Ratcliff v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 27 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:18-cv-715 |
| Parties | ROBERT RATCLIFF, Plaintiff, v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Robert Ratcliff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 32) and Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company's ("NSRC") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 33). Both motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 42). Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement simply called the Court's attention to a case in this District that was decided after briefing closed on the cross motions for partial summary judgment. Defendant opposed the motion and filed a response as to the inapplicability of the cited case. The Court will determine the relevance of the cited case but will allow Plaintiff to supplement his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement is GRANTED.
This case arises out of an alleged injury sustained by Plaintiff early on the morning of January 15, 2018, on NSRC's main rail line running between Portsmouth, Ohio and Columbus, Ohio. Plaintiff was a locomotive conductor with 16 years of experience and safety training as a conductor and engineer. On the morning of the accident, Plaintiff, Engineer David Barnett, and Engineer Cori Martin conducted train 742LB12 from Portsmouth, Ohio to Columbus. (ECF No. 32-2, Ratcliff Dep. at 10, 15, 26-28, 31). After arriving in Columbus at approximately 4:30 a.m., the three men were shuttled a short distance to an area known as "Bannon," where they prepared to conduct train 776LB13 back to Portsmouth. (Id. at 27, 31-32, 35-36, 45). Train 776LB13 was powered by two locomotive units: NS 3637 and NS 3661.
There were three to four inches of snow on the ground in Columbus that morning, and temperatures were in the single digits. (Id. at 27-28, 52). It is unclear exactly when the snow and ice accumulated on the ground. Plaintiff's expert witness, however, testified that the ice conditions were already present when train 776LB13 and its crew arrived in Columbus, at least an hour prior to Plaintiff's arrival, and with enough time to report and correct the conditions. (ECF No. 29-1, Reilly Dep. 73-74). He also testified that he could tell that the ice in question "melted and then refroze and that [it] happen[ed] over a long period of time." (Id. at 58-59). The extent to which winter weather accumulated during the crew's time in Columbus is also unclear. Plaintiff testified that it was not snowing in Columbus when they arrived and that he did not notice any new precipitation while they were at Bannon, but both Barnett and Martin testified that it began to snow lightly while they were there. (ECF No. 32-2, Ratcliff Dep. at 32; ECF No. 32-4, Barnett Dep. at 18; ECF No. 32-4, Martin Dep. at 21).
The three men began their pre-departure routine for Train 776LB13. They boarded lead locomotive NS 3637 through the door at the short hood end and placed their personal belongings in the cab. (ECF No. 32-2, Ratcliff Dep. at 39-41). Barnett then exited the NS 3637 through the same door the men entered, climbed onto the snow-covered ground, and released the handbrakes for both the lead and trailing locomotives. (ECF No. 32-4, Barnett Dep. at 20-21). On his way back, Barnett boarded NS 3637 at the rear of the locomotive and walked along the locomotive's exterior walkway. (Id. at 26). Barnett noticed the walkway was "pretty well covered" with ice and he planned to wait until they reached Portsmouth to report the accumulated ice and snow because there were no mechanical department employees on duty at Bannon. (Id. at 26-29, 69).
Meanwhile, Plaintiff tended to his pre-departure duties, which included releasing the handbrakes on the train cars behind the lead locomotives. (ECF No. 32-2, Ratcliff Dep. at 52-53). Plaintiff took a similar approach to Barnett to complete his exterior duties: he exited NS 3637 the same way he entered the locomotive, walked along the snow-covered ground, released the brakes, re-boarded NS 3637 at the rear of the locomotive, and proceeded toward the front of the cab via the exterior walkway. (Id. at 47-49, 52). Plaintiff chose this route because the other side of the train, the ballast side, had worse conditions. (Id.)
According to NSRC safety rules, employees are required to wear winter footwear and carry a lantern and other personal protective equipment when directed to do so. (ECF No. 29-1, Reilly Dep. at 3-4). As Plaintiff worked to complete to his pre-departure duties, he wore NSRC-approved footwear, carried his NSRC-issued lantern, and carried a "brake stick," which he used to release the handbrakes. (ECF No. 32-2, Ratcliff Dep. at 55, 59). He also held onto a handrail as he walked because the "scattered" ice along the walkway made the surface slippery. (Id. at 55-56).
About halfway to the cab, Plaintiff slipped on a patch of ice that was too long to avoid. (Id. at 59). During the fall, Plaintiff's right foot slipped forward, he lost grip of the railing, and he fell on his buttocks and back. (Id. at 60-62). He experienced immediate pain in his lower back and right leg. (Id. at 68). Barnett assisted him back into the cab of the train. (Id. at 68-69). Following Plaintiff's fall, NSRC conducted its own investigation and noted in the resulting report that the "walkways were observed to be snow and ice covered." (ECF No. 32-9, NSRC Inv. Rep. at 2).
Plaintiff initiated this case on July 20, 2018, by filing a complaint asserting two causes of action against NSRC under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges that NSRC negligently failed to provide Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work. Plaintiff's second cause of action alleges negligence per se for NSRC's alleged violations of the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701, et seq., and various federal regulations, including 49 C.F.R. § 229.119(c), 49 C.F.R. § 229.45, and 49 C.F.R. § 229.7(a). Both parties now move for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's second cause of action.
Defendant moves for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Berryman v. SuperValu Holdings, Inc., 669 F.3d 714, 716-17 (6th Cir. 2012). The Court's purpose in considering a summary judgment motion is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter" but to "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists if the Court finds a jury could return a verdict, based on "sufficient evidence," in favor of the nonmoving party; evidence that is "merelycolorable" or "not significantly probative," however, is not enough to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 249-50.
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of presenting the Court with law and argument in support of its motion as well as identifying the relevant portions of "'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). If this initial burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Cox v. Ky. Dep't of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) ().
In considering the factual allegations and evidence presented in a motion for summary judgment, the Court "views factual evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2009). Self-serving affidavits alone, however, are not enough to create an issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. Johnson v. Washington Cnty. Career Ctr., 982 F. Supp. 2d 779, 788 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (Marbley, J.). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support [the non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.
The Court's standard of review does not change when the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment. See Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991) (). Thus, in reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must still "evaluate each motion on its own merits and view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1994).
Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim brought under the Locomotive Inspection Act ("LIA") via 49 C.F.R. § 229.119(c). Both parties seek partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims brought under the LIA via 49 C.F.R. § 229.7 and 49 C.F.R. § 229.45....
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