Rasheed v. International Paper Co.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 92-0206-RV-C.
• Citation: 826 F. Supp. 1377
• Parties: Charles-Claude RASHEED, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

826 F. Supp. 1377

Charles-Claude RASHEED, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 92-0206-RV-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, N.D.

June 25, 1993.

Collins Pettaway, Selma, AL, for plaintiff.

J. Cecil Gardner, Christopher Krafchak, Mobile, AL, for movant.

William Gardner, Birmingham, AL, for defendant.

ORDER

VOLLMER, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant's timely-filed "motion for partial summary judgment" (tab 27; see also tab 28), "plaintiff's objection and response to defendant's motion for summary judgment" (tab 29), and defendant's "reply brief" (tab 31). After due and proper consideration, the court concludes that defendant's motion is due to be, and hereby is, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part for the reasons that follow.

Overview

This action was brought by Charles-Claude Rasheed, a former employee of the sole defendant, International Paper Company, to redress alleged discrimination in employment and recover for an alleged breach of contract. Plaintiff maintains that he was discriminated against because of his race (black), his religion (Muslim), and in retaliation for filing a complaint against the defendant with the EEOC. He also contends that the defendant breached a contract that allegedly existed between it and Rasheed by taking into consideration portions of his disciplinary history when making the decision to discharge him.

The complaint in this case presently consists of five counts,¹ only three of which are thoroughly addressed² in defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.³ Those three counts are: (1) count five, alleging a breach of contract by IP;⁴ (2) count six, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress by IP;⁵ and (3) count seven, alleging negligence by IP.⁶ Defendant's motion squarely draws into question the factual and legal bases of those claims.

Defendant contends that counts five, six, and seven of the complaint are due to be dismissed. More specifically, defendant asserts that each count essentially challenges actions that allegedly were undertaken by it pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement and, as such, each is preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Continuing, defendant maintains that each of those claims is not sustainable, as a matter of law, under that Act and the unique facts of this case.

Background⁷

1. Plaintiff, Charles-Claude Rasheed ("Rasheed"), is a former employee of the Hammermill Paper Division of the International Paper Company. He is black, a member of the Muslim religion, and a resident citizen of the State of Alabama.

2. Defendant, the Hammermill Paper Division of the International Paper Company ("IP"), is an international paper corporation that conducts, and at all times material to this action conducted, business within the State of Alabama and this judicial district. At all times material to this action, IP owned and operated the Riverdale Mill in Selma, Alabama, at which Rasheed was employed.

3. Rasheed was employed by IP from October 5, 1981, the date on which he was hired, until May 29, 1991, the date on which he was discharged. At the time of his discharge, Rasheed held the job of Assistant Equipment Operator Grade B. Such job is also known as the "Bark Operator."

4. At all times relevant to this case, a valid, binding collective bargaining agreement governing the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment (the "Agreement") existed between IP and the United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 1441 (the "Union").⁸ Rasheed was, at all times during his employment, a member of the bargaining unit represented by the Union, and his wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment were governed by the Agreement. He kept a copy of the Agreement during the tenure of his employment.

5. The Agreement vests IP "with the right of discipline and discharge in accordance with the agreement" and permits an employee's discharge "for just cause." With specific reference to management's exercise of the rights of discipline and discharge, the Agreement provides: "Any injustice or discrimination deemed to exist as a result of the exercise of these prerogatives by management shall be subject to the `Grievance Procedure' section of this agreement." The grounds, circumstances, justification for, and characteristics of employee discipline and discharge appear to be governed either by unwritten IP "policy" — as is alleged in this case — or by written agreements collateral to the collective bargaining agreement.

6. The Agreement includes a grievance and arbitration procedure for the resolution of complaints made by employee-members of the Union's bargaining unit. If a grievance is not settled during the pre-arbitration steps of the grievance procedure, the Union can request arbitration. Under the express terms of the Agreement, "the decision of the Arbitrator shall be binding upon both the Company and the Union and shall be rendered within thirty (30) days of the arbitration hearing."

