Raulerson v. State
| Decision Date | 13 July 2000 |
| Citation | 763 So.2d 285 |
| Parties | James RAULERSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. Hector Lucio, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Rickey Paul Murray, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Albert Michael Gloster, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Michael Keirn, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Robert Lee Hawkins, Jr. Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Jack Alton Beebe, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Timothy Lewis Gaillard, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Richard E. Austin, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Keith Jerome Harvey, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Jorge Castro, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Reniel Santiago, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Kenneth Witts, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner in No. SC91611.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondents in Nos. SC91611, SC92143.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and James R. Wulchak, Chief, Appellate Division, Assistant Public Defender, and Kenneth Witts, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner in No. SC92066.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Mary G. Jolley and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent in No. SC92066.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Brynn Newton, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida; and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner in No. SC92143.
Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioners in Nos. SC92235, SC92750, SC92808, SC92809, SC93274.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee, Bureau Chief Criminal Appeal, and Mark C. Menser, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent in No. SC92235.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Karen E. Ehrlich, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Petitioner in No. SC93114.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia A. Terenzio, Bureau Chief and Rochelle L. Kirdy, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida; and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent in No. SC93114.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and J. Ray Poole, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondents in Nos. SC92750, SC92808, SC92809, SC93274.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioners in Nos. SC93334, SC93335.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and J. Ray Poole and L. Michael Billmeier, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondents in Nos. SC93334, SC93335.
H. Dohn Williams, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Petitioner in No. SC93335.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia A. Terenzio, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Respondent in No. SC93335.
We have for review the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Raulerson v. State, 699 So.2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); the First District Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Gloster, 703 So.2d 1174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); and the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Keirn, 720 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), in which the district courts expressly declared that section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), is constitutional. Further, we have for review Murray v. State, 701 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Lucio v. State, 701 So.2d 127 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Austin v. State, 709 So.2d 1389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Castro v. State, 710 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Harvey v. State, 710 So.2d 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Gaillard v. State, 707 So.2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Beebe v. State, 706 So.2d 953 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Hawkins v. State, 748 So.2d 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); and State v. Santiago, 713 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), which cited as controlling authority either Raulerson, Gloster, or Keirn. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; see also Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418, 420 (Fla.1981)
. On our own motion, we now consolidate all of these cases for disposition in this opinion.1 As more fully explained below, we agree with Florida's District Courts of Appeal2 that section 322.34(1) is constitutional.
In 1995, the Legislature amended section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), to provide, in pertinent part, that a person who drives a motor vehicle upon Florida's highways while his or her driver's license or driving privilege is canceled, suspended or revoked (hereinafter "DWLCSR offense") is, upon a third conviction, guilty of a third-degree felony. See Ch. 95-278, § 1, at 2594, Laws of Fla. Previously, a second or subsequent conviction for a DWLCSR offense was a first-degree misdemeanor. See § 322.34(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). As a result of the 1995 amendment, section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995)3, sets forth in full:
In each of the cases before us today, the State charged the defendant with at least one felony DWLCSR offense pursuant to section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995). Each defendant challenged the constitutionality of section 322.34(1), primarily arguing that the statute constitutes an improper delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. See Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. ( ). More specifically, the defendants asserted that because a trial court may, pursuant to section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1995), withhold an adjudication of guilt with regard to a DWLCSR offense, the trial court therefore has the authority to determine whether a third or subsequent DWLCSR offense constitutes a misdemeanor or a felony. As the Legislature has the sole authority and responsibility to define the degree of substantive criminal offenses, the defendants asserted, the authority of the trial court to withhold adjudication with regard to a DWLCSR offense unconstitutionally infringes upon the Legislature's exclusive authority.
The linchpin of the defendant's primary constitutional challenge to section 322.34(1) is the assumption that no "conviction" results in a DWLCSR case when a trial court withholds adjudication. The defendants in the cases before us asserted their primary constitutional argument with varying degrees of success in the respective trial courts, and appeals were taken in those cases to the various District Courts of Appeal. In Raulerson, Gloster, and Keirn, the Fifth District, First District, and Fourth District, respectively, discussed and analyzed whether section 322.34(1) is unconstitutional. Each of those district courts, along with the Third District in Pirtle v. State, 700 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (adopting Raulerson analysis), and the Second District in State v. Crossno, 713 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (adopting Keirn analysis), determined that section 322.34(1) is constitutional, but the courts did so on different grounds. We now briefly summarize the analysis employed by the district courts in Raulerson, Gloster, and Keirn.
In Raulerson, the Fifth District found that the dispositive issue in the case was whether "a defendant's violation of section 322.34(1) constitutes a conviction when the sentencing court decides to withhold an adjudication of guilt instead of entering a judgment against the defendant." 699 So.2d at 340. In analyzing that issue, the court primarily considered this Court's decision in State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242 (Fla.1971), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(2), both of which include withheld adjudications within the meaning of "conviction." See Raulerson, 699 So.2d at 340
. After considering Gazda, rule 3.701(d)(2), and several other authorities, the Fifth District affirmed the trial court's rejection of Raulerson's constitutional challenge to section 322.34(1), reasoning that:
A common sense reading of the instant statute indicates that the legislature intended the term "conviction" to mean a determination of a defendant's guilt by way of plea or verdict. There appears to be no requirement...
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