Rathbun v. Baumel

Citation196 Iowa 1233,191 N.W. 297
Decision Date15 December 1922
Docket NumberNo. 34377.,34377.
PartiesRATHBUN v. BAUMEL, WARDEN.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Jones County; F. F. Dawley, Judge.

Appeal from an order of Hon. F. F. Dawley, Judge of the District Court in and for the Eighteenth Judicial District, upon hearing in habeas corpus proceeding. The facts and records are sufficiently stated in the opinion. Reversed.

Weaver and Arthur, JJ., dissenting.

Stevens, C. J., dissenting in part.Ben J. Gibson, Atty. Gen., B. J. Flick, Asst. Atty. Gen., B. E. Rhinehart, Co. Atty., of Anamosa, and Chas. S. Macomber, Co. Atty., of Ida Grove, for appellant.

R. S. Milner, of Belle Plaine, and G. P. Linville, of Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

FAVILLE, J.

The appellee was indicted by the grand jury of Ida county, on November 17, 1917, charged with the crime of rape. He was tried on said indictment, and on December 22, 1917, was convicted, and on December 31, 1917, duly sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the reformatory at Anamosa.

On November 16, 1918, the then Governor of the state, Hon. W. L. Harding, acting upon a written application of appellee, for executive clemency, signed and delivered to appellee a pardon for said offense. A copy of said pardon was duly filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of Ida county, on December 7, 1918, and made of record in said office.

Thereafter, on January 6, 1919, an action in equity was instituted in the district court of Ida county, for the cancellation of said pardon. Said action was brought in the name of the state of Iowa, and was instituted by the county attorney of Ida county. In said action the Attorney General of the state, without objection, appeared by petition of intervention. Said officer joined in all of the allegations and the prayer of the petition filed in the name of the state. By order of court said intervention was allowed and the Attorney General, in his official capacity, was made a party plaintiff. It was alleged that said pardon had been procured from the Governor by fraud, practiced by the appellee herein, upon the Governor; that appellee, in procuring the same, had been guilty of a suppression of truth, a suggestion of falsehood, and misrepresentation of evidence. These matters were alleged specifically and in detail, setting forth wherein and by what means it was claimed that a fraud had been committed by appellee upon the Governor in procuring said pardon. It is unnecessary to set out said averments. The appellee appeared in said action in person and by attorney, and filed answer which, with certain admissions, was a general denial.

On February 21, 1919, the appellee filed a petition in habeas corpus in the district court of Ida county. In said petition the appellee, as plaintiff, alleged that he was in custody under a mittimus that had been issued on the judgment and sentence above referred to. Appellee alleged that said commitment was void, because of the pardon issued to appellee, and prayed that he be discharged from restraint under said writ. In this action in habeas corpus, the sheriff of Ida county, who then held the appellee in custody under a mittimus issued on the judgment in the rape case, was made defendant.

An answer was filed in said habeas corpus case which, among other things, alleged that the pardon of appellee was invalid and void for fraud in its procurement, and that the application for a pardon was never referred to the Board of Parole, as the statute requires.

The suit in equity to cancel the pardon and the suit in habeas corpus were heard together. At said time the appellee was present in person and by attorney, and took part in the proceedings. It was stipulated of record, in open court, by all parties, that a decree should be entered in the equity case, adjudging the pardon to be void and ordering it canceled. The court called the appellee before him, and appellee was interrogated by the court as follows:

“Q. Do you understand that this proceeding cancels your pardon, or the pardon granted to you by the Governor, and that the proceedings takes it away from you and you get no rights under it? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is it satisfactory to you to have that done? A. Yes, sir.”

After all this, a decree was duly entered in said equity proceedings, finding that said pardon had been obtained by fraud and deceit, practiced by the appellee upon the Governor, and decreeing that said pardon was void and ordering that the copy of said pardon, held by the appellee, be surrendered and marked “Canceled” and that the copy of the pardon on file in the office of the clerk be marked “Canceled.” No exceptions were taken to this decree by appellee, and no appeal taken therefrom.

The appellee, thereupon, surrendered the copy of the pardon held by him to the clerk of the district court of Ida county, who marked the same “Canceled” and retained the same. The clerk also marked “Canceled” the copy that had been filed in his office.

