Rauert v. Loyal Protective Insurance Co. of Boston, Massachusetts

• Decision Date: 21 October 1940
• Docket Number: 6793
• Citation: 61 Idaho 677,106 P.2d 1015
• Parties: ADA L. RAUERT, Respondent, v. LOYAL PROTECTIVE INSURANCE CO. OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

106 P.2d 1015

61 Idaho 677

ADA L. RAUERT, Respondent, v. LOYAL PROTECTIVE INSURANCE CO. OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, a Corporation, Appellant

No. 6793

Supreme Court of Idaho

October 21, 1940

INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY-ACCIDENT INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-EVIDENCE.

1. An internal hernia sustained by insured while he and son were unloading a barrel of buttermilk from truck, when entire weight of barrel was suddenly shifted onto the two men and they had "to catch it all at once," was an injury by "accidental means" within accident policy.

2. It is matter of common knowledge that insurance contracts are not entered into as other contracts generally are.

3. Contracts of insurance should be considered in view of their general objects and the conditions prescribed by the insurers, rather than on the basis of a strict technical interpretation.

4. Provision of accident policy insuring against loss resulting from bodily injury effected directly and independently of all other causes by "accidental means" would be construed to protect insured against loss by bodily injury, neither expected nor designed, suffered while insured was performing manual labor.

5. Evidence supported jury's finding that adhesions resulting from a prior hernia operation was not a "disease," so as to bar recovery for insured's death, as result of internal hernia sustained while unloading a barrel of buttermilk from truck, on accident policy, on ground that insured's death was due "wholly or partly, directly or indirectly" to "disease" existing prior to alleged accident.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Payette County. Hon. A. O. Sutton, Judge.

Action on accident insurance policy. Judgment for plaintiff. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent. Petition for rehearing denied.

Richards & Haga, for Appellant.

The expressions "accident" and "accidental means" are two distinctly different conceptions in both law and lay language. The decedent was insured not against accidental or unexpected results of intended means, but against death resulting from bodily injury effected directly through accidental means. (Kimball v. Massachusetts Acc Co., 44 R. I. 264, 117 A. 228, 230, 24 A. L. R. 726 729; Stone v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 133 Tenn. 672 182 S.W. 252, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 86, L. R. A. 1916D, 536; Northam v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 231 Ala. 105, 163 So. 635, 111 A. L. R. 622.)

Under a policy which provides "against loss resulting from bodily injury effected directly and independently of all other causes by accidental means," and further provides "indemnity shall not be payable for death due to disease, whether acquired accidentally or otherwise, nor for injury unless same be the result of accidental means, not wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, the result of disease," death which results from "accidental means" and partly from a diseased and infirm condition of the deceased, existing at the time of the injury, does not come within the provisions of the policy and hence there is no liability under the policy. Under such policies the rule of proximate cause has no application. (Stanton v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 83 Conn. 708, 78 A. 317, 34 L. R. A., N. S., 445; Tuttle v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 58 Mont. 121, 190 P. 993, 16 A. L. R. 601; Laessig v. Traveler's Prot. Assn., 169 Mo. 272, 69 S.W. 469; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 255 F. 483, 166 C. C. A. 559.)

Robert E. Lietch and George Donart, for Respondent.

An injury received from the operation of known and usual causes and which injury is neither expected nor designed, is an injury by accidental means within the meaning of the policy of insurance sued upon in this action. (Sec. 43-1810, I. C. A.; Cook v. Winget, 60 Idaho 561, 94 P.2d 676; Aldrich v. Dole, 43 Idaho 30, 249 P. 87; Moutzoukos v. Mutual Benefit etc. Assn., 69 Utah 309, 254 P. 1005; Bennett v. Travelers etc. Assn., 123 Neb. 31, 241 N.W. 781; Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060.)

The words "independently of all other causes" within a policy insuring against injury through accidental means, independent of all other causes, does not mean uninfluenced or unaffected by any other cause, but uncontrolled by any other cause, or that there be no independent intervening cause unproduced or uninfluenced by the injury, which, acting of itself and without stimulation by the injury, tends to produce the result. They have no broader meaning than the words "sole" and "proximate cause." (Hanley v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., (Wash.) 2 P.2d 636; Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., supra; Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 94 Utah 570, 80 P.2d 348; Williams v. General Acc. etc. Corp., 144 Kan. 755, 62 P.2d 856; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Gratiot, 45 Wyo. 1, 14 P.2d 438, 82 A. L. R. 1397; Kangas v. New York Life Ins. Co., 223 Mich. 238, 193 N.W. 867.)

