Rausch v. Hill
| Decision Date | 06 March 1948 |
| Docket Number | 37043. |
| Citation | 190 P.2d 357,164 Kan. 505 |
| Parties | RAUSCH v. HILL, County Engineer. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Wilson County; Ora D. McClellan, Judge.
Replevin action by Pete Rausch against William S. Hill, County Engineer, to recover a road grader. From an adverse judgment plaintiff appeals.
Reversed with directions.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom of legislative policy.
2. The function of courts is to ascertain the legislative intent in order that it may be made effective.
3. The word 'funds' may at times be construed to include property of various kinds.
4. Words should always be interpreted in harmony with the legislative will if it can reasonably be ascertained. It must be determined, if possible, by a consideration of all material parts of a statute, or act, and not from isolated portions thereof.
5. The provisions of G.S.1935, 68-516 and 68-516a, and statutes in pari materia examined, construed and held: (a) The mere adoption of the county road unit system by a county does not in and of itself, transfer title to road machinery and equipment from the townships to the county; and (b) pertinent statutes do not disclose a legislative intent to transfer title of such property to the county.
William Gough, Jr., of Chanute (Ruth Bordner Gough of Chanute, on the briefs), for appellant.
George S. Lindsay, of Fredonia, for appellee.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from an adverse judgment in a replevin action brought to recover a road grader from a county engineer.
The principal question presented is whether plaintiff acquired title to the grader by bill of sale executed and delivered to him by the township after the county had adopted the county road unit system.
The action was tried on stipulated facts which, in substance were:
Plaintiff is a resident of Neosho county; defendant is the county engineer of Wilson county; the township had acquired a used grader in 1942; on September 24, 1945, the board of county commissioners of Wilson county passed a resolution to adopt the county road unit system; thereafter a protest was filed to such action by petitioners signed by more than twenty percent of the qualified electors of the county; an election was had on August 6, 1946, to determine whether such a system should be adopted; the election resulted in adopting such system; on October 28, 1946, the county sent a letter to all township treasurers as follows:
Guilford township, here involved, refused to comply with the letter; on October 29, 1946, that township executed and delivered a bill of sale for the grader to Pete Rausch, the plaintiff; on October 29, 1946, he executed his check for the grader in the sum of $200; the township endorsed the check and placed it on deposit; it received credit to its account in that amount; on December 18, 1946, the grader was located by defendant and he took it into his possession; December 23, 1946, plaintiff demanded its return, which defendant refused.
The contentions of the parties revolve primarily around the following provisions contained in G. S. 1935, 68-516, to wit:
'Boards of county commissioners may adopt the provisions of the county road unit system by resolution at a regular meeting of said board, and in the event of the filing with the county clerk a petition signed by 20 percent of the qualified electors in the county, the board of county commissioners shall adopt the provisions of the county road unit system by resolution at the next regular meeting of said board: Provided, That in either event said resolution shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county for at least three consecutive weeks: Provided Further, That such adoption shall take effect ninety (90) days after date of the first publication of the resolution providing for such adoption unless within such time there is filed with the county clerk a petition signed by 20 percent of the qualified electors in the county protesting such adoption, in which event the board of county commissioners is hereby required to submit the question of a county road unit system to the electors of the respective counties.'
and G. S. 1935, 68-516a, which reads:
(Our italics.)
The parties disagree relative to the date the county road unit system becomes operative where the county adopts that system by virtue of an election. The effective date becomes material in this case only if the legislature intended the county should acquire title to the grader. The latter question will, therefore, receive our first attention.
Appellant contends the statute does not require the township to transfer road machinery and equipment; it provides only for the transfer of '* * * any and all unused road money or funds or any surplus funds in the hands of such township board.'
Appellee counters with the contention the word 'funds' may in certain instances be construed to include property of every kind and to embrace assets. We need not labor that point. This court has recognized the fact that the word 'funds' may at times be so construed. State v. Finney, 141 Kan. 12, 31, 40 P.2d 411.
Words should always be interpreted in harmony with the legislative intent if that intent can reasonably be ascertained. This may be done by all legitimate methods. Clifford v. Eacrett, 163 Kan. 471, 475, 183 P.2d 861. The function of courts is to ascertain the legislative intent in order that the legislative will may be made effective. State ex rel. Mitchell v. State Highway Comm., 163 Kan. 187, 182 P.2d 127. The presumption is in favor of the natural and popular meaning in which the words employed are usually understood. Hunt v. Eddy, 150 Kan. 1, 11, 90 P.2d 747. The intent of the legislature must be ascertained by a consideration of all material portions of a statute or act and not from isolated portions thereof. So in Pfleiderer v. Brooks, 122 Kan. 647, 253 P. 549, it was said:
'The general rule is that words in common use are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning, but it is also the rule that they are to be examined and interpreted in connection with the subject-matter to which they relate. It has been said that 'a cardinal canon of construction, to which all mere rules of interpretation are subordinate, is that the intent, when ascertained, governs.' State v. Bancroft, 22 Kan. 170. If a term is inappropriate or open to more than one meaning, we should look to the context and give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature. 'This (it has...
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...consideration of statutes in pari materia in order to bring them into workable harmony if reasonably possible to do so. Rausch v. Hill, 164 Kan. 505, 190 P.2d 357; State ex rel. Fatzer v. Board of Regents, 167 Kan. 587, 593, 207 P.2d 373. Even if statutes may be not strictly in pari materia......
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