Rauen v. U.S. Tobacco Mfg. Ltd. Partnership

• Decision Date: 10 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-3973.,01-3973.
• Citation: 319 F.3d 891
• Parties: Beverly J. RAUEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES TOBACCO MANUFACTURING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

319 F.3d 891

Beverly J. RAUEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES TOBACCO MANUFACTURING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 01-3973.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued November 4, 2002.

Decided February 10, 2003.

Michael W. Rathsack (Argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David M. Lefkow, Todd D. Steenson (Argued), Holland & Knight, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Joseph A. Seiner (Argued), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of General Counsel, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae.

Before BAUER, KANNE, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

This case involves Beverly Rauen's claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") that her employer, United States Tobacco ("UST"), discriminated against her by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability. The district court granted UST's summary judgment motion, holding that Rauen was not entitled to an accommodation because, although she was disabled, she could perform the essential functions of her job without any accommodation. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the district court's decision.

I. History

A. Rauen's Work at UST

Rauen began working as a secretary for UST, a smokeless tobacco manufacturer, immediately after graduating high school in 1968. While working for UST, she was able to obtain a college degree in 1977 through UST's tuition reimbursement program. She received various promotions, including one in 1987 when UST made her a software engineer in its Nashville, Tennessee facility. After four years of work in Nashville, Rauen moved to the company's plant in Franklin Park, Illinois. She remained in Franklin Park as a software engineer from approximately 1991 until the present litigation.

According to UST's Software Engineer Position Profile, Rauen is expected to spend 60% of her time managing capital projects at the Franklin Park facility; 20% of her time serving as a liaison between UST's Nashville and Franklin Park facilities; and the remaining 20% ensuring that various systems and programs are performing as designed. Both parties agree that Rauen's primary duties involve monitoring contractors' work at the Franklin Park facility, answering contractors' questions as they arise, and ensuring that the contractors' work does not interfere with the manufacturing process.

B. Rauen's Health Problems

In April 1996, Rauen was diagnosed with rectal cancer. She had to have several surgeries and undergo radiation and chemotherapy treatments. Unable to work as a result of these treatments, Rauen went on short-term disability leave from April to October 1996, and then on long-term leave from October to December 1996. UST held her job open during this leave. Rauen returned to work in January 1997 and was able to work without further leaves of absence or accommodations throughout that year. Unfortunately, in January 1998, Rauen was diagnosed with breast cancer and had to undergo various treatments that again left her unable to work. UST again accommodated Rauen's condition by granting her short-term disability leave from January to July 1998 and long-term disability leave from August 1998 to January 1999. She returned to work on January 13, 1999, and was able to work full time, without further leave, from January 1999 through October 2001.

According to Rauen, her sickness and treatments have taken their toll, making it more difficult for her to perform various daily activities. For instance, because she is without a portion of her small intestine and must take in two liters of IV fluids daily, she has to use the bathroom up to fourteen times a day. The fluid intake and rapid flow through her system requires her to wear an ostomy appliance that must be emptied frequently. Because of her small size, the appliance does not fit her properly and often leaks, causing skin rashes. Her condition also produces overwhelming fatigue, forcing her to lie down and rest often. Getting to work can be difficult because she sometimes must stop and use the restroom on the way, and the fatigue she experiences increases her chances of falling asleep behind the wheel.

C. Rauen's Accommodation Request

Because of these complications, upon returning to work in January 1999, Rauen presented UST with a letter from her doctor stating that it would be beneficial for her to work from a home office. In response to this letter, UST requested that Rauen sign a release form permitting its independent contractor health and disability consultant, Dr. Cassidy, to obtain Rauen's medical information in order to review her accommodation request. Rauen, however, refused to sign the release. Her refusal, she informs us, stemmed from concern over the fact that Dr. Cassidy, in addition to being a medical doctor, also held a law degree, and she did not feel comfortable giving her medical records to a lawyer who worked for UST. Thus, no further action was taken by either party pursuant to this initial accommodation request, and Rauen continued to work full time at the office.

In May 1999, she presented UST with another letter, renewing her request to work at home. Although she had still not signed the medical release, UST agreed to meet with her on May 6, 1999, to discuss possible accommodations. Rauen made detailed notes of this meeting. Both parties agree that her notes accurately reflect the events that transpired. The relevant portions of those notes are reproduced below:

11. They asked how this home office would work. How many days would I be at home. I said I would be at the plant as needed—that my job was not routine, it was project oriented, so that, as projects required it, I would be here 7 days a week, that, in the past, I have worked 20-hour days .... But if there were no reason to be here, then I would be home. They said they felt that some structure was needed, maybe coming to work 1 day each week. I said I could see no reason to do that for the sake of doing that. They said they felt that things going on in the Plant would affect my projects and that I needed to be here to know what's going on. I said I could do that by phone and, when I felt it was necessary, I would go to the Plant. So they said you want a home office in its entirety, that a partial home office was not acceptable. I said yes....

12. They asked who would determine when I came to work. I said if John wanted me for a meeting or other reason, I would be here. If I had meetings I would be here. John said, "but you would determine when you would be here, right. Right now, I don't know what time you get to work or what time you leave work, do I." I said no, that's right; for the most part, I would determine when I would be here.

17. They asked me if there was any accommodation they could make at work for me. I said No. They said we could provide you with private facilities. I said that would not help. They said we could give you a place to rest during the day. I said if I want to rest I can lay down on the floor in my office. They asked what it was that made it difficult for me to come to work everyday. I said that if I could stay home, there are things that I would not have to do everyday that I have to do now, that I get very tired, and that I have Leukopenia.

(Def.'s Statement of Material Facts, Doc. 42, Exhibit V, ¶¶ 11, 12, 17.)

It is apparent from these notes that the accommodation Rauen sought was a home office "in its entirety." According to her, she would accept nothing less than being allowed to work from home when she thought she was not needed at the office.

After the meeting, no further discussions about her accommodation request took place for over a year. UST did not inquire further about Rauen's ability to do the essential functions of her job at home, and it did not formally refuse her request to do so. Rauen did not seek further discussions, nor did she sign the medical release form that would have allowed UST's health and disability consultant to review her request.

In August 1999, four months after the meeting, Rauen filed a charge of disability discrimination with the EEOC. She did not inform UST that she was filing the charge, nor did she modify her initial request for a home office. Rather, she immediately sought a right-to-sue letter, and, on October 25, 1999, she filed this action alleging, among other things, that UST violated the ADA by not granting her a home office accommodation.

The next communication between Rauen and UST about an accommodation occurred in September 2000, when she sent UST another letter from her doctor asserting that it would benefit her to work at home. The parties never met concerning this request, each blaming the other for the failure to get together.¹

The district court granted UST's motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim in October 2001, basing its decision on the fact that Rauen could and did perform all essential aspects of her job without accommodation. Rauen worked full-time at the office throughout the entire period from January 1999, when she returned to work following her second leave of absence, to October 2001, when the district court ruled against her. In fact, Rauen maintains, and UST agrees, that despite not receiving the requested home office accommodation, she continued to perform the essential functions of her job as a Software Engineer exceedingly well. Moreover, both parties agree that she was actually performing duties "above and beyond that of a software engineer," in that she was also doing many duties of a project engineer. (Rauen Br. at 7.)

The district court held that since Rauen could perform the essential aspects of her job without accommodation that she was not entitled to any accommodation.² Rauen now appeals that decision. We affirm the district court's decision, but we reach our conclusion through different analysis.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

We review the grant of a motion for summary...