Rau v. Apple-Rio Management Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 1:97-CV-2345-GGB.,Civ.A. 1:97-CV-2345-GGB.
• Citation: 85 F.Supp.2d 1344
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
• Parties: Janet M. RAU, Plaintiff, v. APPLE-RIO MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., d/b/a T.J. Applebee's; Café Ventures, Inc.; Apple Restaurants, Inc.; and Steve Smith, Defendants.

85 F.Supp.2d 1344

Janet M. RAU, Plaintiff, v. APPLE-RIO MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., d/b/a T.J. Applebee's; Café Ventures, Inc.; Apple Restaurants, Inc.; and Steve Smith, Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 1:97-CV-2345-GGB.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

September 30, 1999.

R. Lawrence Ashe, Jr., William Bradley Hill, Jr., Nancy E. Rafuse, Paul Hastings Janofsky & Walker, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Paul Oliver, Kathleen Jean Van Detta, Wimberly & Lawson, Atlanta, GA, Stephen Paul Fuller, Davidson, Fuller & Sloan, Duluth, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER REGARDING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

BRILL, United States Magistrate Judge.

The jury trial of this case concluded on August 20, 1999 when the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor on two counts. This action is currently before the court on this court's August 24, 1999 order requiring the parties to brief the issue of how and in what amount judgment should be entered [Doc. 132], and on plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment [Doc. 133].

On plaintiff's claim for sex discrimination, the jury awarded $17,000 in back pay, $50,000 in compensatory damages, and $1,200,000 in punitive damages. On plaintiff's claim for retaliation, the jury awarded $17,000 in back pay, $42,000 in compensatory damages, and $500,000 in punitive damages. Plaintiff's remaining claims were dismissed by this court on March 30, 1999, including all claims against defendant Steve Smith.

Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment in the full amount of the jury award ($1,826,000). (Doc. 133 ¶ 1). Plaintiff concedes that this amount exceeds the cap on damages required by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, but argues that application of § 1981a should be the subject of post-judgment motions. (Id., Brief at 2-3). Plaintiff also seeks prejudgment interest, at the rate of 12%, on the total award for back pay and compensatory damages ($126,000). (Id. at 4). Finally, plaintiff seeks an array of injunctive and declaratory relief. (Id. at 4-7).

Defendant opposes entry of judgment in the full amount of the verdict because it exceeds the § 1981a cap. (Doc. 134 at 2-8). According to defendant, plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment in the amount of $334,000. (Id. at 8). Defendant also contends that prejudgment interest is not warranted in this case, and that plaintiff is not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief because she did not request it in the pretrial order and because her request is excessive. (Id. at 8-11).

For reasons stated below, plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment [Doc. 133] is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. Judgement will be entered in the amount of $334,000 with the injunctive relief specified below.

I. MONETARY RELIEF

A. Jury Award

1. Jury award not permitted by statute should not be entered as judgment

Generally, entry of judgment is reserved for final resolution of an action, not, as plaintiff suggests, as an intermediate procedure designed to aid final resolution. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(a) ("`Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies."); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c) ("every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered in entitled"); 10 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2651 (1998) ("The terms `decision' and `judgment' are not synonymous under the federal rules. The decision consists of the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law; the rendition of judgment is the pronouncement of that decision and the act that gives it legal effect.").

As noted above, the parties do not dispute that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a is applicable and, more importantly, that it requires reduction of the jury award; their disagreement concerns the amount of that reduction. Entry of judgment in an amount that all agree would require adjustment is contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For this reason, the court will consider how § 1981a should apply and will adjust the jury award accordingly.¹

2. Limitation on damages established by § 1981a applies to each action, not each claim

Section 1981a governs the award of damages in Title VII cases. It permits recovery of compensatory² and punitive damages, but places a variable limit on the amount recoverable. In relevant part, the statute states:

(a)(1) In an action brought by a complaining party under [Title VII] ... the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section....

(b)(3) The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party ... (D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees ... $300,000....

