Rashad v. Walsh
| Decision Date | 31 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 98-11669-NG.,Civ.A. 98-11669-NG. |
| Citation | 204 F.Supp.2d 93 |
| Parties | Rahim RASHAD, Petitioner, v. James T. WALSH, Superintendent, Southeastern Correctional Center, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Max D. Stern, Stern, Shapiro, Weissberg & Garin, Boston, MA, for plaintiff.
Rahim Rashad, Bridgewater, MA, pro se.
William J. Meade, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau, Boston, MA, for defendant.
For the reasons stated below, Rahim RaShad's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [docket entry # 19] is GRANTED.
This habeas corpus petition concerns the application of the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantees. Petitioner Rahim RaShad ("RaShad"), a state prisoner, claims that his speedy trial rights were violated when the state trial court refused to dismiss the indictment against him after the Commonwealth failed to bring him to trial until over five years after he was indicted. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus invalidating his conviction for rape.
RaShad was indicted on February 5, 1987. In October of 1992, five years and eight months later, he was finally brought to trial and immediately moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. The trial court denied the motion, noting that findings of fact would follow. No findings were ever issued. A jury in the Suffolk Superior Court convicted RaShad1 on October 14, 1992. The court sentenced him to not less than thirteen years and not greater than eighteen years at the M.C.I. in Walpole, Massachusetts. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts ("Appeals Court") affirmed RaShad's conviction in an unpublished memorandum on October 22, 1996. The Supreme Judicial Court denied RaShad's application for further appellate review ("ALOFAR") on December 31, 1996. The trial court later denied RaShad's request for a new trial on October 7, 1997. RaShad's state court remedies have therefore been exhausted as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
I find that RaShad's right to a speedy trial was violated and that the indictment should have been dismissed. Though it is clear that RaShad is at fault for fleeing shortly after the indictment was brought, the delay occasioned by his acts, a period of two years, four months, does not compare to the delay occasioned by the official actors in this case. After RaShad had been apprehended and demanded a speedy trial, the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office ("the D.A.") took over five years to finally bring him to trial.
The Appeals Court found against RaShad, holding that he caused a "sizable portion" of the delay and "acquiesced" in most of the rest. Commonwealth v. Graham, No. 94-p—60, slip op. at 4 (Mass.App.Ct. Oct. 22, 1996) [hereinafter "App.Ct.Dec."]. On the one hand, the court's opinion was based on a series of fact findings without record support. Indeed, since the trial court made no findings of fact, the Appeals Court was obliged to substitute its own.
On the other hand, the Appeals Court's opinion is based on a series of legal conclusions that are not spelled out with any degree of clarity. The opinion suggests that RaShad is responsible for the delay because his fugitive status, no matter how long it lasted, somehow relieves the government of its constitutional speedy trial obligations. Even when Massachusetts extradited RaShad to a Texas prison without lodging a detainer that would have made possible his speedy return to Massachusetts under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, the court still held him "responsible" for the delay.
Since the court's conclusions involve either findings of fact totally unsupported in the record, or an unreasonable interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, or both, I therefore GRANT the writ of habeas corpus on speedy trial grounds.
RaShad also makes other claims as to which he is not entitled to relief. He claims that the trial court violated his rights to due process and trial by jury by instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of rape after deliberations had begun; and that the trial court violated his right to due process when it admitted physical evidence that the Commonwealth failed to disclose until the first day of trial, when the late notice prejudiced RaShad's ability to test the evidence.
RaShad's speedy trial claim depends upon a careful analysis of five periods of time. Since legal responsibility for the delay in each period arguably shifts from one party to the other, depending on the specific facts, I describe each period in detail:
1. Period One: May 27, 1984 - September 16, 1986 (two years, four months): RaShad is a fugitive and is finally apprehended. Accordingly, he is responsible for this delay.
On May 27, 1984, a rape was alleged to have occurred at RaShad's apartment in Boston's South End. RaShad is alleged to have kidnapped his ex-girlfriend, Denise Rodriguez ("Rodriguez"), from a movie theater, taken her to his apartment, tied her up, and raped her repeatedly. Rodriguez complained to the police on May 29, 1984. A warrant for RaShad's arrest issued that same day.
