Ratzlaff, Matter of, 13721
| Decision Date | 02 June 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 13721,13721 |
| Citation | 564 P.2d 1312,34 St.Rep. 470,172 Mont. 439 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Robert John RATZLAFF. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
W. Art Graham (argued), Missoula, David J. Patterson (argued), Missoula, for appellant.
Michael T. Greely, Atty. Gen., Helena, Allen B. Chronister, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Helena, Harold F. Hanser, County Atty., Billings, for respondent.
This is an application for post-conviction relief by an inmate of the Montana State Prison. He seeks to void an order of the district court, Yellowstone County, revoking a Sentence Review Division suspension of his sentence.
On December 13, 1972, petitioner Robert John Ratzlaff was convicted of the crime of robbery by jury verdict in the district court of the thirteenth judicial district, County of Yellowstone, Billings, Montana. On January 3, 1973, Hon. Charles Luedke, district judge, sentenced petitioner to 25 years in Montana State Prison with credit given for time already served.
Petitioner sought reduction of his sentence from the Sentence Review Division. On November 7, 1974, the Sentence Review Division ordered that '* * * THE LAST 10 YEARS OF SAID SENTENCE IS HEREBY SUSPENDED.' An amended judgment and commitment conforming thereto was ordered on November 21 by Hon. Robert J. Boyd, district judge, third judicial district, which encompasses Powell County, where the state prison is located and the Sentence Review Division sits.
On June 9, 1975, petitioner was paroled from Montana State Prison. While on parole in August 1976, petitioner was charged with violating the conditions of his parole. In a preliminary hearing held by a hearing officer for the Montana Board of Probation and Parole, probable cause that violations had occurred was found.
The Yellowstone County attorney petitioned the district court of Yellowstone County to revoke the suspension of sentence previously granted by the Sentence Review Division. At the hearing, petitioner objected to the jurisdiction of the district court to determine the matter. On October 4, 1976, Judge Luedke entered a finding that petitioner had violated his parole and ordered the suspension of sentence by the Sentence Review Division revoked.
Subsequently, the Montana Board of Pardons revoked petitioner's parole following a hearing. Petitioner is now incarcerated at Montana State Prison under his original 25 year sentence.
Petitioner has applied to this Court seeking to have the district court's order revoking suspension of his sentence declared void.
Three issues of law are presented for decision:
(1) Does the district court have jurisdiction to revoke a suspension of sentence granted by the Sentence Review Division?
(2) Does the district court have jurisdiction to revoke a suspension of sentence for violation of parole conditions imposed by the Board of Pardons?
(3) Does revocation of a suspension of sentence by the district court after petitioner had begun serving a lawfully suspended sentence violate the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions?
Petitioner argues the district court has no jurisdiction to revoke suspension of a sentence granted by the Sentence Review Division. He points out that section 95-2503, R.C.M. 1947, expressly provides that the decision of the Sentence Review Division is final; that revocation of such suspension of sentence is contrary to the purpose of the Sentence Review Division in that it permits the original sentencing court, with a potential for vindictive treatment of the offender, to nullify the decision of the Division; and, that only the court which suspended the sentence has power to revoke the suspension under section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947.
Section 95-2503 provides in pertinent part that the 'decision of the review division in each case shall be final.' This is not equivalent to a prohibition against revocation of its suspension of sentence by reason of defendant's subsequent conduct violating the conditions of suspension. The conditions of suspension, although not expressed in the Division's order or the amended judgment, sentence and commitment of Judge Boyd in conformity therewith, are necessarily implied as the power to suspend without probation has been held not to exist. State ex rel. Foot v. Dist. Ct., 72 Mont. 374, 233 P. 957. The conditions are found in the regulations of the Board of Pardons, MAC 20-3.10(6)-S10060, and it is these conditions that Judge Luedke found petitioner had violated which form the basis for revocation of the suspension. Thus the Divison's decision was not nullified by the action of the district court, but on the contrary was recognized and given effect in conformity with its conditions.
The potential for vindictive treatment of the offender at a revocation hearing appears no greater here than where the suspension was granted by the original sentencing court under section 95-2206, both before and after its amendment in 1974. There is nothing in this record to even remotely suggest the presence of such factor. Nor do we find such abstract potential to contravene the purposes of the Sentence Review Division. The Division consists of three district judges who are simply not in an adversary position vis-a-vis their colleagues whose sentences they review.
Section 95-2206 provides in pertinent part:
'Any judge who has suspended the execution of a sentence * * * of imprisonment under this section, or his successor, is authorized thereafter, in his discretion, during the period of such suspended sentence * * * to revoke such suspension * * *.'
Although this statute grants the power of revocation to a district judge who has suspended a sentence of imprisonment, it does not necessarily withhold such power where the suspension is granted by the Sentence Review Division. We note there is no grant of the power of revocation to the Division. Sections 95-2501 through 95-2504, R.C.M. 1947. As the Division operates only on petition of the defendant (section 95-2502), constitutional due process and double jeopardy problems would arise if the state were permitted to initiate proceedings there. These considerations persuade us to adopt the view that the Division lacks jurisdiction over a revocation proceeding initiated by the state.
If the Division lacks jurisdiction to hear the state's petition to revoke a Division-imposed suspension of sentence, who but the district court has that power? The district court is a court of general jurisdiction. The revocation of a suspension of sentence leaves the defendant subject to execution of the original sentence, as though it had never been suspended. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 64 S.Ct....
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State v. Coleman, 14448
...multiple punishment for the same offense. Ex Parte Lange (1873), 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173, 21 L.Ed. 872; Matter of Ratzlaff (1977), Mont., 564 P.2d 1312, 1316, 34 St.Rep. 470. Defendant has contended his conviction on the count of deliberate homicide is upon the same set of facts as his ......
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State Of Mont. v. Haagenson, DA 09-0471.
...a suspended sentence thus “lives with the knowledge that a fixed sentence for a definite term hangs over him.” In re Ratzlaff, 172 Mont. 439, 445, 564 P.2d 1312, 1316 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). Revocation of a suspended sentence “indicates a determination by the court that t......
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State v. Morrison
...Although acknowledging our holdings to the contrary in State v. Sullivan, 197 Mont. 395, 642 P.2d 1008 (1982), and. Matter of Ratzlaff, 172 Mont. 439, 564 P.2d 1312 (1977), Morrison notes the language of § 46-18-203(2), MCA, referencing the filing of a revocation petition "during the period......
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State v. Oppelt, 14289
...leaves the defendant subject to execution of the original sentence, as though it had never been suspended." Matter of Ratzlaff (1977), Mont., 564 P.2d 1312, 1315, 34 St.Rep. 470, 473, citing Roberts v. United States (1943), 320 U.S. 264, 64 S.Ct. 113, 88 L.Ed. 41; see also State ex rel. Bot......