Rasheed v. Chrysler Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 05 October 1992
• Docket Number: Docket No. 129620
• Parties: , 60 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 926 Muhammad RASHEED, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation, and James Senart, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 104

493 N.W.2d 104

196 Mich.App. 196, 60 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas.

926

Muhammad RASHEED, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation, and James Senart, jointly and severally Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees.

Docket No. 129620.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 14, 1992, at Detroit.

Decided Oct. 5, 1992, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication Dec. 21, 1992.

Durant & Durant, P.C. (by Kirsten Frank), Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman (by George R. Ashford and Eric J. Pelton), Detroit, for defendants-appellants.

Before FITZGERALD, P.J., and HOOD and KINGSLEY, ^* JJ.

HOOD, Judge.

Plaintiff brought an action for religious and racial discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, religious harassment, and fraud against his employer and immediate supervisor. All claims except the religious discrimination claim were dismissed following defendants' motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's proofs. Defendants appeal as of right from a judgment in plaintiff's favor and from the trial court's order of reinstatement. Plaintiff cross appeals from the trial court's ruling that prohibited him from collecting damages for discriminatory acts that occurred outside the three-year period of limitation and from the trial court's refusal to order full reinstatement, with seniority and back pay, to his former position. We affirm.

Plaintiff had been employed by defendant Chrysler Motors Corporation since 1967. The parties stipulated that, in 1978, plaintiff became a member of the American Muslim Mission. In 1981, plaintiff transferred from Chrysler's Hugo Foundry plant to its Trenton plant. Plaintiff asserts that after the transfer he was subjected to daily harassment relating to his religious beliefs from both co-workers and his supervisor, defendant James Senart. Plaintiff produced evidence at trial that he made known the difficulties he was experiencing to his supervisor and other managerial and union personnel but that they failed to rectify the problem. Senart informed plaintiff of his dislike for those who adhere to plaintiff's religion and often encouraged or participated in the harassment.

Plaintiff was involved in three disciplinary incidents shortly before being discharged. The first involved plaintiff's attempt to participate in the fast of Ramadan, which began near the first of June 1984. During this holy month, plaintiff was required to fast from sunup until sundown. He could not break his fast during his regularly scheduled lunch period (8:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.). Although Senart would not accommodate his need to take a later lunch break, plaintiff was able, when Senart went on vacation, to make arrangements with the substitute supervisor, Pat Crowe, to take a later break. When Senart returned, he revoked this privilege and suspended plaintiff for one day for abuse of lunch privileges. Plaintiff denied abusing the lunch break and was eventually reimbursed for this involuntary layoff.

Shortly after the one-day suspension, plaintiff received a three-day suspension for disobeying his supervisor's direct order to retrieve certain script charts. Plaintiff denied disobeying the order and pointed out that the suspension came on the heels of his refusal to work voluntary overtime. Plaintiff was also reimbursed for this suspension.

On July 12, 1984, the day of the suspension that led to his discharge, plaintiff was charged with destroying company property, specifically, scrap cylinder heads. Plaintiff maintains that he handled the cylinder heads in the usual manner and tossed them into the divider with the normal amount of force used when handling scrap heads. After tossing the heads into the divider, plaintiff was escorted out of the plant by two guards. A week later, plaintiff was notified by mail of his discharge.

Plaintiff availed himself of the grievance procedure provided in his union contract to challenge his discharge. Thirteen months later, pursuant to a settlement between his union and Chrysler, plaintiff was offered his job back with seniority, but without back pay, and with the discharge reduced to a disciplinary layoff. Plaintiff refused the offer because it did not include back pay and because he felt the offer was conditioned upon him admitting that he committed the infraction for which he was discharged. The grievance was not arbitrated. This suit followed.

Plaintiff prevailed on his claim of religious discrimination, and the jury awarded him damages in the amount of $61,300. After trial, a hearing was held to determine whether the trial court would use its equitable powers to reinstate plaintiff to his former position. The court ruled that defendant was to offer plaintiff employment as a new employee, that is, with no seniority, within the following sixty days.

