Rawls v. Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 71-2519.,71-2519.
• Citation: 491 F.2d 141
• Parties: Dorothy Kane RAWLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAUGHTERS OF CHARITY OF SAINT VINCENT De PAUL, INC., the Administrators of Saint Vincent de Paul Hospital; Insurance Company of North America; Harold Bolding; the Aetna Casualty & Surety Company; Charles B. Odom, Individually and as Coroner of Jefferson Parish and The Surety of his Bond, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company; and Genevieve Arneson, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

491 F.2d 141 (1974)

Dorothy Kane RAWLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAUGHTERS OF CHARITY OF SAINT VINCENT De PAUL, INC., the Administrators of Saint Vincent de Paul Hospital; Insurance Company of North America; Harold Bolding; the Aetna Casualty & Surety Company; Charles B. Odom, Individually and as Coroner of Jefferson Parish and The Surety of his Bond, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company; and Genevieve Arneson, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 71-2519.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 15, 1974.

Rehearing and Rehearing Denied May 14, 1974.

Henry L. Klein, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

H. Martin Hunley, Jr., New Orleans, La., for Daugh. of Charity, Ins. Co. of N. America & De Paul Hospital.

Henry B. Alsobrook, Jr., New Orleans, La., for Dr. H. Bolding & Aetna.

Lawrence D. Wiedemann, New Orleans, La., for Dr. Charles Odom.

John M. Mamoulides, Dist. Atty., Metairie, La., for Odom & Arneson.

Before TUTTLE, GODBOLD and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.

Rehearing and Rehearing Denied May 14, 1974.

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge:

On March 24, 1969, appellant Rawls instigated this suit against (1) De Paul Hospital, (2) Dr. Bolding, a psychiatrist, and their respective insurers, contending that they falsely imprisoned her while a patient at De Paul Hospital from January 9, 1969 to March 4, 1969. Appellant Rawls also sued (3) Dr. Odom, the Coroner, (4) Dr. Arneson, his assistant, and their respective insurers, claiming they not only falsely imprisoned her, but also acting under color of state law deprived her of her civil rights.

The district court denied Rawls' motion for summary judgment against De Paul Hospital. Appellant Rawls did not make a motion for directed verdict against any of the parties. After a seven day trial, the jury returned a verdict for all defendants and the district court refused to grant appellant Rawls' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The assignment of errors by the appellant are the district court's: (1) denial of the post-trial motion of judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) failure to grant summary judgment against De Paul Hospital; (3) exclusion of testimony of Dr. Szasz; (4) failure to instruct jury charges #3-12 submitted by appellant; and (5) inclusion of jury instruction that the January 22 court order was valid on its face and was a defense interposed by all defendants.

I. LOUISIANA MENTAL HEALTH LAW

The touchstone for initially analyzing this controversy is the Louisiana Mental Health Law, LSA-R.S. §§ 28:1 et seq., in particular the provisions regarding procedures for commitment to a mental institution and rights of patients therein. At the time of the commitment in this case, the Louisiana Mental Health Law provided four methods for the purely civil commitment of the mentally ill: voluntary admission, coroner's commitment, judicial commitment and emergency commitment. The following three are involved in this case:

§ 51. Voluntary admission

"Any mentally ill, inebriate, or epileptic person who desires to submit himself for treatment may apply to the superintendent for admission to the appropriate institution named in Part II of this Chapter, or to any private mental hospital or institution, provided he is first fully informed of the provisions of this Chapter, fully understands them, and agrees, to obey the rules of the institution.

"A. The superintendent of any state mental institution may so receive and detain the applicant, provided he believes him mentally competent to make the application and to be in need of care. Should the patient become imcompetent or otherwise unable to demand his discharge, the superintendent shall request commitment by the court in whose district the hospital or institution is located. . . ." (Emphasis supplied).

§ 52. Coroner\'s commitment

"Any near relative, or in the absence of relatives, a near friend, curator, or other responsible person shall apply to the coroner to have a patient committed to an institution.

"The application shall be in writing on the form prescribed by the department and shall give the name, sex, and residence of the patient, the reason why institutional care is needed, and any other information the department deems necessary. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of the coroner and one other qualified physician, stating that they have examined the patient within three days of the application and that he is in need of observation or care in an institution. The certificate shall state the facts and sources of information and personal observations upon which opinion is based. . . . After complying with the above provisions the application for commitment shall be presented to the judge of the judicial district court or the civil district court for the parish from which the patient is to be committed, for his approval or disapproval. The application for commitment can be acted upon by the judge in open court or in chambers, in term time or in vacation, without the necessity of formally docketing and allotting said application.

