Ravenscroft v. Ravenscroft

• Decision Date: 30 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. KCD,KCD
• Citation: Ravenscroft v. Ravenscroft, 585 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. App. 1979)
• Parties: Ramona Lee RAVENSCROFT, Respondent, v. Robert RAVENSCROFT, Appellant. 29634.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 270

585 S.W.2d 270

Ramona Lee RAVENSCROFT, Respondent, v.Robert RAVENSCROFT, Appellant.

No. KCD 29634.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

July 30, 1979.

Lee M. Nation, Kansas City, for appellant.

Robert C. Paden, Michael W. Manners, Independence, for respondent.

Before SHANGLER, P. J., WASSERSTROM, C. J., and CLARK, J.

CLARK, Judge.

Robert Ravenscroft appeals the decree entered June 1, 1977 dissolving his marriage to Ramona Lee, a union accomplished when both were seventeen years of age.Issues raised concern only those portions of the decree effecting division of marital property.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ordering division of real estate and in entering an alternative order for a cash payment by appellant to respondent, and also objects generally to the property division as inequitable and unjust.A minimal recitation of facts, essentially undisputed, will suffice to provide the requisite background.

Robert and Ramona were married July 30, 1968.Later that year, they decided to buy the home at 1022 Woodland, Independence, Missouri but, by reason of a misapprehension as to disability occasioned by their age, they arranged for title to be taken in the names of Robert's parents, Charles and Phyllis Ravenscroft.The down payment was supplied in part from Ramona's savings and in part from a personal loan later repaid.Installment payments on a mortgage loan were thereafter made by Robert and Ramona as were payments for taxes and insurance.

The Woodland residence was the marital home occupied during substantially the entire time the parties lived together and has been the home of Ramona and the children since the date of separation.The record title owners, Charles and Phyllis Ravenscroft, were not parties to the action and did not testify.The evidence, however, raises no suggestion that they contributed any funds toward purchase of the Woodland residence nor that they made any payments for taxes, insurance or repairs.The state of the record title and the existence of a mortgage debt do justify an assumption that Charles and Phyllis Ravenscroft executed the mortgage note and are potentially liable for any deficiency remaining after default and foreclosure.The question of to what extent the residence purchase was facilitated by obligation and interposition of the senior Ravenscrofts' credit as makers of the mortgage note is undisclosed in this record.

The parties acknowledged at trial that disposition of the Woodland property was the principal subject of dispute.The order of the trial court relative thereto found the Woodland real estate to be marital property and directed appellant"to cause title to said real estate conveyed to Petitioner."Upon failure of appellant to do so, he was directed in the alternative to pay Ramona $10,000.00.Other property dispositions and allowances in the decree are not material to disposition of this appeal and are not recited.

Robert first contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to make any disposition of the Woodland residence because the status of record title in Robert's parents precluded designation of the real estate as marital property.Despite the uncontroverted evidence that Robert and Ramona made the down payment and the monthly mortgage payments from their own resources and that no contribution toward acquisition or maintenance of the home was shown to have been furnished by the record title holders, Robert asserts that he, and presumably Ramona, never had any legal or equitable interest in the property.From this he argues that the residence was not subject to disposition by the court as marital property and cites Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866(Mo.App.1976).

Reliance by appellant on the Cain case is misplaced.In that case, certain real estate had been acquired by the husband before the marriage and was titled in his name.During the marriage, payments derived in part from marital funds reduced a mortgage debt on the property and increased the equity value.The court held that such payments did not alter the status of the property itself as separate property of the husband because owned prior to the marriage and, hence, not included under Section 452.330-2, RSMo 1978.Specifically not ruled as unnecessary by reason of other available assets was a decision as to imposition of a charge on the property equal to the enhancement of its value through the contribution of marital funds which reduced the debt.

To the limited extent applicable here, the Cain case simply holds that separate property of a spouse owned prior to the marriage does not become marital property merely because a mortgage debt encumbering the property is reduced by application of funds which themselves constitute marital property.Even in such circumstances, however, a charge may be imposed on the separate property to the extent that separate funds of the other spouse or marital funds are expended to reduce the debt or enhance the value of the asset in question.SeeGapsch v. Gapsch, 277 P.2d 278(Idaho1954) annotated at 54 A.L.R.2d 416.In the present case, the Woodland property was purchased during the marriage and, if there be any interest therein owned by Robert and Ramona, such is necessarily marital property by the direction of the statute.Section 452.330-2, RSMo 1978.