Defendants first argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a directed verdict on plaintiff's religious discrimination claim. This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict for an abuse of discretion. Howard v. Canteen Corp., 192 Mich.App. 427, 431, 481 N.W.2d 718 (1991). This Court reviews all the evidence, including all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether there existed a question of fact for the jury's determination. Stoken v. J.E.T. Electronics & Technology, Inc., 174 Mich.App. 457, 463, 436 N.W.2d 389 (1988).

To successfully bring a religious discrimination claim under the Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. Sec. 37.2101 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 3.548(101) et seq.; a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of religious discrimination by demonstrating either disparate treatment or intentional discrimination. Pitts v. Michael Miller Car Rental, 942 F.2d 1067, 1070 (C.A. 6, 1991); Smith v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 168 Mich.App. 773, 778, 425 N.W.2d 220 (1988). To establish disparate treatment, the plaintiff must show that he was a member of a protected class, and that he was treated differently than persons of a different class for the same or similar conduct. Singal v. General Motors Corp., 179 Mich.App. 497, 503, 447 N.W.2d 152 (1989). The employer then has the burden of establishing a legitimate reason for the treatment. If the employer carries its burden, the plaintiff must establish that the reason or reasons presented by the employer were a mere pretext. Pitts, supra. The plaintiff may establish pretext by showing either that it is more likely that a discriminatory reason motivated the employer's action or that the reasons proffered are simply not credible. Pitts, supra at 1071.

Plaintiff's claim is essentially one of disparate treatment. Plaintiff alleges that he was discharged for engaging in conduct that other employees regularly engaged in without being discharged. He further asserts that he was treated differently because he is a Muslim.

Plaintiff established through his own testimony as well as the testimony of Larry Allen, Benny Wright, and Terri Williams that he was discharged for tossing a scrap cylinder head into a divider and that others engaging in similar conduct were not fired. In response, defendants offered testimony establishing that plaintiff was fired for destroying company property. There was testimony from Charles Ferns and Senart that the cylinder head was destroyed and there was damage to the plant floor caused by plaintiff's throwing the head into the divider.

It was then necessary for plaintiff to establish that defendants' reasons for discharging him were a mere pretext. Plaintiff presented testimony from Larry Allen that the cylinder head was not destroyed and that there was no damage to the floor. Further, plaintiff testified about a history of harassment from defendant Senart concerning plaintiff's religion. In addition, there was testimony from Senart that plaintiff was a good repairman and a productive and capable worker.

The resolution of this case rests almost entirely on the jurors' assessment of each witness' credibility. The verdict rendered indicates that, in the jury's estimation, plaintiff's testimony and the testimony of witnesses who supported his version of the events were more credible than defendants' testimony.

If reasonable jurors could reach different conclusions, a motion for a directed verdict should be denied. The trial court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Jenkins v. Raleigh Trucking Services, Inc., 187 Mich.App. 424, 427, 468 N.W.2d 64 (1991). The trial court did not commit error requiring reversal when it denied defendants' motion for a directed verdict.

Defendants next argue that the trial court erred in refusing to allow plaintiff's entire personnel file into evidence.

The decision to admit evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Michigan Microtech, Inc. v. Federated Publications, Inc., 187 Mich.App. 178, 186, 466 N.W.2d 717 (1991). An abuse of discretion is found only if an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made. People v. Milton, 186 Mich.App. 574, 576, 465 N.W.2d 371 (1990). Only relevant evidence is admissible. MRE 402. However, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403; Dunn v. Nundkumar, 186 Mich.App. 51, 55, 463 N.W.2d 435 (1990).

The trial court ruled that, under the collective bargaining agreement, defendants were allowed to go back only three years when making a decision to discharge and that, therefore, those were the only relevant years. However, the trial court also determined that, if older information contained in plaintiff's personnel file was needed for impeachment purposes, it would make...