(d) As used in this section: (1) The term "complaining party" means — (A) ... a person who may bring an action or proceeding under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.)....

42 U.S.C. § 1981a (emphasis added).

Plaintiff contends that the $300,000 cap should apply separately to each of her claims, for a total cap of $600,000. (Doc. 133, Brief at 3 n. 2). Defendant contends that the $300,000 cap applies to plaintiff's action as a whole. (Doc. 134 at 2-8).³

The court agrees with defendant and with every other court that has addressed the issue, and finds that the plain language of § 1981a requires application of the cap to the action as a whole, not to each individual claim. See Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1199-1201 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 822, 119 S.Ct. 64, 142 L.Ed.2d 50 (1998); Smith v. Chicago School Reform Board, 165 F.3d 1142, 1149-50 (7th Cir.1999); Baty v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1245-46 (10th Cir.1999); Krahel v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 971 F.Supp. 440, 455 (D.Or.1997); Hall v. Stormont Trice Corp., 976 F.Supp. 383, 385-86 (E.D.Va.1997); Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Assoc., 977 F.Supp. 464, 469-70 (D.D.C.1997), vac'd on other grounds, 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C.Cir.1999); Muller v. Costello, 997 F.Supp. 299, 302-03 (N.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 187 F.3d 298 (2nd Cir.1999). See also Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980) (A "familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."). The reference to "each complaining party" in § 1981a(b)(3), in combination with the definition of "complaining party" found in § 1981(d) and the reference to "action" in § 1981a(a)(1), compels a finding that the caps apply to each action, not each claim.

B. Prejudgment Interest

Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to prejudgment interest, at the rate of 12% from November 12, 1996 until the date of judgment, on the total back pay and compensatory damages awarded by the jury. (Doc. 133 ¶ 4). In response, defendant contends that this court has discretion to decline an award of prejudgment interest and that it should do so in this case. (Doc. 134 at 8-9). According to defendant The Court should exercise its discretion to deny Plaintiff prejudgment interest because the jury has already factored interest into its back pay award. In describing her monetary damages to the jury, Plaintiff included an amount for interest on her lost wages. Plaintiff asked for $33,995.36, including interest. The jury awarded Plaintiff $34,000, split evenly between the two claims.

(Doc. 134 at 8). Defendant also argues that, even if plaintiff were entitled to prejudgment interest, it would apply only to the award of back pay, not to compensatory damages. (Id. at 9). Finally, defendant disputes the beginning and ending dates for accrual of interest and the rate of interest suggested by plaintiff. (Id.).

1. Back pay

"The decision regarding whether to grant equitable relief and what equitable relief to grant lies in the discretion of the trial court." Lengen v. Dep't of Transportation, 903 F.2d 1464, 1468 (11th Cir. 1990). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit "has held, however, that once a plaintiff has proven discrimination, back pay should be awarded `unless special circumstances are present.'" Lengen, 903 F.2d at 1468 (quoting, Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1391 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied sub nom., Local 13000, United Steelworkers of America, AFL — CIO CLC v. Parson, 441 U.S. 968, 99 S.Ct. 2417, 60 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1979)). The court finds that no special circumstances are present here and that plaintiff is entitled to interest on her lost wages to achieve full compensation.

Nevertheless, the court will not add interest to the $34,000 already awarded by the jury. As noted above, defendant contends that this figure includes interest on plaintiff's lost wages. Though given an opportunity to dispute this contention, plaintiff did not respond. (See Doc. 135 at 2). The court, therefore, accepts it as true.

If plaintiff disagrees, she may file a motion to alter or amend judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Any such motion should include a discussion of the content of plaintiff's testimony regarding lost wages and interest, with appropriate citations to the record. Plaintiff should also address the details of how interest should be calculated and provide the actual calculations. Finally, plaintiff should discuss the significance of relevant case law, including the following: Darnell v. City of Jasper, Ala., 730 F.2d 653, 656-57 (11th Cir.1984) (finding that back pay should be calculated using a "quarterly earnings formula"); Smith v. American Service Co. of Atlanta, Inc., 796 F.2d 1430,...