Rauterkus v. United States
| Decision Date | 02 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 1:19-CV-240 |
| Parties | DAVID V. RAUTERKUS and MARIA RAUTERKUS, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, by and through TOM VILSACK, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Agriculture; NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE; and DENISE COLEMAN, in her official capacity as State Conservationist (for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania) with the Natural Resources Conservation Service, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Re: Motion to dismiss ECF No. 46
Pending before this Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint. ECF No. 46.
Plaintiffs David and Maria Rauterkus, owners of real property, initiated this civil action by filing a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. ECF No. 1. As Defendants to this action, Plaintiffs name the United States by and through Sonny Perdue, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture; the Natural Resources Conservation Service("NRCS"); and Denise Coleman in her official capacity as State Conservationist with the NRCS.2
This case arises out of a voluntary easement executed between the Rauterkuses and the United States pursuant to the federal Wetlands Reserve Program3. After the Easement was signed, differences arose between the parties as to the type and scope of the conservation activities to occur on the property. Plaintiffs raise four legal claims4: Counts I and II arise out of § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, Count III arises under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, and Count IV is a claim of anticipatory trespass.
The complaint, along with a motion for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction, was filed on August 23, 2019. Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction sought to have this Court issue a preliminary injunction "with regard to all restoration, protection, enhancement, maintenance, and management actions and activities set to commence on the property subject to the Warranty Easement Deed in Perpetuity, Wetlands Reserve Program Easement No. 662D3711447." ECF No. 8, page 3. Following an evidentiary hearing on the matter, this Court denied the motion for preliminary injunction concluding that Plaintiffs had notmet their burden to show the likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable injury. ECF No. 36.
An amended complaint was filed and Defendants have moved to dismiss it. As the dispositive motion is fully briefed, it is ripe for disposition by this Court. See ECF Nos. 47, 50, and 52.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) addresses the "very power [of the court] to hear the case." Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Because Plaintiffs administrative remedies the parties asserting jurisdiction, they bear the burden of showing that their claim is properly before the court. See Dev. Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Hous. & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995).
When addressing a jurisdictional challenge, a court must first distinguish between two types of rule 12(b)(1) motions: those that involve facial attacks and those that involve factual attacks. A facial attack is "an argument that considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is insufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court." Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014). When reviewing a facial attack, the court must accept as true the factual allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). In other words, the court must apply the same standard of review that it would use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Aichele, 757 F.3d at 358.
Alternatively, a factual attack is an argument that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist "because the facts of the case ... do not support the asserted jurisdiction." Aichele, 757 F.3d at 358. For factual attacks, court can consider evidence outside the proceedings and the allegations contained in the complaint are not presumptively true. CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008). Because a factual attack requires a factual dispute, the party asserting the challenge must file an answer or otherwise preen competing facts. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 892 n.17 (); Aichele, 757 F.3d at 358.
Rule 12(b)(6) recognizes a defense based on a plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm's, 894 F.3d 509, 526-27 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To survive dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual mater, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "as a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider extraneous to the pleadings." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). "However, an exception to the general rule is that a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered withoutconverting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Plaintiffs David and Maria Rauterkus are the owners of approximately eighty (80) acres of real property in Crawford County, Pennsylvania. They have owned the property for thirty years and have maintained it in a manner sufficient to allow avian wildlife and vegetation to flourish. ECF No. 39, ¶ ¶ 18-21. During their ownership of the property, the Rauterkuses participated in two government programs to convert portions of the farmland into wetlands. This included the Partners program with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, as well as the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program. Id., ¶ 23.
Around July 2010, the NRCS approached Plaintiffs about enrolling their property in the Wetlands Reserve Program, the purpose of which is to restore, protect, or enhance wetlands on eligible private land. Id. ¶ ¶ 11, 27. Plaintiffs met with NRCS representatives to discuss the manner in which Plaintiffs had previously maintained and managed their Land. Id., ¶ 28. One of the NRCS representatives, Lew Walker, advised Plaintiffs that they could play an active role and meaningfully participate in the planning, management, and operation of the restoration activities on their land. Id., ¶ 29.
Id., ¶ 15. The Manual also explains: "if, at this point in the process, the landowner and NRCS cannot come to agreement on the practices and on the management, operation and maintenance activities that will be applied to restore, protect, and maintain the wetland, the process should be ended and the application cancelled..." Id., ¶ 16.
After Plaintiffs enrolled in the program, employees of the NCRS repeatedly assured Plaintiffs that they would be allowed meaningful participation in the restoration and management activities of the Easement. Id., ¶ 34. Despite repeatedly expressing their concerns over the lack of a preliminary operations plan, Plaintiffs were never presented with a preliminary plan. Id., ¶ ¶ 40-41, 44.
Sometime after enrolling in the WRP, NRCS employees provided Plaintiffs with a draft of the Easement. The draft Easement included a blank form "Exhibit D" that outlined water uses and water rights that could be reserved to landowners. Id., ¶ 35. Plaintiffs repeatedly informed employees of NRCS of their intent to reserve water rights. Id.,¶ 37. In each conversation, NRCS representatives informed Plaintiffs that Exhibit D did not apply and that the NRCS "did not do Exhibit Ds." Id., ¶ 38. Plaintiffs were told that their concerns regarding water use rights would be addressed through a compatible use agreement that would be developed after the closing on the Easement. Id. Later, NRCS representatives told Plaintiffs that compatible use agreements areonly developed after the restoration work has been completed and that Plaintiffs' water use rights would be worked out at that time. Id., ¶ 39.
Despite the NRCS's failure to follow its own procedures, around August 28, 2013, David and Maria Rauterkus signed the Warranty Easement Deed in Perpetuity. ECF No. 39-1, pages 1-19. The Rauterkuses granted the...
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