On the uncontroverted facts demonstrating that Robert and Ramona supplied the funds to purchase the Woodland property and currently retire the mortgage debt, it is fatuous to contend that they never had any legal or equitable interest in the property.Appropriate to this aspect of the case is the following analysis of the subject in Hergenreter v. Sommers, 535 S.W.2d 513 l. c. 518-519(Mo.App.1976):

"Missouri follows the general rule that where one pays the purchase price for land with legal title taken in another, a presumption arises that the latter holds the property under a resulting trust for the payor.Davis v. Roberts, supra(365 Mo. 1195, 295 S.W.2d 152);Carr v. Carroll, supra(178 S.W.2d 435(Mo.1944));Ferguson v. Stokes, 269 S.W.2d 655(Mo.1954);Parker v. Blakeley, 338 Mo. 1189, 93 S.W.2d 981(1936);Scott, supra, § 440.This theory is founded on an assumption that one who provides purchase money intends to receive the benefit of the purchase and the law will imply that intention in absence of rebutting facts and circumstances.2 Bogert, supra, § 454.Application of the rule is peculiarly appropriate where a child furnishes the purchase money and for reasons of convenience, minority, or otherwise, title is taken in his parents.Adams v. Adams, 348 Mo. 1041, 156 S.W.2d 610, 614-615(1941).In such circumstances, the presumption is that of a resulting trust in favor of the child as opposed to a presumption of gift or advancement.Padgett v. Osborne, supra(359 Mo. 209), 221 S.W.2d (210) l. c. 212;Davis v. Roberts, supra, 295 S.W.2d l. c. 156."

The trial court here found, and the evidence countenances no other result, that appellant's parents held title to the Woodland property as trustees for the benefit of Robert and Ramona as owners of the equitable title.Such equitable interest has previously been held to constitute "property" within the scope of the term as employed in Section 452.330-1 which provides, in part: "In a proceeding for * * * dissolution of the marriage * * * the court * * * shall divide the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just * * *."Claunch v. Claunch, 525 S.W.2d 788(Mo.App.1975).

It was therefore obligatory in this case for the trial court to make disposition of the equitable interest of the parties in the Woodland home as marital property.In so doing, the court assigned the full equity interest to Ramona and, as previously noted, directed Robert to arrange for conveyance to Ramona of the legal title.Upon his failure to do so, he was ordered to pay Ramona $10,000.00.While this decree is an innovative approach to the problem presented the orders quoted did not result in a valid, enforceable judgment.

Nothing in the evidence warrants a conclusion that Robert has the actual or practical ability to procure and deliver the deed in compliance with the order.At best there is no more than some inference by reason of the family relationship that Robert could prevail upon his parents to execute a deed which they are otherwise under no present obligation to sign.The situation is distinguishable from those cases in which a party may have the ability to comply (as, for example, to execute a conveyance of real estate outside the court's jurisdiction) and may, by the remedy for contempt, be coerced to perform.No such vehicle is available here.

Upon failure of Robert to obtain the deed, this decree would not support execution or any other process available to Ramona for enlisting the court's aid in procuring a deed.Concurrently, however, the availability to Ramona of execution on the alternate judgment for $10,000.00 is uncertain because conditioned on a prior event, the failure of Robert to cause title to be conveyed.Further uncertainty is added by reason of the absence of any time limit within which Robert may avoid liability for the cash payment by obtaining the deed.

An essential requirement of a judgment is that it be sufficiently certain in its terms to be susceptible of enforcement in the manner provided by law.To comply with this requirement, the judgment must adjudicate the controversy to a conclusion which permits issuance and processing of an execution without external proof or another hearing.Brolinson v. Brolinson, 564 S.W.2d 911(Mo.App.1978);Bishop v. Bishop, 151 S.W.2d 553(Mo.App.1941).

In the subject case, future enforcement of the judgment is dependent on subsequent inquiry dehors the record as to whether or not Robert has caused title to be conveyed and, if not, whether sufficient time has elapsed so that failure to do so obligates him to payment of the sum as contemplated by the...