Ravenell v. Pugmill Sys., Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 December 2014
• Docket Number: C.A. No.: 2:13-cv-00815-PMD
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: The Estate of Lamar Ravenell, by his personal representative, Debbie Ravenell Plaintiff, v. Pugmill Systems, Inc.; WEG Electric Corporation; and CMI Terex Corporation, Defendants.

The Estate of Lamar Ravenell, by hispersonal representative, Debbie Ravenell Plaintiff, v. Pugmill Systems, Inc.; WEG ElectricCorporation; and CMI Terex Corporation, Defendants.

C.A. No.: 2:13-cv-00815-PMD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

December 15, 2014

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants CMI Terex Corporation's ("CMI Terex") and Pugmill Systems, Inc.'s ("Pugmill Systems") (collectively "Defendants") respective motions in limine to exclude the opinions of Plaintiff's proposed expert witness Stephen Fournier, P.E. (ECF Nos. 92, 97) (collectively "Motions to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert"), as well as Defendants' separate motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 114, 115) (collectively "Motions for Summary Judgment"). The Court held a hearing on October 7, 2014, and entertained argument on all pending motions.¹ At that time, the Court granted Defendants' Motions to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert and Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. This written Order serves to memorialize the Court's oral rulings and to resolve any remaining issues taken under advisement.

BACKGROUND

On March 6, 2012, Lamar Ravenell, an employee of Sanders Brothers Construction Company ("Sanders Brothers"), was fatally injured while performing maintenance on an asphalt mixer known as a pugmill. A pugmill is a component of a hot-mix asphalt plant. A hot-mix asphalt plant is an assembly of mechanical and electronic equipment where aggregates, recycled materials, or other additives are blended, heated, dried, and mixed with binder to produce asphalt mixtures meeting specified requirements. Pugmill Systems manufactured this particular pugmill, and WEG Electric Corporation ("WEG") manufactured the pugmill's motor. Pugmill Systems sold the pugmill at issue to CMI Corporation, a predecessor of CMI Terex, which in turn sold the pugmill to Sanders Brothers on or about September 8, 1995, as part of an asphalt plant designed by CMI Terex. The asphalt plant, including the pugmill, was delivered to Sanders Brothers' Summerville, South Carolina location in November 1995.

At the time of the accident, Mr. Ravenell was attempting to clean or otherwise maintain the pugmill's paddles. The covers to the pugmill had been removed, and Mr. Ravenell was positioned inside of the mixer. It is undisputed that prior to entering the machine, Mr. Ravenell did not properly "lockout" and "tagout" the pugmill's energy supply.² While Mr. Ravenell was inside of the pugmill, a fellow employee, Marques Raspberry, entered the asphalt plant's energy center to test a different piece of equipment. Mr. Raspberry mistakenly activated and started the pugmill, trapping Mr. Ravenell inside of the pugmill. Due to the injuries he sustained in theaccident, and the resulting hemorrhaging and cardiopulmonary arrest, Mr. Ravenell was subsequently pronounced dead at the hospital.

On February 5, 2013, Mr. Ravenell's 56-year-old, disabled widow, Debbie Ravenell ("Plaintiff"), as the personal representative of her husband's estate, instituted this products liability action in state court against Pugmill Systems and WEG.³ Plaintiff's Complaint alleged claims as to each Defendant based on theories of: (1) strict products liability, (2) products liability based on negligence, (3) breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and (4) breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The claims are based on theories of inadequate warnings and improper design. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that the pugmill was defective because it had neither an emergency stop ("e-stop") nor an interlock device that prevented the machine from operating when the covers were removed, as well as because it lacked adequate warnings. Plaintiff seeks actual, consequential, and punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a jury. On March 26, 2013, Pugmill Systems removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on May 28, 2013, asserting identical claims against CMI Terex.

In advance of trial, the Parties filed a number of motions in limine, including the present requests to exclude the opinions of Stephen Fournier, P.E. ("Fournier" or "Mr. Fournier") filed by CMI Terex and Pugmill Systems on May 2, 2014, and May 13, 2014, respectively. Plaintiff responded in opposition to the Motions to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert on May 14, 2014, and Defendants each filed a Reply on May 27, 2014. Additionally, on May 28, 2014, CMI Terex and Pugmill Systems separately moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff responded in opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment on June 16, 2014, andDefendants each filed a Reply on June 26, 2014. Accordingly, the pending motions are ripe for consideration. Following extensive briefing and oral argument, the Court now issues the instant Order.

JURISDICTION

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as there is complete diversity of citizenship among the Parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the State of South Carolina. Pugmill Systems is a corporation organized under the laws of Tennessee with its principal place of business in Tennessee. CMI Terex is a corporation organized under the laws of Oklahoma with its principal place of business in Oklahoma. Finally, Plaintiff seeks damages in excess of $75,000. Therefore, this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Expert Testimony

The introduction and admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 provides as follows:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. The party offering the expert witness testimony bears the burden of demonstrating "its admissibility by a preponderance of proof." Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2001).

The Supreme Court has recognized that, under Rule 702, trial judges serve as gatekeepers to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). This "basic gatekeeping obligation" identified in Daubert, and now embraced by Rule 702, applies not only to scientific testimony but to all expert testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). The gatekeeping obligation, like other determinations of the admissibility of evidence, requires the trial judge to exercise an informed and broad discretion, "guided by the overarching criteria of relevance and reliability." Oglesby v. Gen. Motors Corp., 190 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1999). Although the trial court is granted broad discretion, see Cooper, 259 F.3d at 199; United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th Cir. 1994), the rejection of proposed expert witness testimony is the exception rather than the rule, see SMD Software, Inc. v. EMove, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634-35 (E.D.N.C. 2013) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (2000)); see also United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The Supreme Court emphasized in Daubert that 'vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.'" (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596)).

II. Summary Judgment

To grant a motion for summary judgment, the court must find that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The judge is not to weigh the evidence but rather must determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). All evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1990)."[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate." Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1991). Summary judgment is not "a disfavored procedural shortcut," but an important mechanism for weeding out "claims and defenses [that] have no factual basis." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Indeed, "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322; see also Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1381 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[T]his obligation of the nonmoving party is 'particularly strong when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof.'" (quoting Pachaly v. City of Lynchburg, 897 F.2d 723, 725 (4th Cir. 1990))).

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants' Motions to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert

On July 5, 2013, the deadline for disclosing her expert witnesses, Plaintiff identified Mr. Fournier, of Robson Forensic, Inc., as Plaintiff's proposed expert witness on the issue of liability. Plaintiff also filed a copy of Mr. Fournier's report. Mr. Fournier is Plaintiff's only putative expert witness with regard to pugmill design and safety.⁴ As stated in Mr. Fournier's report, the purpose of his investigation was to "determine if...