary, she has had limited work and job experience; that prior to this marriage, [Mrs. Rappleye] did have employment as a secretary at an hourly wage of $6.00; that [Mrs. Rappleye] is 55 years of age and has had one year of college; that [Mrs. Rappleye's] health is good; that by reason of [Mrs. Rappleye's] limited education, training and job experience it is unlikely that she will be able to earn significantly more than as above indicated; that [Mrs. Rappleye] claims monthly living expenses of $917.00 which does not include anything for...