Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority
Decision Date | 27 May 1988 |
Citation | 201 Cal.App.3d 817,247 Cal.Rptr. 492 |
Parties | Walter RASON, et al., Appellants, v. SANTA BARBARA CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, etc., et al., Respondents. Civ. B026890. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Moises Vazquez, Santa Barbara, for appellants.
Tardiff, Rothe & Staton and Jamie M. McMillan, Santa Barbara, for respondents.
Here we affirm an order dismissing a petition for relief from the requirements of the Tort Claims Act. The claimant filed his petition beyond the time limitation prescribed by Government Code section 946.6, subdivision (b). 1 Because the claimant later filed a complaint for damages, we offer some guidance which perhaps will obviate the need for further appellate proceedings.
Walter Rason and his son, Walter Rason, Jr., lived in public housing provided by the Santa Barbara City Housing Authority (Housing Authority). In a claim filed with the Housing Authority, the Rasons allege that on February 6, 1986, they returned home from a vacation to discover their possessions had been removed and their apartment had been rented to another person. For the next five weeks the Rasons remained homeless, until the Housing Authority provided them with another apartment.
On May 16, 1986, 99 days after returning home to discover they had been displaced, the Rasons filed a claim with the Housing Authority seeking damages for injuries caused by wrongful eviction. (§§ 905, 910, 945.4.) The Housing Authority returned the claim with a notice explaining that the claim was not presented within 100 days of accrual as required by section 911.2. 2 The Housing Authority apparently concluded that the cause of action accrued sometime before the Rasons discovered the eviction. The notice included this warning:
On June 3, 1986, the Rasons applied for "leave to present [a] late claim," although they did not concede filing late nor state reasons for filing beyond the 100-day limit. (See § 911.4.) Instead, the Rasons disputed the Housing Authority's determination that the claim was untimely. They contended that the cause of action did not accrue until they had discovered the eviction and that their claim was filed 99 days later.
The Housing Authority treated the application as if the Rasons were presenting excuses for filing a late claim, and denied the application on June 18, 1986. Notice of the denial was not mailed until approximately a month later, and the Rasons did not receive the notice until July 22, 1986, 33 days after the denial. Pursuant to section 911.3, the notice of denial included this warning:
On January 15, 1987, the Rasons filed a petition for relief from the claims presentation requirements in the superior court. They asserted that they filed the claim within the requisite 100-day period, and in the alternative, that any failure to file the claim on time was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable mistake. (See § 946.6, subd. (c)(1).) The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not filed within six months of June 18, 1986, the date the application was denied by the Housing Authority. On November 30, 1987, after this appeal was filed, the Rasons filed a complaint for damages against the Housing Authority. This appeal is from the trial court's dismissal of the 946.6 petition.
We affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.
The petition was the improper vehicle to argue that the claim was timely. This issue can only be raised in the complaint for damages. Nevertheless, it was prudent for the Rasons to have filed it. There was no way for them to know how the court would have ruled on the petition. For example, the court may have felt their claim was not timely, but that they were entitled to relief. Because the order of dismissal is not a bar to filing the complaint, we discuss these and other issues in order to forestall possible further appellate proceedings concerning some issues.
Before a complaint for damages against a public entity can be filed in court, a claim must first be filed with the entity in accordance with the Tort Claims Act, and rejected. (§ 945.4.) Under current law the claim has to be filed within six months of accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.2.) At the time of this action, the claim had to be filed within 100 days. For purposes of the Tort Claims Act, the date of accrual is the same date on which the cause of action would accrue if there were no claims requirements. (§ 901.) If the claim is filed beyond the 100 days, the claimant may apply to the public entity, within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after accrual, for leave to present a late claim. (§ 911.4.)
The public entity must approve or reject a timely claim within 45 days and provide written notice to the claimant. (§§ 912.4, 912.6, 913.) If a timely claim is rejected in whole or in part, the claimant may file suit for money or damages within six months after the date notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail. (§§ 945.4; 945.6, subd. (a)(1).) If the rejection is not properly noticed in accordance with section 913, however, the action may be filed in court within two years from the accrual of the cause of action. (§ 945.6, subd. (a)(2).)
If the entity determines that the claim was filed late, it must return the claim within 45 days from the date it was filed, along with a notice that the claimant may apply for leave to present a late claim. (§§ 911.3, 911.4.) In responding to an application for leave to present a late claim, the entity must grant or deny leave within 45 days and provide notice. (§§ 911.6, 911.8.) As will be discussed, infra, a claimant who disputes the determination of untimeliness must raise that issue by filing suit rather than a section 911.4 application. (Toscano v. County of Los Angeles (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 775, 782-783, 155 Cal.Rptr. 146.)
If an application for leave to file a late claim is rejected by the public entity, the claimant must first obtain a court order for relief from the requirements of the Claims Act before filing a suit. (§ 946.6.) A petition for such an order must be filed with the court within six months after the application is denied or deemed denied. (§§ 946.6, subd. (b); 911.6.)
The Rasons filed their petition for relief from Claims Act requirements with the superior court on January 15, 1987, more than six months from the date the Housing Authority denied their application, but within six months of receiving notice of that action from the Housing Authority. That notice date also happened to be the 45th day after the application was filed. If the Housing Authority had taken no action by the 45th day, the application would have been deemed denied. (§§ 946.6, subd. (b); 911.6, subd. (c).)
The Rasons argue that legislative intent and due process requires us to rule that the six-month clock for filing the section 946.6 petition began to run on the date notice was received, instead of the date the application was denied. The Rasons argue that where notice of denial is not provided until the 45th day, section 946.6 offers the claimant the choice of filing the petition within six months after the actual denial date, or within six months after the 45th day.
The Rasons misconstrue section 946.6, subdivision (b). An application is deemed denied as a matter of law only if the public entity takes no action within the requisite 45-day period. (§ 911.6, subd. (c).) Here the Housing Authority denied the application within that period, and so there is no need to consider a "deemed" denial date. The plain meaning of section 946.6, subdivision (b), is that the six-month clock began to run on June 18, the actual date of denial.
The Rasons' reliance on Hochfelder v. County of Los Angeles (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 370, 272 P.2d 844, and Denham v. County of Los Angeles (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 860, 66 Cal.Rptr. 922, is misplaced. In both those cases, the public entity took action after the requisite period to act had expired. The appellate courts held that the public entities were estopped from pleading that the clock began to run at an earlier date. Moreover, the statute considered in Hochfelder, a predecessor to the modern Tort Claims Act, expressly stated that the claimant "may treat" the claim as rejected when the public entity does not act within the statutory time. Claimant had the option of treating the claim as rejected when the entity actually rejected the claim after the 45th day. (Hochfelder v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 126 Cal.App.2d at pp. 372, 374-375, 272 P.2d 844.) The current statute offers no such option. (§§ 911.6, subd. (c); 946.6, subd. (b).)
In Denham, defendant public entity was estopped to assert the time period ran from the 45th day when claimant relied on the entity's written rejection which occurred after the 45th day. The statute in effect at the time of Denham allowed the parties to extend by agreement the period in which the entity had to act. Therefore, the 45-day period was not a "jurisdictional limitation." ( Denham v. County of Los...
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