Ratony's Estate, In re

• Citation: 277 A.2d 791,443 Pa. 454
• Parties: In re ESTATE of Alexander RATONY, Jr., late of the City of Coatesville, Chester County, Pennsylvania, Deceased. Appeal of Julia RATONY, the surviving spouse.
• Decision Date: 27 May 1971
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 791

277 A.2d 791

443 Pa. 454

In re ESTATE of Alexander RATONY, Jr., late of the City of

Coatesville, Chester County, Pennsylvania, Deceased.

Appeal of Julia RATONY, the surviving spouse.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 27, 1971.

Franklin L. Gordon, Gordon & Ashton, Coatesville, for appellant.

William R. Keen, Jr., Milton Apfelbaum, Coatesville, for appellee, Doris Ratony Moore, Ex'x, and others.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY and BARBIERI, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELL, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves the validity of a postnuptial Separation Agreement.

Decedent, Alexander Ratony, Jr., and appellant, Julia Ratony, were married on June 15, 1940. On June 20, the Ratonys purchased property in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, As tenants by the entireties. Sixteen months later, being then separated, they conveyed the property for a net sum of $620. On December 11, 1941, they executed a formal Separation Agreement. The Agreement was drawn by the decedent's attorney, who also witnessed its signing. After the Agreement was entered into, the parties continued to live apart and appellant made no attempt to attack or set aside or ignore the clear language of this Agreement or the mutual promises they made therein, until after decedent's death on August 26, 1968, twenty-seven years later.

In the Separation Agreement, Which contained mutual promises and mutual releases, they (1) divided all the net proceeds of the sale of their home which they owned as tenants by the entireties, namely $620; and (2) agreed to divide all the furniture and personal articles which they owned, as well as certain leased articles; and, most important of all, (3) mutually agreed that '* * * this shall be a full and complete settlement of all property rights between the parties (and) from this time forward, neither party shall have any property interests in any property owned by the other.' The parties in this case were (when they made this Agreement) extremely poor. The husband gave his wife one-half of everything he had in the world. In the twenty-seven years in which they lived separate and apart, appellant never made any attempt to go back and live with the husband, or to get any support from him, or to claim any of his subsequently acquired property, or made any attempt to set aside or attack the Separation Agreement.

The Separation Agreement provides as follows:

'Separation Agreement

'This agreement made this 11th day of December 1941 by and between Alexander Ratony, Jr. and Julia, his wife, witnesseth:

'Whereas differences have arisen between the parties on account of which they are now separated and are now living separate and apart and Intending to live separate and apart from each other during the remainder of their natural lives, ¹ and

'Whereas the home formerly occupied by the parties has been sold and the various debts in connection with the said real estate have been paid, and

'Whereas there has resulted a fund of six hundred and twenty dollars ($620.00), and

'Whereas the parties have mutually agreed upon a division of the furniture, and upon the retention of all personal articles belonging to each other and have agreed to either return or take over certain leased articles.

'Now, therefore In settlement, adjustment and compromise of all property, questions and rights, the parties hereto have mutually agreed that upon the division of the said six hundred and twenty dollars ($620.00) and upon the payment of three hundred and ten dollars ($310.00) thereof to Julia, the wife, that This shall be a full and complete settlement of all property rights between the parties. From this time forward, neither party shall have any property interests in any property owned by the other. (Could any language be clearer?)

'The said Julia hereby expressly agrees that the said division and the said payment shall be in lieu of all claims for support and she hereby expressly agrees that she will not assert any further claim for support against her said husband.

'This agreement does not prevent or in any way militate against the right of either party to ask for and obtain a divorce, nor does it admit or deny any such right.

'In witness whereof the parties do hereto set their hands and seals this 11th day of December 1941.

(s) Julia Ratony

(s) Alexander Ratony, Jr.

'(s) Walter A. Herley

Witness to both

'Received $310.00 in full.

