Raschke v. Blancher

• Decision Date: 06 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 3-84-0449,3-84-0449
• Citation: 141 Ill.App.3d 813,96 Ill.Dec. 711,491 N.E.2d 1171
• Parties: , 96 Ill.Dec. 711 John RASCHKE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Harry BLANCHER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1171

491 N.E.2d 1171

141 Ill.App.3d 813, 96 Ill.Dec. 711

John RASCHKE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Harry BLANCHER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 3-84-0449.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Third District.

March 6, 1986.

Rehearing Denied April 17, 1986.

Stuart R. Lefstein, Katz, McAndrews, Durkee, Balch & Lefstein, Rock Island, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Larry Vandersnick, State's Atty., Cambridge, John W. Robertson and Dee A. Runnels, Bozeman, Neighbour, Patton & Noe, Moline, for defendants-appellees.

Justice STOUDER delivered the Opinion of the court:

This action was commenced by nine farmer taxpayers (John Raschke, et al.), as a class action in behalf of themselves and all other farmer taxpayers similarly situated. The action sought damages and other relief from Harry Blancher, Henry County Supervisor of Assessments, and Lyle Jager, Chairman of the Board of Review of Henry County, for violations of their constitutional rights as proscribed by 42 U.S.C., section 1983. This is a companion case to People v. Carl G. Abrahamson, et al., 141 Ill.App.3d 492, 96 Ill.Dec. 714, 491 N.E.2d 1174. Both cases arise from substantially the same factual dispute and were considered by the trial court at the same time. In this case the trial court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment holding the plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies before this action could be maintained under the federal statute. The administrative procedure and remedies are those which are the subject of the companion case. Since this is a class action the plaintiffs in the instant case are all of the farmer taxpayers affected by the assessment rather than only those farmer taxpayers who properly perfected their objections to the assessment and responded to the application of the Collector to sell land on which taxes were delinquent. In addition, other relief and the allowance of attorney fees were requested.

The complaint alleges that the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs were violated by the defendants in that the conduct of the latter constituted a "deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and laws * * * " (42 U.S.C., sec. 1983). The factual allegations described the same conduct as that in the companion case relating to the reassessment of farmlands, farm improvements and farm dwellings. Since the facts were extensively discussed in that case they will not be repeated here. It is sufficient to say that in the companion case we did hold that reassessment of farm improvements and farm dwellings as part of a quadrennial reassessment in one year, but delay of reassessment of all other categories of property until the succeeding year, did deny the owners of the farm property equal protection of the laws.

On this appeal the plaintiffs urge that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint as premature because of their failure to exhaust their available administrative remedies.

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), and its progeny including McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963), the rule is announced that other legal remedies need not be exhausted or resort to such other legal remedies was not a prerequisite to the institution of Section 1983 actions in federal courts. Interpreting congressional intent these cases have held Congress intended an independent or supplemental procedure for redress of unconstitutional deprivations.

In Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), the Court reaffirmed its adherence to the rule concluding that it had been uniformly applied since the decision in McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963). In Patsy, a case arising in the Federal District Court in Florida, brought under Section 1983, the Court rejected the claim that the right to bring such a claim was in any way dependent on whether the state administrative procedure had been followed or whether such state administrative procedure was adequate.

The plaintiffs have urged that under the rule reaffirmed in Patsy and as discussed in its ancestors, the question of whether they did or did not avail themselves of the tax objection procedure is immaterial to their right to institute and maintain their Section 1983 damage action. This result is required according to the plaintiffs as indicated by our opinion in Beverly Bank v. Board of Review of Will County (1983), 117 Ill.App.3d 656, 72 Ill.Dec. 791, 453 N.E.2d 96. In Beverly Bank, the court held the taxpayers were entitled to maintain their Section 1983 action because of constitutionally impermissible reassessment of their industrial and commercial property. How binding or persuasive is or should be the result in Beverly Bank has been vigorously debated by the parties to the instant case. In Beverly Bank we said,

"Plaintiffs first argued that the trial court erred in basing its ruling on the doctrine that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit under the federal statute. Defendants agree that the exhaustion doctrine is not applicable to actions under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act and assert further that they do not rely upon that doctrine. (See Patsy vs. Board of Regents of the State of Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172.) We think that a careful reading of the trial court's memorandum opinion indicates that the trial court did not apply the exhaustion doctrine but rather considered several exhaustion cases in determining whether Illinois law afforded plaintiffs due process. Accordingly, we will not belabor the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies by further consideration. (72 Ill.Dec. at 794, 453 N.E.2d at 99)

As can be seen from the previous quotation, the non-exhaustion of remedies doctrine was not a specifically contested issue in the case and there is no discussion of other cases requiring prior resort to statutory remedies.

In Chicago Welfare Rights Organization v. Weaver (1973), 56 Ill.2d 33, 305 N.E.2d 140, the court was required to decide whether the failure of aid to dependent children claimants to avail themselves of the administrative review procedures was a bar to their maintenance of a Section 1983 action. In holding affirmatively, the court after discussing the non-applicability of the exhaustion of remedies rule in ...