Rashid v. Public Sav. Ass'n, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 87-7249. |
| Citation | 97 BR 187 |
| Parties | Amin A. RASHID v. PUBLIC SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Amin A. Rashid, Amin A. Rashid & Associates, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Richard F. Stern, Jenkintown, Pa., for Public Savings Ass'n, Inc., Apex Financial Corp. of Pa., Inc.
Jeffrey B. Albert, Philadelphia, Pa., for Second Church of Christ, Scientist, Inc. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel.
This action arises from alleged civil rights violations which plaintiff claims were perpetrated upon him by defendants Public Savings Association, Inc. (Public Savings), Apex Financial Corporation of Pennsylvania, Inc. (Apex), Richard Stern (Stern) and Fox Rothchild, O'Brien & Frankel (Fox, Rothchild).1 Before the court are the motions of the defendants Public Savings, Apex, Stern, and Fox, Rothchild for summary judgment.2 For the reasons set forth below, I will grant the defendants' motions and enter summary judgment in their favor.
The relevant facts are as follows: Plaintiff Amin A. Rashid owned a piece of real property located at 3015 West School House Lane, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On or about December 9, 1983, plaintiff executed a Note secured by a Mortgage on his property from Zeta Beta Tau in the amount of $50,000. On or about January 31, 1985, plaintiff executed a second Note secured by a Mortgage from Colonial Financial Services, Inc. in the amount of $55,000. This mortgage was then assigned to defendant Apex and later reassigned to defendant Public Savings. Apex remained as Public Savings' servicing agent on the loan. As a result of plaintiff's failure, beginning in May 1985, to meet his monthly installment obligations on the mortgage,3 on August 20, 1985 Public Savings instituted mortgage foreclosure proceedings against the plaintiff. Plaintiff, pro se, filed an answer and new matter in response to Public Savings' action. At the close of the pleadings, Public Savings filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff failed to respond to Public Savings' motion, and by order dated March 18, 1986, Judge DiBona of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granted the motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Public Savings and against plaintiff in the amount of $59,365.01 plus interest. On March 26, 1986, damages were assessed in the amount of $64,435.69, and Public Savings obtained a writ of execution with plaintiff's property scheduled for a sheriff's sale on May 5, 1986.
On May 1, 1986, plaintiff filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the sheriff's sale was stayed pending those proceedings. Public Savings filed a motion in the bankruptcy court for relief from the automatic stay to which plaintiff then responded, and a hearing was scheduled for June 12, 1986. Upon representations by the plaintiff that he would be unable to attend the hearing, Judge Goldhaber continued the hearing until June 30, 1986. The hearing was held, but plaintiff failed to attend and Judge Goldhaber granted Public Savings' motion for relief. On July 7, 1986, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with Judge Goldhaber. He also filed a request with Judge Goldhaber to reconsider, or alternatively, to stay the proceedings. No bond to support a stay was filed by plaintiff, and Public Savings relisted plaintiff's property for a sheriff's sale for October 6, 1986. By order dated October 2, 1986, Judge O'Neill of this court granted plaintiff's requested stay and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for a hearing. Judge Fox scheduled a hearing pursuant to Judge O'Neill's order, for October 30, 1986.4 At the hearing held on October 30, 1986, Judge Fox found that plaintiff had no equity in the property because the balance of the two mortgages liened thereon exceeded the fair market value of the property, that plaintiff failed to make any mortgage payments from May 1985 through October 1986 and that the property had been vacant, subject to vandalism and in a dilapidated condition.5 As a result of these findings, Judge Fox granted Public Saving's motion for relief and permitted it to sell plaintiff's property at a sheriff's sale scheduled for November 3, 1986. The premises was sold on November 3, 1986 and Public Savings assigned its bid to Second Church on November 13, 1986.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). For a dispute to be "genuine," the evidence must be such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To establish a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must introduce evidence beyond the mere pleadings to create an issue of material fact on "an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The evidence presented must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and that party must receive the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from that evidence. Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 537, 88 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985).
Section 1985(3)
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), alleging that the defendants conspired to engage in conduct designed to deprive him of "the equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws." Section 1985(3) provides, in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws ... the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
In United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 610 AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 3357, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether section 1985(3) contains a requirement of state involvement and found that in the context of a 1985(3) claim alleging a conspiracy to deprive a person of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, "it would be untenable to contend that either of those provisions could be violated by a conspiracy that did not somehow involve or affect a state." Id. at 831, 103 S.Ct. at 3357-58. Although Scott involved a First Amendment violation, the Court made clear, and subsequent lower court decisions have found, that if the substantive right underlying the 1985(3) claim is one which requires either state action or state involvement, such state involvement must be alleged, and evidence of this official conduct must be presented. See Morris v. The Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., No. 87-7062, slip op. at 12-13, 1989 WL 14063 (E.D.Pa. February 21, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Bowman v. Bank of Delaware, 666 F.Supp. 63, 65 (D.Del.1987); Stoltzfus v. Ulrich, 587 F.Supp. 1226, 1230-31 (E.D. Pa.1984). In the case sub judice, plaintiff's equal protection allegations are premised on the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, only protects individuals against state action and not against wrongs by individuals. Scott, 463 U.S. at 831-32, 103 S.Ct. at 3357-58. As a result, plaintiff must prove, either that defendants were "state actors" or that defendants sought to influence the state to act in a prohibited way. Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 404 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1339, 103 L.Ed.2d 809 (1989). After a comprehensive review of the record, I find no evidence of any state involvement in the alleged conspiracy. All parties to this action are clearly private actors. Moreover, plaintiff has offered absolutely no evidence which remotely suggests that defendants were in any way related to or acting on behalf of, the state. Because plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that there was any state involvement, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, I will grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants on plaintiff's 1985(3) claim.6
I turn now to plaintiff's claim that he was not notified of hearings held on June 30, 1986 and October 30, 1986 to lift the automatic stay of the sheriff's sale. On May 1, 1986, faced with the imminent sheriff's sale of his property, plaintiff filed a petition for relief pursuant to chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, all enforcement proceedings which have been commenced against him are automatically stayed. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). However, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), creditors have a right to request that the court grant relief from the automatic stay provisions and provide it with a hearing to determine if the automatic stay should be lifted.7
Plaintiff asserts that defendants conspired to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws by failing to provide him with adequate notice of these hearings. In order to properly evaluate plaintiff's claim, I will briefly...
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