Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co..
Decision Date | 02 August 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 32119.,32119. |
Citation | 23 A.3d 100,130 Conn.App. 502 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Ronald RAWLSv.PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stephanie A. Onorato, for the appellant (defendant).
Nathan C. Nasser, for the appellee (plaintiff).BEACH, ALVORD and SCHALLER, Js.ALVORD, J.
The defendant, Progressive Northern Insurance Company, appeals from the trial court's denial of its motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict. The court rendered judgment, after a jury trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Ronald Rawls. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied its motions (1) for a directed verdict because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case and (2) to set aside the verdict and render judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict when there was no evidence from which a jury reasonably could infer a finding of negligence. We agree with the defendant's second claim, and accordingly reverse the judgment of the trial court.1
On August 3, 2007, the plaintiff commenced this action seeking to recover damages for personal injuries that he sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the operator of the vehicle that hit his vehicle, Zabian Bailey: was negligent in that he was following too closely in violation of General Statutes § 14–240; failed to keep a proper and reasonable lookout for other motor vehicles; failed to apply his brakes in time to avoid a collision although by “proper and reasonable exercise of his faculties, he could have, and should have”; failed to turn his vehicle to the left or right to avoid the collision although by “proper and reasonable exercise of his faculties, [he] could have and should have”; failed to have his vehicle under proper and reasonable control; was inattentive to his surroundings and was operating at an unreasonable rate of speed. The plaintiff sought underinsured motor vehicle coverage under his own policy with the defendant. The defendant filed an answer to the complaint on December 4, 2007, leaving the plaintiff to his burden of proof as to Bailey's negligence.
The jury trial commenced on December 11, 2009. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On March 27, 2006, shortly before 11:30 p.m., the plaintiff was traveling westbound on North Avenue in Bridgeport. He stopped at a traffic light behind another vehicle. The plaintiff estimated he was stopped for approximately fifteen seconds before the vehicle driven by Bailey impacted the back of his car, forcing his vehicle to move forward and collide with the car in front of his. The plaintiff testified that he “heard a noise and all of a sudden [he] blacked out” for a “couple of minutes.” He did not see the vehicle that hit his car, nor did he have any knowledge that the impact was going to happen prior to the collision. The plaintiff testified that he did not know: where Bailey was “looking at the time of the impact,” Bailey's speed or whether Bailey attempted to apply his brakes or swerve. The plaintiff did not speak to either of the other two drivers involved in the accident.
Pedro Rosa, the investigating Bridgeport police officer, testified that emergency personnel were present at the scene when he arrived. Rosa spoke to the plaintiff but did not take a statement from Bailey. Rosa noted heavy front end damage to Bailey's vehicle, heavy rear end damage to the plaintiff's vehicle and minor rear end damage to the vehicle stopped in front of the plaintiff. The plaintiff also produced photos of the damage to his vehicle.
After the plaintiff rested his case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the issue of liability, arguing that the plaintiff failed to submit evidence that Bailey was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. The court denied this motion. At the conclusion of the trial, the defendant's renewal of this motion also was denied. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict and render judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict, which the court denied on March 16, 2010. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the court improperly denied its “motion to set aside the verdict and render judgment in accordance with the motion for directed verdict” because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could infer a finding of negligence. We agree. Our analysis of this issue is dispositive, thus, we need not reach the other issue on appeal.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marciano v. Kraner, 126 Conn.App. 171, 177, 10 A.3d 572, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 922, 14 A.3d 1007 (2011).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stein v. Tong, 117 Conn.App. 19, 27, 979 A.2d 494 (2009). Furthermore, “the plaintiff must prove both causation in fact and proximate cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Stamford, 115 Conn.App. 47, 76, 971 A.2d 739, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 912, 978 A.2d 1108 (2009).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schweiger v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 110 Conn.App. 736, 741, 955 A.2d 1241, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955, 961 A.2d 421 (2008), citing O'Brien v. Cordova, 171 Conn. 303, 306, 370 A.2d 933 1976) (“[c]ommon experience shows that motor vehicle accidents are not all due to driver negligence”).
In Burton v. Stamford, supra, 115 Conn.App. at 68–88, 971 A.2d 739, this court discussed in detail the relevant case law. Therein, this court found significant the fact that there was an eyewitness to the collision who testified to the circumstances from which the accident arose and that two officers testified, one of whom conducted an accident reconstruction that included evidence of the physical factors contributing to the accident. Id., at 81–84, 971 A.2d 739. Thus, this court concluded that Burton was controlled by Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, 156 Conn. 313, 317, 240 A.2d 881 (1968), in which our Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence of negligence when the plaintiff was struck from behind by the defendant's car and the plaintiff proffered testimony as to what he had seen immediately before the accident occurred and evidence was presented as to other physical facts reflected in the police officer's accident report. Likewise, in Hicks v. State, 287 Conn. 421, 437, 948 A.2d 982 (2008), our Supreme Court noted the significance of an eyewitness who testified as to the causation of the accident.
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