Rasmussen v. Rich
| Decision Date | 05 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 49433-7-II,49433-7-II |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | ERIC O. RASMUSSEN, M.D., and JANICE M. RASMUSSEN, and the marital community comprised thereof, Respondents/Cross Appellants, v. RODNEY RICH and SANDRA RICH, and the marital community comprised thereof, Appellants/Cross Respondents. |
WORSWICK, P.J. — Rodney and Sandra Rich appeal the trial court's summary judgment order quieting title in certain property. The Riches argue that the trial court erred in granting Eric O. Rasmussen, M.D., and Janice M. Rasmussen's motion for summary judgment because the Riches presented sufficient evidence to support their affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel and laches and their counterclaim for mutual recognition and acquiescence. The Rasmussens cross appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the Riches' motion for reconsideration and denying attorney fees and costs to the Rasmussens.
We reverse in part the trial court's order granting the Rasmussens' motion for summary judgment on their quiet title claim and remand for further proceedings because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Riches' equitable estoppel defense defeats the Rasmussens' claim. We affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment dismissal of the Riches' laches defense and mutual recognition and acquiescence counterclaim, and we affirm the trial court's order granting the Riches' motion for reconsideration, which denied attorney fees and costs to the Rasmussens.
In 1993, the Riches purchased a parcel of property on Bainbridge Island. The Riches' property is a waterfront lot that consists of a bluff, where their home sits, and a hillside leading to the beach. Soon after they purchased their property, the Riches met with their neighbors, the Rasmussens, to discuss the boundary line between their properties. Mr. Rich asked Mr. Rasmussen where the property line was on the beach. Mr. Rasmussen stated that "he did not know exactly where it was" because it had not been surveyed, but "he believed that it was at the end of his deck." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 76. The Riches and the Rasmussens also agreed that a concrete wall that the Riches planned to build next to laurel hedges on the bluff between their properties would serve as the true boundary line.
The end of the Rasmussens' deck cannot be seen from the top of the bluff. The Riches asked the Rasmussens if they should get a survey to determine the true boundary line between their properties, and the Rasmussens answered in the negative. The Riches believed that their conversation with the Rasmussens established that the boundary line between their properties would run from the Rasmussens' deck on the beach to the concrete wall on the bluff.
Soon after purchasing their property, the Riches built a concrete wall that abutted the laurel hedge on the bluff. The hillside between the concrete wall on the bluff and the Rasmussens' deck on the beach is approximately 75 feet in length and consisted of overgrown blackberries and ivy. There were no property markers in the overgrown vegetation, and the Riches did not otherwise physically mark the purported boundary line on the hillside.
The Riches began making improvements on the hillside in 2007. The Riches built a concrete deck and concrete retaining wall on the beach in 2008. The Riches also built terraces along the hillside between 2010 and 2013. Later in 2013, the Rasmussens obtained a survey of the true boundary line of their property. The survey revealed that the Riches' concrete deck and retaining wall on the beach extended over 12 feet into the Rasmussens' property, and the terracing on the hillside extended over 9 feet into the Rasmussens' property. After obtaining the survey, the Rasmussens and the Riches engaged in negotiations with their attorneys regarding the Riches' encroachments. The negotiations were unsuccessful.
In 2015, the Rasmussens filed a complaint to quiet title to the disputed area between the Riches' purported boundary line and the true boundary line between their properties. The Riches pleaded the affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel and laches. The Riches also filed a counterclaim for mutual recognition and acquiescence.
The Rasmussens later filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Riches failed to present sufficient evidence to support their mutual recognition and acquiescence counterclaim. The trial court granted the Rasmussens' motion for summary judgment, finding that the Rasmussens were entitled to an order quieting title to the disputed area. The trial court also dismissed the Riches' mutual recognition and acquiescence counterclaim with prejudice and awarded the Rasmussens attorney fees and costs under RCW 7.28.083(3).
The Riches filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in awarding the Rasmussens attorney fees and costs under RCW 7.28.083(3) because the statute authorizes an award of fees for only adverse possession actions. The trial court granted the Riches' motion for reconsideration and vacated its award of fees and costs. TheRiches appeal the trial court's summary judgment order quieting title in the disputed property, and the Rasmussens appeal the trial court's order granting the Riches' motion for reconsideration and denying attorney fees and costs to the Rasmussens.
The Riches argue that the trial court erred in granting the Rasmussens' motion for summary judgment because they presented sufficient evidence to support their counterclaim and pleaded affirmative defenses. In their cross appeal, the Rasmussens argue that the trial court erred in granting the Riches' motion for reconsideration of the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to the Rasmussens under RCW 7.28.083(3).
We reverse in part the trial court's order granting the Rasmussens' motion for summary judgment on their quiet title claim and remand for further proceedings because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Riches' equitable estoppel defense defeats the Rasmussens' claim. We affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment dismissal of the Riches' laches defense and mutual recognition and acquiescence counterclaim, and we affirm the trial court's order granting the Riches' motion for reconsideration on the issue of attorney fees and costs.
The Riches argue that the trial court erred in granting the Rasmussens' motion for summary judgment because they presented sufficient evidence to support their equitable estoppel affirmative defense, mutual recognition and acquiescence counterclaim, and laches affirmative defense. We hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Riches' equitable estoppel defense defeats the Rasmussens' quiet title claim, but we affirm summaryjudgment dismissal of the Riches' laches defense and dismissal of their mutual recognition and acquiescence counterclaim.
We review a trial court's order granting summary judgment de novo. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we consider all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ranger Ins. Co., 164 Wn.2d at 552. "A material fact is one on which the litigation's outcome depends in whole or in part." TT Props. v. City of Tacoma, 192 Wn. App. 238, 245, 366 P.3d 465, review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1036 (2016).
"Summary judgment is subject to a burden-shifting scheme." Ranger Ins. Co., 164 Wn.2d at 552. The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 154 Wn.2d 16, 26, 109 P.3d 805 (2005). A party may move for summary judgment by alleging that the nonmoving party failed to present sufficient evidence to support its case and showing "'those portions of the record, together with the affidavits, if any, which . . . demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Pac. Nw. Shooting Park Ass'n v. City of Sequim, 158 Wn.2d 342, 351, 144 P.3d 276 (2006) (quoting Guile v. Ballard Cmty. Hosp., 70 Wn. App. 18, 22, 851 P.2d 689 (1993)). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence that rebuts the moving party's contentions and demonstrates that material facts are in dispute.Vallandigham, 154 Wn.2d at 26. If the nonmoving party fails to meet its burden, summary judgment is proper. 154 Wn.2d at 26.
The Riches argue that the trial court erred in granting the Rasmussens' motion for summary judgment because they presented sufficient evidence to support their equitable estoppel affirmative defense. We hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Riches' equitable estoppel defense defeats the Rasmussens' quiet title claim. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissal of the Riches' equitable estoppel defense.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel provides that a party may be prevented from setting up his legal title when he has, through his actions, words, or silence, led another to take a position in which the assertion of the legal title would be contrary to equity. Sorenson v. Pyeatt, 158 Wn.2d 523, 539, 146 P.3d 1172 (2006). The elements of equitable estoppel are: "'(1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent with a claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by another in [reasonable] reliance upon that act, statement or admission, and (3) injury to the relying party from allowing the first party to contradict or...
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