Ratliff v. State

• Decision Date: 23 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-2644,94-2644
• Citation: 666 So.2d 1008
• Parties: 21 Fla. L. Weekly D268 Sidney Tyrone RATLIFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1008

666 So.2d 1008

21 Fla. L. Weekly D268

Sidney Tyrone RATLIFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 94-2644.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

Jan. 23, 1996.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. R. Hudson Olliff, Judge.

James T. Miller of Corse, Bell & Miller, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Patrick Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

BENTON, Judge.

Convicted of burglary with assault, Sidney Tyrone Ratliff seeks reversal on grounds the trial court erred in allowing a peremptory challenge to an African-American juror designate, and in accepting as racially neutral the reasons the prosecutor advanced for the challenge. While we agree that some of the reasons offered bore no relationship to the prospective juror's ability to sit, we find no evidence of racial bias. We also reject appellant's contention that the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony from trial as irrelevant (a contention we do not believe merits further discussion), certify a question concerning the proper procedure when a litigant objects that an opposing party seeks to exercise a peremptory challenge for constitutionally impermissible reasons, and affirm.

Peremptory Challenge

During voir dire, the prosecutor sought to exercise a peremptory challenge against David Flowers, who like Mr. Ratliff is African-American. ¹ Defense counsel promptly "ask[ed] the court to do a Neil inquiry." ² Called upon to state reasons for the peremptory challenge to Mr. Flowers, the prosecutor responded: "Judge, Mr. Flowers appears to be a single male in his forties with no children. He also needed help, trouble reading through the factual background history."

Defense counsel did not respond by questioning the legitimacy ³ or accuracy of any reason articulated by the state for its challenge to Mr. Flowers. The trial court ruled: "I find the reasons given by both state and defense ⁴ are racially neutral reasons and ... I deny your challenge [to the prosecutor's right to exercise the peremptory challenge]." The record does not reveal the race of the juror who sat in Mr. Flowers' stead.

Before the jury from which Mr. Flowers was excluded was sworn and before other members of the venire had been dismissed, defense counsel accepted the jury panel "subject to [our] previously stated objections." "[A]ccepting a jury subject to an earlier Neil objection is sufficient to preserve the issue of alleged racial bias in the exercise of peremptory challenges." Suggs v. State, 620 So.2d 1231, 1232 (Fla.1993); Mitchell v. State, 620 So.2d 1008 (Fla.1993). See Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174 (Fla.1993).

On appeal, Mr. Ratliff contends that the trial court erred in allowing the peremptory challenge, arguing that the reasons the state advanced for the challenge--identified in appellant's brief as Mr. Flowers' age, marital status, lack of children, and purported difficulty in reading the juror questionnaire--had no bearing on the facts of the case, that there was no record basis for the assertion that Mr. Flowers had difficulty reading, ⁵ and that the trial court accepted the proffered reasons without critical evaluation.

Inquiry Necessary

Unless there are "race-neutral reasons for excusal ... already on the record," Taylor v. State, 638 So.2d 30, 33 (Fla.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 518, 130 L.Ed.2d. 424 (1994), a trial court must make inquiry if a party objects on grounds that even a single peremptory challenge is racially motivated. State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1993); Reynolds v. State, 576 So.2d 1300 (Fla.1991). That is what happened here. "[U]nless a court can cite specific circumstances in the record that eliminate all question of discrimination, it must conduct an inquiry." Valentine v. State, 616 So.2d 971, 974 (Fla.1993). In Florida courts, defense counsel as well as prosecutors may be called upon to justify peremptory challenges, State v. Aldret, 606 So.2d 1156 (Fla.1992), and the issue may also arise in civil cases. Hall v. Daee, 602 So.2d 512 (Fla.1992).

Reviewing courts "must rely on the superior vantage point of the trial judge, who is present, can consider the demeanor of those involved, and can get a feel for what is going on in the jury selection process." Files v. State, 613 So.2d 1301, 1305 (Fla.1992). Whether the prosecutor is discriminating on the basis of race is a question of fact, one which the trial court has primary responsibility to resolve.

Part of the trial judge's role is to evaluate both the credibility of the person offering the explanation as well as the credibility of the asserted reasons. These must be weighed in light of the circumstances of the case and the total course of the voir dire in question, as reflected in the record.

State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988). "While these issues encompass more than 'basic, primary or historical facts,' their resolution depends heavily on the trial court's appraisal of ... credibility and demeanor." Thompson v. Keohane, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 457, 465, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). Unless clearly erroneous, the trial court's findings concerning discriminatory intent will be upheld.

Florida Procedures

The Florida Supreme Court laid down procedures initially to protect the right of the accused under the Florida Constitution to an impartial jury. State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984). See Kibler v. State, 546 So.2d 710, 712 (Fla.1989) (declaring Neil "unmistakably based" on the Florida Constitution). Antedating Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the decision in Neil put the burden of proof on the proponent of a peremptory challenge--the party denying racial discrimination--"to show that the questioned challenges were not exercised solely because of the prospective jurors' race," 457 So.2d at 486-87, but only if the questioning party first showed "a substantial likelihood" that the challenge sprang from racial prejudice.

By the time the court decided Slappy, Florida case law required no inquiry or evaluation until and unless the party questioning the challenge proved a substantial likelihood that racial discrimination was the reason for the questioned challenge, but the decision in Batson had come down. The Slappy court said:

Once a trial judge is satisfied that the complaining party's objection was proper and not frivolous, the burden of proof shifts. At this juncture, Neil imposes upon the other party an obligation to rebut the inference created when the defense met its initial burden of persuasion. This rebuttal must consist of a "clear and reasonably specific" racially neutral explanation of "legitimate reasons" for the state's use of its peremptory challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98 & n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-24 & n. 20. While the reasons need not rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause, they nevertheless must consist of more than the assumption

that [the veniremen] would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.... Nor may the [party exercising the challenge] rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or "affirming his good faith in individual selections." ... If these general assertions were accepted as rebutting a ... prima facie case, the Equal Protection Clause "would be but a vain and illusory requirement." Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972), and Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598, 55 S.Ct. 579, 584, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935)).

Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22 (emphasis added). The court has since reiterated that a "Neil inquiry requires the person exercising the questioned peremptories to show that the challenges were not exercised solely on the basis of the prospective juror's race." State v. Alen, 616 So.2d 452, 453 (Fla.1993) (emphasis added).

Batson v. Kentucky

In Batson, the Court spelled out different procedures for vindication of prospective jurors' federal rights to equal protection of the laws. See Purkett v. Elem, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) ("the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike"); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); Batson. Shifting the burden of proof in the manner set out in Slappy is inconsistent with the procedure prescribed in Batson. Confusion arises because the Slappy opinion cites Batson with apparent approval, seemingly with the intention to adopt the federal procedure for the protection of state constitutional rights, as well. Certainly a unified procedure has practical advantages.

In the employment context, ⁶ Florida courts have long been familiar with the procedure the federal supreme court adopted in Batson for deciding whether particular prosecutorial peremptory challenges effect invidious discrimination:

In Batson, we outlined a three-step process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the Equal Protection Clause.... First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Id., at 96-97, 106 S.Ct., at 1722-1723. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Id., at 97-98, 106 S.Ct., at 1723-1724. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Id., at 98, 106 S.Ct., at 1723.

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59, 111 S.Ct. at 1865-66 (emphasis added). Upon a prima facie showing that racial prejudice motivates peremptory challenges, the party exercising the questioned peremptory...