Rashid v. Khulmann, 97 CIV. 3037(SS).
Decision Date | 08 January 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 97 CIV. 3037(SS).,97 CIV. 3037(SS). |
Citation | 991 F.Supp. 254 |
Parties | Ali Abdul RASHID a/k/a Chester Bruce, Petitioner, v. Robert H. KHULMANN, Superintendent, Sullivan Correctional Facility, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Ali Abdul Rashid, Dannemora, NY, pro se.
Respondent moves to dismiss this habeas petition on the ground that the claims asserted by petitioner are barred by the one-year limitations period of § 101 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217 (April 24, 1996), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner mailed his petition to the Court 359 days after the effective date of the AEDPA, and over ten years after his conviction became final. For the reasons to be discussed, I grant respondent's motion to dismiss the habeas petition as untimely.
Petitioner was convicted on December 22, 1983, following a jury trial in New York State Supreme Court, New York County, of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the First Degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 220.21(1)) and Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 220.16(1)), and three counts of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 220.16(1)). Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of fifteen years to life on the first count and concurrent terms of six to twelve years on the remaining counts. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at Sullivan Correctional Facility.
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, on the grounds that 1) the state failed to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 2) the trial court improperly allowed introduction of evidence of uncharged crimes, 3) the trial court's sentencing as a second felony offender was tainted by flaws in the plea to the predicate offense, 4) the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive, 5) petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel, and 6) the trial court erred in charging the jury on permissible inferences regarding intent. On May 27, 1986, the Appellate Division affirmed petitioner's conviction. People v. Bruce, 120 A.D.2d 993, 502 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1st Dep't 1986). On September 11, 1986, the New York State Court of Appeals denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Bruce, 68 N.Y.2d 810, 507 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 499 N.E.2d 876 (1986). Petitioner did not file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner did file a petition pursuant to CPL § 440.20 in the Supreme Court, New York County, which petition was denied on December 31, 1985; petitioner did not appeal this denial. Petitioner also states that he filed another § 440.20 petition on April 18, 1997. Although the state authorities deny having received this petition, for purposes of this motion to dismiss the Court will assume that the petition was in fact filed.
On April 18, 1997, petitioner mailed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent submitted its motion to dismiss on September 5, 1997, and petitioner opposed the motion on or about September 23, 1997. Respondents submitted an affidavit in reply on October 27, 1997, and petitioner submitted a further response on November 9, 1997.
Petitioner filed this petition after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the AEDPA. The AEDPA amended the habeas corpus statute to require that habeas petitions "be filed no later than one year after the completion of state court review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (1997). However, "[t]ime during which a properly filed state court application for collateral review is pending is excluded from the one year period." Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 679 (2d Cir.1996); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The Second Circuit in Peterson v. Demskie, 107 F.3d 92, 93 (2d Cir.1997), recognized that it would be unfair to deny access to the federal courts to prisoners who did not have notice of the new time limits of the AEDPA. Although other circuits have ruled that "habeas petitioners should have a full year after the effective date of the AEDPA to file their petitions in federal district court," Lindh v.. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 866 (7th Cir.1996) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737 (10th Cir.1997); Calderon v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, 112 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir.1997), this Circuit has held that "a habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to a `reasonable time' after the effective date of the AEDPA to file a petition." Peterson, 107 F.3d at 92. Furthermore, "in circumstances ... where a state prisoner has had several years to contemplate bringing a federal habeas corpus petition, we see no need to accord a full year after the effective date of the AEDPA." Peterson, 107 F.3d at 93.
Following Peterson, district courts in this circuit have found petitions filed near the end of the year following the enactment of the Act to be untimely.1 See, e.g., Acosta v. Artuz, 985 F.Supp. 438, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ( ); Hill v. Keane, 984 F.Supp. 157, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ( ); Howard v. Lacy, No. 97 Civ. 2286, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19185, at *10, 1997 WL 749390, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1997) ( ); Wong v. United States, No. CV 97-2234, 1997 WL 793107, at *1, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19947, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1997) ( ); Hairston v. United States, No. CV 97-2212, 1997 WL 793108, at *1, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19948, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1997) ( ); Pacheco v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ. 3171, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18257, at *5, 1997 WL 724774, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1997) ( ); Reese v. Greiner, No. 97 Civ. 5622, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17641, at *3-4, 1997 WL 694716, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1997) ( ); Reid v. Greiner, No. 97 CV 1852, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19257, at *6-7, 1997 WL 694723, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1997) ( ); Santana v. United States, 982 F.Supp 942, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ( ); Avincola v. Stinson, No. 97 Civ. 1132, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17078, at *6, 1997 WL 681311, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1997) ( ); Garcia v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Services, No. 97 Civ. 3867, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17079, at *7, 1997 WL 681313, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1997) ( ); United States v. Terry, No. 97-CV-522, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16606, at *7, 1997 WL 662477, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1997) ( ); White v. Garvin, No. 97 Civ. 3244, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15577, at *7, 1997 WL 626396, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1997) ( ); Degrijze v. Artuz, No. CV 97-2258, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis, at *3, 1997 WL 720756, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1997) ( ); Ross v. Artuz, No. CV 97-3564, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16238, at *3, 1997 WL 720754, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct 1, 1997) ( ); Reynoso v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ. 2797, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14896, at *2, 1997 WL 605119, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1997) ( ); Nucci v. Artuz, No. CV 97-2352, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16235, at *3-4, 1997 WL 720773, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1997) ( ); Posada v. United States, No. CV 97-2506, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16233, at *3, 1997 WL 720757, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 1997) ( ); LaTorres v. Walker, No. 97 Civ. 3392, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14931, at *5, 1997 WL 605105, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1997) ( ); Byas v. Keane, No. 97 Civ. 2789, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14926, at *4, 1997 WL 605106, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1997) ( ); Yeung v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ. 3288, 1997 WL 572908, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.10, 1997) ( ); see also id. (collecting earlier cases).
The Second Circuit in Peterson also cautioned, however, that "we do not think that the alternative of a `reasonable time' should be applied with undue rigor." Peterson, 107 F.3d at 93. Accordingly, courts in this circuit have found petitions filed after the effective date of AEDPA to be timely where the petition was filed well before the conclusion of the one year period following the effective date of the Act or soon after state review concluded. See Peterson, 107 F.3d at 93 ( ); Morillo v. Crinder, No. 97 Civ. 3194, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18295, at *6, 1997 WL 724656, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1997) ( ); Jones v. Artuz, No. CV 97-2394, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15581, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1997) ( ); Higgins v. Strack, No. CV 97-2226, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1997) ( ); Rivalta v. Artuz, No. 96 Civ....
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