In the habeas corpus case heard at the same time, the court, upon the issues joined, and after a hearing on the merits, adjudged that the pardon was absolutely void and denied the writ prayed for. No review of this order was ever had or sought. Thereafter, the appellee was confined in the reformatory at Anamosa under commitment until the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in this cause. In said petition the appellee alleges his conviction and sentence in the district court of Ida county, as above set forth, and alleges that he was duly pardoned for said offense, on November 16, 1918, and that because thereof he is unlawfully deprived of his liberty under said commitment.The appellant, by way of answer, alleges all the matters and things that were done in connection with said pardon and the proceedings in equity and in habeas corpus, as herein before set forth, and prays that the writ be denied.

I.

[1] The first question for our determination is as to the effect of the decree in equity, canceling the pardon. It is earnestly contended that the court had no jurisdiction to act in the equity suit to cancel the pardon, and that the decree entered was an unwarranted interference by one department of the state government with a co-ordinate department, and that the decree is void. This case does not present the question of interference by the judiciary with the voluntary and valid act of the executive. Not at all. It may be granted, for the sake of the argument, that if the Governor acted fraudulently, or from improper motives, in granting the pardon, that he is answerable therefor to the people, or subject to impeachment, and that the courts cannot question the motives for his acts within the scope of his constitutional authority, even though he acted corruptly. But no such question is presented in this case. There is no claim, hint, or suggestion that the Governor was guilty of any semblance of fraud or that he, in the slightest degree, acted corruptly. The fraud charged was not by the Governor at all. It was a fraud upon the Governor. The written instrument having been once executed and delivered, cannot be revoked by the Governor after he discovers the fraud. All authorities so declare.

[2] That being true, are the courts impotent to protect their judgments from annulment by fraud perpetrated upon the pardoning power? This is no interference by the judicial department with the constitutional prerogatives of a co-ordinate branch of the government. The court is not asked to investigate or pass upon the motives of the Governor in granting the pardon. No such question is in the case. It is the acts of the appellee, who is claiming a benefit under the written instrument, that are the subject of the inquiry. Here we have a situation where a man duly convicted of crime seeks the annulment of the judgment against him. He has possession of a written instrument which, if valid, annuls the judgment. It is contended that the instrument was procured by his own fraud and is therefore invalid.

A court of equity has the power to investigate his title to such written instrument and to inquire whether or not the same is valid. This is not an interference with the prerogatives of the executive. It is merely an inquiry into the rights of the party holding such instrument to claim anything thereunder. The Governor may issue pardons without let or hindrance on the part of the judiciary. No inquiry is made in regard to his acts. But the party seeking to benefit by an official act of the Governor can certainly have his own acts investigated for fraud.

[3] Suggestion is made that the Governor did not institute the proceedings in equity for cancellation of the pardon. This is merely begging the question. If a court of equity has no power to act in such a case, it would be as much without jurisdiction to annul the pardon at the instance of the Governor as at the instance of the head of the department of justice.

[4][5][6] That being true, the question at this point is whether or not a court of equity can entertain a suit to vacate a pardon in any event. If it can do so it certainly can act at the instance of the Attorney General, acting for the people of the commonwealth. It is a fundamental proposition that fraud in the procurement of any written instrument vitiates it in the hands of one seeking to benefit thereby. Likewise, it is one of the functions of a court of equity to set aside and hold for naught any written instrument that has its inception in fraud. Also, it is an established maxim that one cannot lawfully profit by his own wrong. One of the most important functions of a court of equity is to inquire into the validity of written instruments that are impeachable for fraud. A pardon must be evidenced by a written instrument. It is not sufficient to vacate and supersede the judgment of a court, for the executive to orally say to the convict, “Go, and sin no more.” A pardon is a deed to the validity of which delivery and acceptance are...

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11 cases
  • McLaughlin v. Bronson, 13110
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 16 Febrero 1988
    ...... This is consistent with the general rule that judgments and written instruments obtained by fraud are void. Rathbun v. Baumel, 196 Iowa 1233, 1239, 191 N.W. 297 (1922); Adkins v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 312, 319-20, 23 S.W.2d 277 (1929). Some courts have upheld ......
  • Rathbun v. Baumel
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • 15 Diciembre 1922
  • Harms v. Bennett
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • 20 Octubre 1964
    ...... Rathbun v. Baumel, 196 Iowa 1233, 191 N.W. 297, 30 A.L.R. 216; Alberts v. Lainson, 250 Iowa 748, 751, 91 N.W.2d 94, 96; Lint v. Bennett, 251 Iowa 1193, 1199, ......
  • Lint v. Bennett, 50045
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • 2 Agosto 1960
    ...... It was again adjudged against him in the second proceeding when plaintiff's status was the same as now. Rathbun v. Baumel, 196 Iowa 1233, 1246, 191 N.W. 297, 30 A.L.R. 216; Streit v. Lainson, 250 Iowa ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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