Ratliff v. Cohn

• Decision Date: 27 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 49S02-9710-CV-529,49S02-9710-CV-529
• Parties: Donna RATLIFF, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Edward COHN, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 530

693 N.E.2d 530

Donna RATLIFF, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Edward COHN, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 49S02-9710-CV-529.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 27, 1998.

Richard A. Waples, JauNac M. Hanger, Waples & Hanger, Indianapolis, Kenneth J. Falk, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General, Phillip D. Hatfield, Deputy Attorney General, Jon Laramore, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.

Greta M. Rowland, Indianapolis, Juvenile Justice Task Force, Inc., Wayne O. Adams, III, David D. Robinson, Johnson, Smith, Pence, Densborn, Wright & Heath, Indianapolis, for Amicus Curiae Indiana Advocates For Children, Inc.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

DICKSON, Justice.

On May 8, 1995, the appellant-plaintiff, fourteen-year-old Donna Ratliff, set fire to her family home, killing her mother and sixteen-year-old sister. Charged as an adult, she pled guilty to arson, a class A felony, and two counts of reckless homicide, class C felonies. The trial court ordered her to serve concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for arson and four years for each reckless homicide conviction. Although the trial court recommended placement in an alternative facility, ¹ the Indiana Department of Corrections ("DOC") instead placed her in the Indiana Adult Women's Prison ("Women's Prison"). ² Once inside the Women's Prison, Ratliff was placed in the Special Needs Unit, separated from the general prison population.

In her civil complaint against the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Corrections ("the Commissioner"), Ratliff contended that the conditions of her incarceration violated the Indiana and United States Constitutions. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the Department of Corrections ("DOC") to transfer her from the Indiana Women's Prison to a rehabilitative juvenile treatment facility.

The Commissioner moved to dismiss the complaint under Trial Rules 12(B)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted) and 12(B)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). Without specifying the basis for its ruling, the trial court granted the motion. Ratliff appealed and, in a cursory opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Article 9, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution "prohibits the incarceration of juveniles with adult prisoners." Ratliff v. Cohn, 679 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). ³ We granted transfer.

A. Trial Rule 12(B)(6)

Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim upon which Relief Could be Granted

Ratliff contends that her complaint sufficiently alleges valid claims and, therefore, the trial court should have denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. In reviewing a dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(6), an appellate court must determine whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every inference drawn in her favor, the complaint stated any set of allegations upon which the trial court could have granted relief to the plaintiff. Cram v. Howell, 680 N.E.2d 1096, 1096 (Ind.1997). Dismissals under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) are "rarely appropriate." Obremski v. Henderson, 497 N.E.2d 909, 910 (Ind.1986).

On appeal, Ratliff presents five state constitutional grounds ⁴ and three federal constitutional grounds ⁵ upon which she contends a trial court could grant relief. We address these grounds accordingly.

1. Institutions for Juvenile Offenders

Ratliff contends that Article 9, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution, "[t]he General Assembly shall provide institutions for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders," ⁶ requires the State to place all juvenile offenders--irrespective of their crimes or background--in institutions separate from adult prisons.

Questions arising under the Indiana Constitution are to be resolved by "examining the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our Constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions." Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996) (citing Ind. Gaming Comm'n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Ind.1994)). See also Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind.1994); Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 963 (Ind.1993); Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 412 (Ind.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 415 (1992). In construing the Constitution we "look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the Constitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy." Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 412 (citing State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 391 (1871)).

At Indiana's constitutional convention in 1850-51, the following text for Article 9, Section 2 was proposed: "The General Assembly shall have the power to provide Houses of Refuge for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders." Comments of Delegate Bryant (Dec. 18, 1850), in 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, 1203 (Indiana Historical Collections Reprint, 1935). When this provision was subsequently discussed at the convention, Delegate James Bryant of Warren County moved to amend the proposed language to state that the General Assembly shall provide Houses of Refuge, "so as to make it obligatory upon the General Assembly to provide houses of refuge for juvenile offenders, instead of referring the subject to the discretion of that body, as proposed by the reported section." Id. at 1903 (Jan. 29, 1851). He justified this amendment by stating, "Since this Convention assembled, we have had a state of facts presented to us, such as I had previously no conception of." Id. That previously unknown information involved the fact that "more than one-eighth of the whole number" of convicts committed to the Indiana State prison from September, 1822, to November, 1850, "were minors within the age of twenty-one years, and some of these as young as eleven years of age." Id. (emphasis in original). Delegate Bryant described this as an "outrage upon civilization and humanity," concluding that he was "persuaded that if these facts had been spread before the public, such a deep disgrace to the character of Indiana would long since have been swept away by the fierce indignation of the people." Id.

Delegate Bryant then concluded that "the object of all punishment" was "two-fold: the prevention of crime and the reformation of the offender." Id. He questioned how the framers could "propose to diminish crime" or "reform offenders" with a system which sends "the children of the State, perhaps the victims of dissolute parents and neglected education, to this school of vice and infamy, where they cannot fail by means of the associations into which you thrust them, to be irretrievably ruined?" Id. He urged, "There is in this Convention, I am sure, but one feeling in regard to this matter, and that is, that this outrage upon all propriety and humanity shall no longer be." Id. He concluded, "With such facts before us, it is the imperative duty of the Convention to arrest this evil, to prevent this iniquitous system from being any longer tolerated, and to compel the General Assembly to provide institutions where these juvenile offenders can be restrained, and at the same time reformed." Id.

Delegate James Lockhart of Posey and Vanderburgh Counties echoed Delegate Bryant's indignation, arguing that "there is no question that can be presented for the consideration of this Convention, that is of more importance than this." Comments of Delegate Lockhart (Jan. 29, 1850), in 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, 1903 (Indiana Historical Collections Reprint, 1935). He noted that, "Having occupied for several years past a high judicial position, I have often been pained to see the youth, the mere boy, branded as a felon, under our laws, and sent for a series of years to that worst of all prisons in the United States--the Jeffersonville State prison." Id.

Delegate Bryant's amendment was adopted and the convention approved Article 9, Section 2. The resulting Constitution was thereafter ratified and became effective on November 1, 1851. Governor's Proclamation Declaring Constitution in Force (Sept. 3, 1851, in 1 CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA 1780-1850, § 149, at 420 (Charles Kettleborough, 1916)).

Clearly, there was strong support at the convention for significant change from the then-existing state of affairs regarding juvenile incarceration. We agree with Ratliff that Article 9, Section 2 "is unambiguous in requiring the legislature to provide institutions for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders." Brief of Appellant at 11.

However, while the Constitution clearly requires the General Assembly to create a House of Refuge to provide alternative reformation and incarceration opportunities for juvenile offenders, ⁷ what is not clear is whether the framers intended that every juvenile convicted of an adult crime be sent to the House of Refuge.

Our review of the debates of the constitutional convention reveals no discussion of whether the House of Refuge should be the exclusive place for all juvenile offenders without regard to the nature of the juvenile's crime or the background of the juvenile offender. Noticeably absent from the text of Article 9, Section 2 is any adjective designating inclusivity, such as "all juvenile offenders," "every juvenile offender," "any juvenile offender," or "each juvenile offender." This absence is despite the fact that such adjectives were employed in many, if not most, other constitutional provisions. ⁸ Further, we find no historical evidence of contemporaneous public expectation that the new constitution was intended to prohibit the incarceration of any and every juvenile offender in an adult prison. In fact, other than...