A few days later, after finding out that a complaint had been brought against him, RaShad, whose true name at the time was Larry Graham, became a fugitive. He departed Boston in June 1984 and resided, at various times between 1984 and 1986, in Dorchester, Brockton, and New York City.
On August 8, 1986, police arrested RaShad in Stoughton, Massachusetts, in a stolen vehicle. He was charged with use of a motor vehicle without authority, and was convicted and sentenced to M.C.I. Norfolk under the false name of Charles McCrary.
Two years, four months passed since the date on which the arrest warrant was issued for RaShad, a delay plainly occasioned by RaShad's efforts to evade apprehension.
2. Period Two: September 1986-February 1987 (six months): RaShad discloses his true name, and asks to be tried "as soon as possible"; he is indicted soon thereafter: The Commonwealth conceded its responsibility for this delay.
While at the Norfolk County Jail, RaShad informed officials of his true name, Larry Graham. He was told that a default warrant was outstanding against him in the Boston Municipal Court. On September 16, 1986, RaShad wrote to the Municipal Court, stating that he was incarcerated in the Norfolk County Jail and that he would like to be "brought forward" on the pending charges "as soon as possible." As a result, he was brought into court on November 5, 1986, for a probable cause hearing. Thereafter, RaShad remained in the custody of the Norfolk County Jail.
On February 5, 1987, a Suffolk County grand jury returned indictments against RaShad charging him with three crimes: one count of aggravated rape, Mass.Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 22(a); one count of kidnapping, Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 265, § 26; and one count of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, to wit: a knife, Mass. Gen.Laws ch. 265, § 15B(b).
Significantly, the Commonwealth concedes that it was responsible for this delay (six months).
3. Period Three: February 1987 - August 1990 (three years, six months): The Commonwealth transports RaShad to Texas to face charges there, but neither lodges a detainer nor takes any steps to bring him back to Massachusetts: The legal significance of this period is contested.
Before RaShad could be arraigned, the Commonwealth transported him to Texas, where he served a three and one-half year sentence for burglary. On March 10, 1987, the date of his arraignment, RaShad obviously could not answer the charges. Unaware of RaShad's whereabouts, the magistrate noted that RaShad had previously filed a motion for speedy trial, and a writ of habeas corpus was issued for March 27, 1987. When RaShad did not appear in court on that date, the magistrate made an inquiry to M.C.I. Norfolk and was informed that RaShad had been extradited to Texas. The magistrate issued a default warrant for RaShad's arrest, adding that he was doing so "in order to get the process working under the [interstate] compact to begin the process of bringing him back to Massachusetts."2 (He was obviously referring to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 276 App., § 1-1 et seq..) And the magistrate reiterated: "The only way we're going to get him back is through some form of the process, a Governor's warrant."3 The Commonwealth, however, did not follow the magistrate's lead. It took no further steps to obtain RaShad's return from Texas; the docket report indicates solely that the "[i]ndictment [was] placed on file until after arrest of the defendant."4
RaShad remained in custody in Texas until August 1990.5 While he was in a pre-release program in Texas, he applied for a Texas driver's license. During the routine background check associated with getting a driver's license, the Texas Department of Public Safety learned that there were charges pending against RaShad in Massachusetts. The state police took RaShad into custody while the Texas state parole office faxed an inquiry to Massachusetts law enforcement authorities to determine whether Massachusetts was seeking RaShad's arrest and return.
Significantly, Texas authorities informed RaShad that, while state charges were pending against him, Massachusetts was not seeking his arrest, as there was no warrant in the system. He was released from their custody back into the pre-release program.
Responsibility for delay in this period (three years, six months) is contested.
4. Period Four: August 1990 - March 1992 (one year, seven months): RaShad returns to Massachusetts voluntarily and uses his true name, even when stopped for motor vehicle violations and posting bond for a friend: The legal significance of this period is contested.
By November 1991, after completing the halfway house program in Texas, RaShad returned voluntarily to Massachusetts. He lived openly, under his own name. Subsequent events in Massachusetts confirmed the information h...
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Rashad v. Walsh
...had abridged the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial — the district court found in his favor. RaShad v. Walsh, 204 F.Supp.2d 93, 115 (D.Mass.2002).3 In reaching this result, the court first determined that the aggregate delay was sufficient to warrant a full-blown speedy tr......