"The superintendent may admit the patient to the institution within fourteen days of the examination by the coroner and the physician.

"After fourteen days the certificate of examination of the coroner and the physician is invalid. . . ." (Emphasis supplied).

§ 53. Judicial commitment

"A. Upon application by any responsible person, accompanied by a certificate as provided in R.S. 28:52, the judge of the civil district court may commit to an institution any patient within his jurisdiction when, in his opinion, commitment is in the best interest of the patient and the community. The court shall fix a date for a hearing to be held not less than five days from receipt of examiner\'s report. . . ." (Emphasis supplied).¹

Two additional provisions of the Louisiana Mental Health Law bear upon the plaintiff's rights in this case:

§ 98.1. Right to release on application of voluntary patients

"A voluntary patient who requests his release or whose release is requested, in writing, by his legal tutor, parent, spouse, or adult next of kin shall be released forthwith . . ."

§ 171. Enumeration of rights guaranteed

"Every mental patient is guaranteed the following rights: (1) To communicate in private with counsel or with the director or an agent of the department. . . ."²

Familiarity with these prerequisites for, and rights appurtenant to, commitment to a mental institution in Louisiana enables us to understand the significance of certain events in the course of the plaintiff's confinement.

II. FACTS

The following is a chronological outline of events giving rise to this lawsuit.

January 9, 1969

Mr. Rawls, plaintiff's husband and Mr. Kane, plaintiff's brother, initiated an application for the commitment of Dorothy K. Rawls in the Coroner's Office. Mr. Bergeron of the Coroner's Office began filling in a form entitled "In Re Application for Commitment." He explained that as a prerequisite to commitment under Louisiana law, i. e. Coroner's Commitment Section 28:52, either (1) Mrs. Rawls must be examined by a doctor who then recommends the commitment, or, (2) the only other procedure was to issue a warrant which would authorize the police to arrest Mrs. Rawls for examination. Mr. Rawls stated his wife would not go to a doctor; Mr. Rawls and Mr. Kane objected to the warrant procedure. Mr. Bergeron testified he wrote "Warrant issued for her to be picked up and held for examination" on the commitment application at this point, because Mr. Rawls said he was going to apply for a warrant in the future. Mr. Bergeron's testimony was that he only wrote this statement there for his information, considered the application withdrawn and placed it in his desk drawer. A warrant was never issued for Mrs. Rawls, but the language, "Warrant issued for her to be picked up and held for examination," remained on the partially completed commitment application.

Later that morning, Mr. Kane telephoned Dr. Bolding, a private psychiatrist, authorized to admit patients to De Paul Hospital. Dr. Bolding arranged to have plaintiff admitted and notified the hospital to expect Mrs. Rawls.

Mr. Rawls called an ambulance from a private concern which came to Mrs. Rawls' home around 2:45 p. m. A second ambulance from the Coroner's Office arrived at the scene because it was aiding the private ambulance in locating the address. When the private ambulance arrived, neighbors stated the lady inside will probably give you trouble. So the private ambulance attendants called the police for assistance and a patrol car with two officers came immediately. Mr. and Mrs. Rawls were arguing at her home. Ambulance attendant Brewer testified that Mrs. Rawls requested an attorney and that at first she did not want to go. Her husband tried to persuade her, but she still refused. Police officer Danos discovered that the ambulance attendants did not have any commitment papers or a warrant, and he told Mrs. Rawls that she was not obliged to leave with the ambulance attendants. The plaintiff stated, according to Danos, that she would accompany the ambulance attendants to De Paul to prove to her husband that she was not mentally ill. She eventually went without resisting physically. Attendant Macera testified that Mrs. Rawls spoke of obtaining an attorney all the way to the hospital.

Upon arrival at the hospital, Mr. Rawls signed the "Admission Agreement," the "Statement of Financial Responsibility," and the "Application for Commitment." Since the Coroner's application was not completed at this juncture and since a judicial commitment had not been instigated yet, this initial admission must be sustained as a voluntary admission under section 28:51 in order to be lawful. Mrs. Rawls did not sign any documents upon entering the hospital and was not apprised of her rights, as required in section 28:51. Dr. Head, the medical director, admitted his inability to locate any admission papers signed by Mrs. Rawls. There was no contrary...