Ravan v. Greenville County
| Decision Date | 17 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 2052,2052 |
| Citation | 315 S.C. 447,434 S.E.2d 296 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Robert W. RAVAN, Mavis O'Shields, Nellie E. Gillespie, and Tommy G. Fuller and Mary B. Fuller, Appellants/Respondents, v. GREENVILLE COUNTY, Morton International, Para-Chem Southern, Inc., Hoechst Celanese Corporation, J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., and Waste Management of South Carolina, Inc., Respondents. and of whom Appeal of Greenville County and Waste Management of South Carolina, Inc., are, Respondents/Appellants. . Heard |
[315 S.C. 451] J. Kendall Few and John C. Few; and W. Harold Christian, Jr., of Christian, Moorhead & Davis, Greenville, for appellants/respondents.
Reginald L. Foster, of Holcombe, Bomar, Wynn, Cothran & Gunn, P.A., Spartanburg; Bradford W. Wyche and William W. Kehl, both of Wyche, Burgess, Freeman & Parham, Greenville, for respondents/appellants.
John B. McLeod, of Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, Greenville; and M. Bradford Sanders, of Taft, Stellinius & Hollister, Cincinnati, OH, for Morton Intern.
Eric C. Schweitzer, L. Gray Geddie, Jr., and Ronald E. Cardwell, all of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Greenville, for Para-Chem Southern, Inc. and Hoechst Celanese Corp.
Joseph A. Rhodes, Jr., of Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson & Greaves, Greenville, for J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc.
[315 S.C. 452] CURETON, Judge:
This appeal involves four separate lawsuits which were consolidated for trial. The lawsuits arose out of the operation of a landfill by Greenville County on property leased from Carl Putnam. The landfill operated for less than six months in 1972. 1 The appellant landowners sued Greenville County and the corporate respondents alleging damage to their properties, which are adjacent to or a part of the landfill site. A jury awarded damages to the landowners against all respondents. The landowners'
primary complaint is that the damages they were awarded are insufficient. We affirm in part and reverse in partThe landowners alleged that in 1972 Greenville County had operated the landfill without a permit and in violation of applicable regulations of the State Department of Health. They also claimed the corporate respondents had contaminated their properties by depositing large quantities of hazardous, cancer-causing chemicals into the landfill.
The landowners stated causes of action against Greenville County for inverse condemnation, breach of covenant of title, breach of contract, strict liability, trespass, negligence and recklessness, and nuisance. They asserted causes of action against the corporate respondents in strict liability, trespass, negligence and recklessness, and nuisance. The county and corporate respondents asserted several defenses, including general denial, assumption of the risk, and the statute of limitations.
Following trial motions, the only cause of action submitted to the jury against Greenville County was that of inverse condemnation. As to the corporate respondents, the jury considered causes of action based on negligence and strict liability. The jury returned verdicts against Greenville County in inverse [315 S.C. 453] condemnation and against the corporate respondents in negligence as follows:
LANDOWNER GREENVILLE COUNTY CORPORATE RESPONDENTS
Ravan $4,279 $21,395
O'Shields 825 3,300
Gillespie 1,042 4,168
Fuller 1,425 5,700
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The landowners moved for a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of the verdicts and with respect to portions of the jury charges. Waste Management of South Carolina, Inc. (Waste Management) moved for a directed verdict and for judgment N.O.V. Greenville County moved to require the landowners to elect between the damages awarded against the county in inverse condemnation and those awarded against the corporate respondents in negligence. They argue election was necessary to avoid double recovery. The trial judge denied all motions.
I.
THE LANDOWNERS' APPEAL
A.
The landowners first argue the verdicts are so grossly inadequate as to demonstrate the jury was influenced by considerations not founded on the evidence. We disagree.
In July and August of 1989, the Environmental Protection Agency and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) notified the landowners that testing of their wells revealed the presence of volatile organic contaminants in their drinking water. The letters further stated that although the concentrations detected did not exceed the maximum contaminant level established for the protection of drinking water, the agencies recommended that the landowners use alternate water sources for drinking and cooking.