HOLDEN, J. Budge, P. J., Givens and Morgan, JJ., concur. Ailshie, C. J., did not sit at the hearing or participate in the decision.

OPINION

HOLDEN, J.

August 27, 1931, the Loyal Protective Insurance Company of Boston, Massachusetts, issued and sold to William Rauert what is termed a "Permanent Protection Policy" in the principal sum of $ 2,000. The policy states it is non-cancellable, and provides indemnity for loss of life, limb, sight or time by accidental means, or of time by disease, as limited therein. The pertinent provisions of the policy follow:

"Loyal Protective Insurance Company of Boston, Massachusetts does hereby insure Wm. Rauert, subject to the provisions and limitations hereinafter contained, endorsed hereon or attached hereto, against loss resulting from bodily injury effected directly and independently of all other causes by accidental means, and against loss resulting from disease originating after thirty days following the date hereof."

"GENERAL CONDITIONS AND PROVISIONS. . . .

E. Indemnity shall not be payable for death due to disease, whether acquired accidentally or otherwise, nor for injury unless same be the result of accidental means, and not wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, the result of disease. . . ."

June 14, 1938, the insured and his son, James Rauert, were unloading a barrel of buttermilk from a truck. The barrel weighed 450 pounds. As they were moving the barrel over the side of the truck the entire weight was suddenly shifted onto the two men and they had "to catch it all at once." That evening the insured complained of illness and suffered vomiting spells all night. The next day he was taken to the office of the family physician, Dr. J. C. Woodward. June 19, 1938, he was taken to Weiser and hospitalized. The following day he was moved to St. Luke's Hospital at Boise and operated upon for internal hernia. He died at the hospital July 18, 1938.

Notice of the injury and death, respectively, were immediately given the company. It denied liability, claiming the "policy does not provide benefits either for loss of time or death on the basis of 'accidental injury'" and further asserting the hernia was attributable in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, to a disease of the insured. The company, however, tendered a check for $ 146.14 "to cover indemnity for loss of time under the sickness provisions."

November 19, 1938, insured's widow, beneficiary under the policy, commenced this action to recover the principal sum of the policy, alleging the issuance of the policy, that it was in force and effect at the time of Rauert's death, the accident resulting in the death of insured, and "that the death of said William Rauert was caused directly and independently of all other causes by the said bodily wrench or bodily strain so received by him in unloading said barrel of buttermilk."

Appellant answered, admitting the issuance of the policy and that it was in effect at the time of the insured's death, but denied liability. The case was tried to a jury November 15, 1939. At the close of respondent's case appellant moved for judgment of nonsuit upon the grounds (a) respondent had failed to present any proof showing that the death of the insured resulted from bodily injury effected directly and independently of all other causes by accidental means; (b) respondent had affirmatively shown that the death of the insured had resulted wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from disease or bodily infirmity and was not due solely and exclusively to accidental means. The court denied the motion. And after the submission of all the evidence and both parties had rested, appellant moved for a directed verdict upon substantially the same grounds set forth in the motion for judgment of nonsuit. The court likewise denied the motion for directed verdict.

Following argument of counsel for the respective parties, the court by instructions Nos. 4 and 5 instructed the jury as follows:

"You are instructed that if you find from the evidence that William Rauert received an accidental injury commonly known as a hernia or rupture and that such injury was the active efficient cause which set in motion and induced other agencies, including septicaemia, which resulted in his death, without the intervention of any other independent force, then and in that event the said injury so commonly known as hernia or rupture should be regarded as the sole and proximate cause of his death."

"You are instructed that an injury received from the operation of known and usual causes and which injury is neither expected or designed, is an injury by accidental means within the meaning of the policy of insurance sued upon in this action."

Appellant requested the court to give the following instructions, Nos. 3 and 4:

(3) "The policy sued on provides that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff, as...