Ravenswood Disposal Servs. v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n

CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Writing for the CourtJUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
CitationRavenswood Disposal Servs. v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 2019 IL App (1st) 181449WC, 133 N.E.3d 1261WC, 433 Ill.Dec. 981WC (Ill. App. 2019)
Decision Date28 June 2019
Docket NumberNo. 1-18-1449WC,1-18-1449WC
Parties RAVENSWOOD DISPOSAL SERVICES, Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Sergio Lagunas, n/k/a Sergio Delgado, by His Parent/Guardian Maria Diaz, Next of Kin of Raul Lagunas, Deceased, Appellee).

Attorneys for Appellant: Arisa Taguchi, of Knell, O'Connor, Danielewicz, of Chicago, for appellant.

Attorneys for Appellee: Jack M. Shapiro and Francis J. Discipio, of Law Offices of Francis J. Discipio, Ltd., of Oak Brook, for appellee.

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Ravenswood Disposal Services (RDS) appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County, confirming a decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) that (1) found that an employment relationship existed between it and the decedent, Raul Laguna, on September 14, 2013, when, while working, Raul was pinned between two vehicles resulting in his death, and that Raul's minor son, Sergio Lagunas, now known as Sergio Delgado, qualifies as a dependent under section 7(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) ( 820 ILCS 305/7(a) (West 2012)), notwithstanding the fact that he was adopted by Isidro Delgado subsequent to the date of the accident, which resulted in the death of his father; (2) awarded Sergio death benefits and weekly benefits until age 18 or, if he is enrolled in an accredited educational institution, until age 25, penalties under sections 19(k) and (l ) of the Act (id. § 19(k), (l ) and attorney fees under section 16a of the Act ( id. § 16a); and (3) ordered it to pay Raul's medical bills of $17,570.61, subject to the statutory fee schedule. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 The following factual recitation is taken from the evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing held on October 26, 2015.

¶ 3 Maria Diaz and Raul married on June 4, 1996. Their son, Sergio, was born on November 9, 2001. Maria and Raul divorced on August 18, 2010, and on October 17, 2010, Maria married Isidro Delgado. It is uncontested that Raul died on September 15, 2013, after he was crushed between a dump truck and front loader on the premises of RDS on September 14, 2013. The parties stipulated that RDS paid funeral and burial costs totaling $14,062.50 and made one payment of $1497.60 for death benefits.

¶ 4 Maria testified that, after she and Raul divorced, Raul complied with the court's order to pay her child support, which, according to their marital settlement agreement (MSA), amounted to $313.04 every other week. Later, when Raul began receiving cash payments from RDS, he gave Maria payments totaling $200 to $300 per week. Until he died, Raul made those payments on a weekly or monthly basis, depending on when Maria needed the money, and also gave Sergio a weekly allowance of $10 to $30. Maria explained that she and Raul "provided for" Sergio even though he lived with her and Isidro and, although she did not have "frequent" contact with Raul, he responded "any time [she] needed help from him." After Raul died, Isidro adopted Sergio, and Maria changed the last name on his birth certificate from Lagunas to Delgado. Until his adoption, Sergio used the last name Lagunas.

¶ 5 Branko Vardijan, RDS's president, testified that Raul began working for RDS and its related companies "a few years before his death." A spreadsheet entered into evidence showed that RDS paid Raul a total of $37,674.70 between September 8, 2012, and September 11, 2013. Raul received $750 per week between September 8, 2012, and November 10, 2012, but entries between November 17, 2012, and September 11, 2013, varied between $0 and $1264 per week. Vardijan stated that RDS initially paid Raul by sending checks to a staffing company but later, at Raul's request, paid him directly in cash. RDS did not issue him "W-2" or "1099" forms for the cash payments. Vardijan explained that the cash payments began following a conversation in March 2013 between him, his brother, and Raul, during which Raul requested to "do work differently." Specifically, Raul asked to work at just one of RDS's premises and to set his own hours. Notwithstanding, Vardijan stated that he told Raul "what to do" and agreed that he "control[led] * * * the way that [Raul] did his job." Vardijan added that he considered Raul to be an employee and acknowledged that, when the accident occurred, he was "doing the work that employees do."

¶ 6 Sergio testified that, at the time of the hearing, he considered his parents to be Maria and Isidro. He agreed that Isidro "bought [him] things" after marrying Maria and that he spent most of his free time with Isidro and Maria and went on vacations with them. Sergio agreed that he did not see Raul often after Raul and Maria divorced but also stated that Raul picked him up from school two or three days per week and would give him $5 or $10. Sergio's school records and a martial arts award from 2015 listed his last name as Delgado, but he explained that he did not use the name Delgado until "after" Maria and Isidro "changed [his] last name."

