Ravel v. Hewlett-Packard Enter., Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 January 2017
• Docket Number: CIV. NO. 2:16–cv–2610 WBS DB
• Citation: 228 F.Supp.3d 1086
• Parties: Betty RAVEL, Plaintiff, v. HEWLETT–PACKARD ENTERPRISE, INC., a Delaware corporation, and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

228 F.Supp.3d 1086

Betty RAVEL, Plaintiff,

v.HEWLETT–PACKARD ENTERPRISE, INC., a Delaware corporation, and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendant.

CIV. NO. 2:16–cv–2610 WBS DB

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed January 11, 2017

David Jay Graulich, Law Practice of David Graulich, Esq., Fair Oaks, CA, for Plaintiff.

Benjamin A. Emmert, Littler Mendelson, P.C., San Jose, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Betty Ravel filed this action against defendant Hewlett–Packard Enterprise, alleging that defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her disability in violation of the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). (Notice of Removal Ex. A, First Am. Compl. ("FAC") (Docket No. 1).) Before the court is defendant's Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint. (Def.'s Mot. (Docket No. 4).)

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff began working for defendant, a computer technology company, in 2010. (FAC ¶¶ 2, 12.) In March 2015, she was promoted to Sales Administration Manager, a position that involves managing teams of Executive Assistants "located all over the U.S. and internationally." (Id. ¶¶ 15–16.) According to plaintiff, she would "manage[ ] her team on a virtual basis from her home office [in Folsom, CA], using Skype, e-mail and collaborative software," "with occasional trips to the company's [office] in Roseville, CA." (Id. )

Plaintiff alleges that in May 2015, she "began experiencing shooting pains in her left leg." (Id. ¶ 18.) Her doctor diagnosed her with sciatica and a herniated and two bulging spine discs. (Id. ¶ 19.) After the diagnosis, plaintiff "attempted to work a few days in Roseville," which she alleges is a one hour commute from her home. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that "[a]fter the third day of commuting to Roseville," the pain in her left leg became "excruciating." (Id. ) As a result, she "resumed working at home." (Id. ¶ 23.)

"In March 2016, plaintiff attempted to resume work on-site in Roseville. After three days, the severe pain returned—this time in both legs." (Id. ¶ 28.) The one-hour commute to Roseville, according to plaintiff, was interfering with her acupuncturist's "orders [to] ... alternate[ ] sitting, standing and lying down in ... 30–minute rotation[s]," and thus "exacerbat[ing] her herniated and bulging discs" and putting her at risk for "irreparable spinal damage." (Id. ¶ 29.)

In April 2016, plaintiff requested that defendant allow her to work exclusively from home going forward. (See id. ¶ 30.) Defendant denied her request in July 2016 and told her that it could "accommodate [her medical] restrictions in the [Roseville] office." (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff then requested that defendant transfer her to its Folsom office, which she alleges "is only fifteen minutes from her home." (Id. ¶ 37.) Defendant denied that request as well. (Id. ¶ 38.)

On July 22, 2016, plaintiff went on paid disability leave. (Id. ¶ 45.) She was paid 100% of her regular salary until September 2016, at which time her pay was reduced to 70%. (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff alleges that during the time she has been on leave, she has been "ready, willing and able to work from her home." (Id. ¶ 45.)

Plaintiff filed this action in the California Superior Court on September 21, 2016. (Notice of Removal at 1.) She asserts the following causes of action against defendant: (1) disability discrimination in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. , and FEHA, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940 ; (2) failure to engage in an interactive process in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), and FEHA, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(n) ; (3) failure to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), and FEHA, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(m) ; (4) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment in violation of FEHA, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k) ; (5) age discrimination in violation of FEHA, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a) ; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (FAC at 10–13.)

Defendant removed plaintiff's action to this court on November 1, 2016. (Notice of Removal.) Defendant now moves to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Def.'s Mot.)

II. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations in the pleadings as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer , 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) ; Cruz v. Beto , 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

The "plausibility" standard, "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," and where a plaintiff pleads facts that are "merely consistent with a defendant's liability," the facts "stop[ ] short of the line between possibility and plausibility." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions...." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," and "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. Discussion

A. Disability Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation

Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges that defendant discriminated against her on account of her disability. (FAC at 10.) Her third cause of action alleges that defendant failed to provide her a reasonable accommodation. (Id. at 12.) Each claim is brought under both the ADA and FEHA.

The ADA and FEHA each provide protections to disabled employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) ; Cal. Gov't Code § 12940. While courts in this circuit have often analyzed claims brought under the ADA and FEHA together, see, e.g. , Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n , 239 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We analyze [plaintiff's] state and federal disability claims together...."), they have also noted that "in a number of instances [,] FEHA's anti-discrimination provisions provide even greater protection to employees than does the ADA," Diaz v. Fed. Express Corp. , 373 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Because FEHA provides greater protection than the ADA in some instances, "a judgment for a defendant as to an ADA claim will not necessarily lead to a similar judgment with respect to a FEHA claim." Cripe v. City of San Jose , 261 F.3d 877, 895 (9th Cir. 2001).

A key issue raised in plaintiff's ADA and FEHA claims is whether defendant satisfied its obligation to provide her a lawful accommodation by placing her on paid disability leave, instead of allowing her to work from her home or at its Folsom office. Because the ADA and FEHA differ with respect to this question, the court will address plaintiff's disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims under the two legislations separately.

1. Disability Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA

"The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability ‘because of the disability.’ " Nunes v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. , 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) ). To state a prima facie claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly show: "(1) [she] is a disabled person within the meaning of the [ADA]; (2) [she] is a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment action because of [her] disability." Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. , 273 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2001).

With respect to the first prong, the ADA defines a "disabled person" as an individual who has "a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more of the individual's major life activities." Coons v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Treasury , 383 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004). "An impairment covered under the ADA includes any physiological disorder," id. and "major life activities" includes "standing," "sitting," and "lifting," 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. "Substantially limited" means that a person is "significantly restricted as to condition, manner or duration under which [she] can perform [the] particular major life activity as compared to ... [an] average person in the general population." Coons , 383 F.3d at 885. "Temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities." Wilmarth v. City of Santa Rosa , 945 F.Supp. 1271, 1276 (N.D. Cal. 1996)

Defendant's only challenge with respect to the first prong is that plaintiff cannot base her argument for "disabled person" status on mere "recommendations" from her physician alone. (Def.'s Mot. at 15.) That argument fails because plaintiff alleges that her acupuncturist's advice that she not sit or stand for more than thirty minutes was in fact a "strict order[ ]." (FAC ¶ 29.)

Plaintiff alleges that her sciatica and disc condition prevent her from sitting or standing for more than thirty minutes, or lifting anything "more than ten pounds." (See FAC ¶ 29.) While she indicates that her condition would improve over time "with proper treatment and care," (id. ¶...