Dec. 14, 1941

(s) Julia Ratony'

Appellant filed an election to take against decedent's will and, pursuant to Section 11 of the Estates Act of 1947, P.L. 100, an election to take against certain of his inter vivos conveyances. Since the estate is insolvent, the only relevant election is her claim under Section 11. She therefore filed objections to the first and final account of decedent's executrix, based on her failure to include certain assets which were transferred by decedent during his lifetime. The lower Court found the Separation Agreement to be valid And that, as of the date thereof, 'the decedent and his wife possessed no assets other than the proceeds from the sale of their former home together with certain items of furniture and personal items referred to in the agreement of that date.' This very important finding of fact, Which the minority completely ignore, was certainly and unquestionably supported by the evidence and, together with the above-quoted Agreement and the mutual promises and releases therein contained, is decisive of this case! Accordingly, the Court confirmed the account and dismissed appellant's objections. This appeal followed.

It is appellant's contention that the Separation Agreement, notwithstanding its crystal-clear language And its mutual promises and mutual releases of any property interests in any property then and 'from this time forward' owned by the other, discloses a want or failure of consideration, and, consequently, does not bar her right to take against his will or his (so-called) inter vivos conveyances.

We find absolutely no merit in any of appellant's contentions.

Preliminarily, we are of the opinion that the principles applicable to antenuptial agreements, even though the consideration and the circumstances may sometimes differ slightly, are equally applicable to postnuptial agreements. See Slagle's Appeal, 294 Pa. 442, 144 A. 426.

It is a general principle of law which has existed for centuries that mutual promises are binding upon the parties thereto and furnish valid consideration. Section 103, Williston on Contracts (3 Ed. 1957); § 75, Restatement of the Law, Contracts; 8 P.L.E. Contracts, § 45; Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 283 Pa. 434, 129 A. 559; Gredler's Estate, 361 Pa. 384, 65 A.2d 404; Rosciolo Estate, 434 Pa. 461, 258 A.2d 623; Kaplan v. Kaplan, 25 Ill.2d 181, 182 N.E.2d 706. 8 P.L.E. Contracts, § 45, states: 'Mutual promises afford sufficient legal consideration for the support of each other, and the mutual promises of the parties are sufficient to create a binding contract.' In Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 283 Pa. 434, 129 A. 559, supra, this Court said (page 441, 129 A. page 562): "Where there is no other consideration for a contract mutual promises must be binding on both parties." In Gredler's Estate, 361 Pa. 384, 65 A.2d 404, supra, we pertinently said (page 387, 65 A.2d page 406): 'These mutual promises, made by the parties in the presence of a witness, cf. Moffitt v. Moffitt, 340 Pa. 107, 16 A.2d 418 constituted an enforceable contract.'

In Rosciolo Estate, 434 Pa. 461, 258 A.2d 623, supra, the parties entered into a mutually-executed antenuptial agreement. This agreement was drawn by an attorney for the husband and, as in the present case, the wife did not have an attorney. The agreement pertinently provided: '(I)t is agreed that all the properties of any name or nature, real, personal or mixed, wherever they may be found, belonging to the party of the first part before marriage, shall be and remain forever, his personal estate * * *.' There then followed a disclosure by the parties of their respective properties, but there was no provision with respect to an abandonment of the right of a wife to take against her husband's will. ² Upon her husband's death, the wife elected to take against her husband's will. She presented several contentions which she finally limited to one, namely, she 'based her claim and her right to an election to take against his will on the fact that the Antenuptial Agreement (which contained less specific language and less clear property releases than does the Agreement in the present case) Did not contain an express waiver of this right (to take against his will).' In spite of the fact that Mrs. Rosciolo (an Italian) spoke and understood very little of the English language, a unanimous Supreme Court stated (pages 466--467, 258 A.2d page 626): 'In our judgment, this Antenuptial Agreement precludes any right of either party to take against the will of the other, Even though there is no express waiver.'

We believe the following portion of the present Agreement, 'in settlement and * * * compromise Of all property, questions And rights, the parties hereto have Mutually agreed that * * * this shall be a full and complete settlement of all property rights between the parties. From this time forward, neither party shall have any property interests in any property owned by the other,' clearly and unequivocally provides that the wife gave up all rights to and all property rights and all property interests in any property of decedent then or from that time forward owned by the husband.

Because of the different and very intimate relationship of husband and wife (and of prospective spouses), One of two additional factors has been required to validate ante-and postnuptial agreements. An antenuptial or postnuptial agreement is presumed to be valid and binding upon the parties thereto and the party seeking to avoid or nullify or circumvent the...