7. On February 1, 1991, Rasheed received a written reprimand and a two-week suspension. Premised on Rasheed's history of poor work attendance and inattention to the responsibilities of his job, the written reprimand specifically warned: "Any further neglect of your job, or absentees, will result in your immediate termination." Rasheed maintains that the adverse action was taken against him because of this race and religion and, further, asserts that IP impermissibly took into consideration his past disciplinary record in assessing his "punishment." With respect to the latter contention, Rasheed asserts that it was IP's "policy" to take into consideration only certain past disciplinaries when calculating punishment; that policy was violated in this instance, he maintains, when IP calculated the length of his suspension based on past disciplinaries which, under that "policy," should not have been considered.⁹

8. Sometime following the February suspension — presumably prior to Rasheed's later termination —, Rasheed filed a complaint with the EEOC, charging IP with having committed racial and religious discrimination. The EEOC made no ruling or final determination on the merits of Rasheed's complaint; instead, it issued Rasheed a right to sue notice on December 9, 1991. Rasheed did not file a grievance concerning his suspension.

9. On May 29, 1991, Rasheed was discharged from his employment with IP. The plaintiff's written discharge notice specifically noted that Rasheed had been observed sleeping on the job on Friday, May 24, 1991, and charged that Rasheed's "persistent poor work history left the Company no alternative but to terminate his employment." Rasheed agrees with the statement, contained in the discharge notice, that "On Friday, May 24, 1991, at approximately 5 o'clock in the afternoon, he was observed sleeping on the job by three individuals"; he contends, however, that his employment was terminated in retaliation for his filing of an EEOC complaint concerning his February 1991, suspension.

10. Sometime following his termination, Rasheed filed a second charge with the EEOC, alleging that he had been discriminated against in retaliation for filing the first EEOC charge. The EEOC made no ruling or final determination on the merits of Rasheed's second complaint; instead, it issued Rasheed a right to sue notice on January 7, 1992.

11. Also following his termination, Rasheed directed the Union to file a grievance for him, concerning his discharge, under the grievance procedures of the Agreement. The grievance was filed and prosecuted up to and through arbitration by the Union.¹⁰ By his grievance, Rasheed primarily maintained that IP improperly considered his past disciplinary record, including numerous oral reprimands, in terminating his employment, in violation of the aforementioned IP "policy." Ultimately, the grievance was submitted to arbitration.

12. Following an arbitration hearing, during which Rasheed testified, the Arbitrator upheld Rasheed's discharge as having been for just cause. The Arbitrator's written ruling, which was issued on January 20, 1992, and ultimately was received by Rasheed, stated "that it was `policy' to remove a record of discipline from an employee's personnel file if, after discipline, the employee worked for 12 months without being disciplined."¹¹ The Arbitrator further found, however, that:

The written reprimands and suspension given Rasheed constitute a valid disciplinary record of Rasheed's employment. In considering these matters, it is noted that each subsequent reprimand or suspension occurred within 12 months of a prior reprimand or suspension. Thus at no time between March 25, 1987 and May 24, 1991, was any written reprimand or suspension subject to removal from Rasheed's personnel file. It is notable, further, that only once did Rasheed receive a written reprimand/suspension and that this grievance was not processed to arbitration. It follows that Rasheed's written disciplinary record prior to May 24, 1991, stands as admitted.

The Arbitrator concluded:

Taken together Rasheed's accumulated offenses, each of which provided just cause for discipline, and especially noting that Rasheed had been suspended three times and specifically warned of discharge, constitute just cause for discharge. Company's discharging Rasheed was not arbitrary or capricious. Rasheed had been accorded progressive discipline.¹²

13. This lawsuit was filed on March 18, 1992.

Discussion

A. Jurisdiction and Venue

1. The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and 29 U.S.C. § 185.

2. Venue is appropriate in this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391; 29 U.S.C. § 185.

B. Standard of Review

3. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is due to be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the...