¶ 7 Maria testified that, at the time of the hearing, she paid "a hundred percent" of the expenses for Sergio's "[h]ealth and welfare." When Isidro contributed, he typically paid "a little less" than 30% of Sergio's expenses.

¶ 8 Prior to the close of proofs, Maria's counsel entered into evidence a notice issued by the Department of Healthcare and Family Services (DHFS) to RDS, stating that DHFS "has become subrogated to [Raul]'s right of action to recover medical expenses paid on [his] behalf." Maria's counsel also tendered bills from the medical providers who treated Raul before he died. Although counsel represented that the bills "were sent directly to [Maria]," each was addressed to Raul at his address in Chicago.

¶ 9 RDS's counsel objected to the admission of the bills into evidence on the basis that "many of [the bills] have been reduced," but he did not specify which bills were inaccurate and did not provide his own calculations for the unpaid expenses. The arbitrator asked RDS's counsel whether he had "any other grounds" for objecting to the bills' admission into evidence, and he said, "no." Next, the arbitrator asked Maria's counsel whether the bills were obtained pursuant to subpoena and certified for purposes of the Act. Maria's counsel stated that the bills were certified but that the certifications were not attached to them and that he could "make [a] representation to the court" that they had been obtained pursuant to subpoena. The arbitrator stated that the bills would be entered into evidence subject to "the grounds that are stated in [RDS's] objection."

¶ 10 Following the arbitration hearing on October 26, 2015, the arbitrator held that (1) RDS employed Raul on the date of the accident, (2) the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment, and (3) Sergio was Raul's survivor for purposes of section 7(a) of the Act. The arbitrator found that RDS unreasonably argued that no employment relationship existed, as the evidence established that it controlled Raul's work, paid him regularly during the year preceding his death, and its president considered him to be an employee. The arbitrator also noted that, although RDS "raised reasonable questions" as to whether Sergio was entitled to benefits after Maria's second husband, Isidro Delgado, adopted him following Raul's death, Sergio's right to benefits under the Act was unaffected by his adoption, the fact that Isidro financially supported him, or evidence that he regarded Isidro as a father and lacked "emotional ties" with Raul. The arbitrator concluded that, because Sergio was Raul's dependent when Raul died, Raul was legally required to support him, and because Maria testified "credibly" that Raul paid child support until his death, Sergio was entitled to section 7(a) benefits. The arbitrator (1) ordered RDS to pay Raul's medical bills totaling $17,570.61, subject to the fee schedule; (2) awarded Sergio death benefits of $48,089.90 and weekly benefits of $473.39 until age 18 or, if he is enrolled in an accredited educational institution, until age 25; and (3) granted RDS a $15,560.10 credit for already-paid death benefits and funeral expenses. Additionally, the arbitrator imposed penalties of $32,081.46 and $10,000 pursuant to sections 19(k) and 19(l ) of the Act, respectively, and attorney fees and costs totalling $12,832.58 under section 16 of the Act.

¶ 11 RDS filed a petition for review of the arbitrator's decision before the Commission. On November 17, 2017, with one commissioner dissenting, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. The dissenting commissioner noted that, although section 7(a) of the Act does not expressly terminate benefits for dependent minors upon adoption in the same manner as for surviving spouses who remarry, that provision should be construed in light of the Adoption Act ( 750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2012)). As the Adoption Act's intent "is to terminate all parental rights and responsibilities of [a] biological parent in lieu of the adoptive parent," and the Act's purpose "is to protect dependent children in case of [the] work-related death of a parent upon whom the child is legally dependent," the dissenting commissioner reasoned that Sergio's adoption "terminated his dependency on his late father and therefore his entitlement to survivor benefits." (Emphasis in original.) According to the dissenting commissioner, the majority's decision would allow Sergio to collect double benefits should Isidro also die in a work-related accident, which would be "fundamentally unfair and might have due process implications."

¶ 12 RDS sought a judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Cook County. On June 7, 2018, the court entered a written order confirming the...

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2 cases
  • Chavez v. Chavez
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • April 16, 2020
    ...into which an appellant may dump the burden of argument and research ....’ " Ravenswood Disposal Servs. v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm'n , 433 Ill.Dec. 981, 133 N.E.3d 1261, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (quoting U.S. Bank v. Lindsey , 397 Ill.App.3d 437, 336 Ill.Dec. 306, 920 N.E.2d 515, 535 (200......
  • Interest of Chavez
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • April 16, 2020
    ...into which an appellant may dump the burden of argument and research . . . .’” Ravenswood Disposal Servs. v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 133 N.E.3d 1261, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (quoting U.S. Bank v. Lindsey, 920 N.E.2d 515, 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)). ¶ 38 Moreover, because we are a divis......