All landowners testified to personal inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of their land, and their belief that the use of their properties posed health hazards to them and their families. They testified to individual damages as follows.
O'Shields testified her husband had purchased the land for [315 S.C. 454] her in 1983 for $9,000 with the intent of constructing a home. They installed a well and septic tank, planted trees, dug a basement for their proposed home, and started to build a driveway. They paid approximately $3,000 for the well and $2,000 for the septic tank. They also purchased sand, gravel, and asphalt for the driveway, costing "a couple of thousand
dollars," and bought a trailer in July 1987 at a cost of $1,500After she received notice that her well water was contaminated, she and her family discontinued drinking the water although they continued to use it for bathing. After enduring this situation for approximately two months, she "couldn't stand it any longer [and] had to get out of there." As a consequence, she moved her trailer to another location at a cost of approximately $3,500. She testified her property has no present value.
Gillespie testified that she had cleared her land, built a driveway at a cost of $300, put a mobile home on the lot, and planted trees and flowers. She had planned to build an addition to her mobile home. She described cracks in her back and side yards. She found an alternative source of drinking water until she and the other residents were supplied with public water several months after they learned of the contamination. When asked to put a value on her property without the contamination, she responded: "Well, I know I couldn't put a price on my land because I enjoyed living there and it is the only home I ever had." She claimed her property has no present value.
Ravan testified he had built his house in 1980 at a cost of $50,000, with an addition in 1987 at a cost of $32,000. He installed a swimming pool in 1985 at a cost of $10,000. He testified that without the contamination his house would be worth between $140,000 and $150,000, but with the contamination it has no value. He also testified that he had to purchase water for eight to nine months. He further testified although he had listed his house for sale in 1988 at a price of $96,500, he found no buyer. He contends that without the contamination his property would have increased approximately fifty percent above its value in 1988.
The Fullers testified they had bought their lot in 1987 for $10,000. They improved the lot by filling craters, placing a trailer on it, installing a driveway at a cost of $1,000, planting [315 S.C. 455] trees and flowers, building a shop at a cost of $7,000 to $8,000, installing a fence at a cost of $1,000, and installing a well at a cost of $3500. They stopped drinking the well water when they learned of the contamination and bought water for about a year. They stated that they do not feel safe using the lot. Mr. Fuller testified that although the lot would be worth approximately $50,000 uncontaminated, it has no present value.
The landowners' expert, a toxicologist, tested the landowners' properties and found dangerous chemicals in the ground water and air vapors. He further testified he had serious reservations about the landowners living on their properties. He later testified, however, that the landowners' access to public water alleviated his concerns to some extent. Their real estate expert testified that the landowners' properties had decreased approximately 70% in value because of the contamination.
The corporate respondents presented the testimony of two expert witnesses. The first, a toxicologist, testified that the low-level contamination of the groundwater on the landowners' properties did not pose a health threat and should not adversely affect the marketability of the properties. The other witness, an expert real estate appraiser, testified that recent sales of properties located in the immediate area of the landowners' properties confirmed his opinion that the low-level contamination had not adversely affected the market values of the landowners' properties. He testified that he appraised Ravan's property at $102,000, Gillespie's at $20,840, Fuller's at $28,250, and O'Shields' at $16,500. He stated that the well contamination had no impact on value since the landowners now have public water. He discounted the landowners' expert's opinion that their land had decreased in value by 70% as being without foundation.
The question of the inadequacy of damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. His discretion will not be questioned on appeal unless his finding is wholly unsupported by the evidence or there has been an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Clarkson, 267 S.C. 121, 126, 226 S.E.2d 696, 697
(1976); Toole v. Toole, 260 S.C. 235, 239, 195 S.E.2d 389, 390 (1973). The test which guides this Court in the exercise of its power and duty to set aside a [315 S.C. 456] verdict on the ground of inadequacy is whether the verdict is so shocking and outrageous "as to manifestly show that the...To continue reading
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