Ratcliff v. Louisiana Industrial Life Ins. Co.
| Citation | 185 La. 557,169 So. 572 |
| Decision Date | 30 June 1936 |
| Docket Number | 33885 |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | RATCLIFF v. LOUISIANA INDUSTRIAL LIFE INS. CO |
Judgment of the Court of Appeal set aside, and judgment of the city court reinstated and affirmed.
Gill & Simon, of New Orleans, for Ford Ratcliff.
Loys Charbonnet and E. B. Charbonnet, Jr., both of New Orleans for Louisiana Industrial Life Ins. Co.
OPINIONO'NIELL, Chief Justice.
The plaintiff is the beneficiary named in a policy of insurance issued by the defendant, Louisiana Industrial Life Insurance Company, for $ 184, on the life of Peter Ratcliff. The policy was dated and delivered on the 5th day of February, 1934. The insured died on the 5th day of February, 1935; that is, on the first anniversary of the date of the policy. The question is whether the beneficiary is entitled to $ 184, or only $ 92. The city court gave judgment for the $ 184. The Court of Appeal reduced the amount to $ 92. 165 So. 881. The plaintiff has brought the matter here on a writ of review.
The dispute as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to $ 184 or to only $ 92 is over the following clause in the policy:
"One-quarter of the above mentioned benefit is payable if death occur within six calendar months from date hereof; one-half after six months and the full amount if death occur one year thereafter."
The expression "one year thereafter" means one year after the date of the policy. The question is whether the death, which occurred on the 5th day of February, 1935, occurred one year after the 5th day of February, 1934. Of course, if the policy did not go into effect until midnight on the 5th day of February, 1934, and if, therefore, the "one year thereafter" should be reckoned from the end of the 5th day of February, 1934, the "one year thereafter" did not end until the end of the 5th day of February, 1935. But it is admitted that the policy was in force on the 5th day of February, 1934, from the moment it was issued. In fact, the first one of the "Conditions" stated in the policy is this: "No obligationis assumed by the Company prior to the date hereof, nor unless on said date the insured be alive and in sound health." That means that the policy was in force on the date thereof, the 5th day of February, 1934; which means that the policy had been in force a year at the expiration of the 4th day of February, 1935, because there cannot be two 5ths of February -- or duplicates of any day of the month or year -- in the period of one year.
Our understanding of the expression, "One-quarter of the above mentioned benefit is payable if death occur within six calendar months from date hereof; one-half after six months and the full amount if death occur one year thereafter," is this: That the policy was for $ 46 during the first six months in which it was in force, and was for $ 92 during the next six months, and was for $ 184 thereafter. The wording leaves no doubt that in order for the benefit to have been only $ 46 the death would have had to occur "within six calendar months from the date" of the policy. Accordingly, in order for the benefit to be $ 92 the death would have had to occur within one year from the date of the policy. There is no difference between the terms "from the date of the policy" and "after the date of the policy." The Court of Appeal construed the expression "one year thereafter" as meaning after one year had elapsed from -- and not including -- the date of the policy. That would be our understanding of the term "one year thereafter" if the policy itself did not provide that it went into effect on the date which it bore, and if, therefore, the "one year thereafter" had to be computed from the expiration of the date of the policy. But we understand that the expression "after six months," in the paragraph which we are considering, meant after the policy had been in force six months. Accordingly, "one year thereafter" meant after the policy had been in force one year. If we include the 5th day of February, 1934, this policy had been in force six months at the end of the 4th day of August, 1934, and had been in force one year at the end of the 4th day of February, 1935. The expression "within six calendar months from date hereof" is significant, because the fact that the 5th day of February, 1934, was within, or part of, the initial six months in which the policy was in force, makes it impossible for the 5th day of August, 1934, to be within, or part of, the initial six months in which the policy was in force, and makes it impossible for the 5th day of February, 1935, to be within, or a part of, the initial year in which the policy was in force.
There is another paragraph among the "Conditions" of this policy, which confirms our understanding of the expression "the full amount [is payable] if death occur one year thereafter." The paragraph which we now refer to is this:
"If the insured * * * has had before the date this policy was issued any pulmonary disease, chronic bronchitis, cancer, or disease of the heart, liver or kidneys, or if death results from any of these causes before the policy is in force more than a year, then only one-half of the amount herein specified shall be payable to the beneficiary."
The significant features of the paragraph just quoted are, first, the repetition, virtually, that the policy went into force on "the date this policy was issued," and, second, the declaration that only half of the amount specified would be payable to the beneficiary if death should result from one of the specified causes "before the policy is in force more than a year." That was the same as to say that the whole "amount therein specified" would be payable to the beneficiary if death should result, from any cause whatsoever, when the policy had been "in force more than a year." Including, as a part of the year, the 5th day of February, 1934, this policy was in force more than a year on the 5th day of February, 1935, when the death occurred.
It is suggested, by way of argument for the insurance company, that the policy was in force during only a part of the 5th day of February, 1934, and that the expression in the policy "one year thereafter" meant after one year from the end of that day had expired. It was the insurance company itself, though, that worded the contract so as to make the 5th day of February, 1934, one of the days on which the policy was in force. We doubt that we should deal with the first day to be counted as being only a fractional part of a day, in computing the initial year in which the policy was in force. If we should count the first day on which this policy was in force as being only a fractional part of a day, in computing the initial year in which the policy was in force it would be unfair to omit the fractional part of the terminal day, up to the time of day at which the policy was issued. If the computation should be made in that way, the result would show that this policy was in force more than a year before the insured died. He died at 11:35 p. m. on the 5th of February, 1935. It would be unreasonable to presume that the policy, which was issued on the 5th of February, 1934, was issued within the last 25 minutes before midnight that night. We doubt that the hour at which the death occurred is a matter of any importance in this case, however, because the policy, unlike fire insurance policies in that respect, did not state the hour of its going into effect. The Civil Code, in article 2060, declares that, where a term stated in a contract is a month, or a stated number of...
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