Ratliff v. Stretch

• Decision Date: 05 February 1892
• Citation: 30 N.E. 30,130 Ind. 282
• Parties: RATLIFF v. STRETCH et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

130 Ind. 282

30 N.E. 30

RATLIFF

v.STRETCH et al.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 5, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Grant county; R. T. ST. JOHN, Judge.

Action by John Ratliff against Jane A. Stretch and others to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment for partition, and the prosecution of an action for the recovery of rents. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

John A. Kersey, for appellant. Carroll & Dean, for appellees.

MILLER, J.

The action of the court in sustaining a demurrer to the complaint is the only question contained in the record. The action is to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment for the partition of real estate, and the prosecution of an action for the recovery of rents. A synopsis of so much of the complaint as is deemed necessary to an understanding of the questions of law involved is as follows: Plaintiff complains of defendants, and says that the plaintiff is the owner in fee-simple of a tract of real estate, which is described; that in 1868 he recovered a judgment in the Grant circuit court against said Jane A. Stretch and others, quieting his title to the real estate; that since that time she has never acquired or had any right or title thereto or interest therein; that by a mistake and inadvertence on the part of the clerk of the court who recorded the judgment the description of the land was omitted from the decree; that plaintiff did not know of the mistake and omission until the year 1886, and when he learned of the same the complaint in the cause was not on file in the office of the clerk of said court, and upon diligent search could not be found; that the complaint in said cause contained an accurate description of the real estate; that since the April term, 1889, of the Grant circuit court, the plaintiff has found the complaint, and has commenced proceedings to procure the amendment and correction of the decree, by havinginserted therein the description of the real estate as contained in the complaint; that in the year 1886 said Jane A. Stretch recovered a judgment against the plaintiff in said court for the partition of said real estate, and on the trial of the cause plaintiff put in evidence the record of his judgment quieting his title against her, and then for the first time learned that said judgment and decree did not contain a description of the real estate; that the complaint containing the description was lost, and could not be found; that, if said decree had contained said description, or if said complaint could have been found, it would have been given in evidence, and said Jane A. Stretch could not and would not have recovered her judgment in partition against him, but that in said action she did obtain a decree in partition for the one-seventh of said real estate; that, as soon as the plaintiff found said complaint, he commenced his proceedings to correct the record of said judgment; that when the record is corrected it will show that said Jane has no right or title to or interest in said real estate, and never had any; that there was no paper or memorandum other than the complaint by which the judgment quieting title could have been amended. The complaint shows that the land in dispute was about to be sold by a commissioner appointed in the partition suit. It is also alleged that said Jane A. Stretch had commenced an action against the plaintiff, which was pending, for the recovery of rents on the one-seventh interest in the land which had been set off to her; that the plaintiff is now able to prove by his said judgment quieting title, and the complaint filed by him in that suit, that when said Jane A. Stretch recovered her judgment in partition she had no right or title to or interest in said real estate, which fact he was unable to prove on the trial by said unavoidable accident and mistake. The power of courts of general jurisdiction to grant equitable relief is not only conferred by our code of practice, but has often been recognized as among their inherent powers, necessary to the complete administration of justice. Nealis v. Dicks, 72 Ind. 374;Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318;Curtis v. Gooding, 99 Ind. 45;Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338;Brown v. Goble, 97 Ind. 86.

The liberal provisions of our Code by which both legal and equitable defenses may be interposed on a trial and new trials granted for misconduct of the jury or prevailing party, or on account of accident or surprise, have, by affording an equally efficient and more expeditions method of affording relief, greatly abridged the province of equity in granting relief by injunction. On this...