Rawson v. Brownsboro Independent School Dist.
| Decision Date | 13 November 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 14770,14770 |
| Citation | 263 S.W.2d 578 |
| Parties | RAWSON et al. v. BROWNSBORO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Holland & Moore, Athens, Carl C. Mays, Dallas, for appellants.
Justice, Justice & Rowan; and Jack T. Life, Athens, Wynne & Wynne, Wills
Point, W. C. Wallace, Cameron, and Tom G. Pollard, Jr., Tyler, for appellees.
This is a class suit brought by appellants as resident taxpayers against the Trustees of the Brownsboro Independent School District individually and in their official capacity as a Board, the Tax Collector-Assessor of Henderson County, Texas, First National Bank of Athens, Texas, Citizens' National Bank of Cameron, Texas, Homer Bass, School Superintendent, and John Sexton and Company. Appellants allege that the Trustees and the Superintendent have in the past, and will continue in the future to expend the School District's money wrongfully through deficiency financing-that is, paying old debts incurred in previous years out of current tax funds of the year 1952-1953. Appellants also attack the validity of a bond election and of a tax levy for the year 1952-1953. The defendant Banks and John Sexton and Company were made defendants on the ground that they are owners and holders of deficiency debts against the School District.
Appellees, except John Sexton and Company, leveled special exceptions at various parts of appellants' pleading, all of which exceptions were sustained. Appellants declined to amend, whereupon the trial court dismissed the entire case. This appeal, was taken from the order of dismissal.
Appellants' petition contains three counts. In their first count they allege that deficiency debts created in the last four years amount to more than $60,000, and that bond money from a Permanent Improvement Fund has been wrongfully transferred to the Local Maintenance Fund for the payment of some of these debts.
In their second count appellants allege that a bond issue of $250.000 and a $50cents per hundred dollars tax levy, voted in an election July 19, 1952, is void because (a) the petition asking for the election was not signed by the required number of voters; (b) only one voting box was used for the election, though the School District contains several voting precincts; and (c) the affidavit of posting bond notices was certified to July 8, 1952, whereas on its face said affidavit says that the notices were posted July 9, 1952.
In their third count appellants allege that a tax of $1.50 per $100 valuation attempted to be levied under authority of the bond election is invalid because (a) the election petition was not signed by the required number of persons; (b) the bond issue is a nullity; and (c) no valid levy of said tax has been made, hence the School District has no right to collect or demand payment of the taxes.
Appellants pray for a money judgment of $66,239.89 against the Trustees individually and the School Superintendent. In addition they ask that the School District be enjoined from issuing and selling the bonds voted in the election; that the School Board be enjoined from collecting the 50-cent tax voted July 19, 1952; that the School Board be enjoined from using funds of the current year for any purpose not authorized by statute; that the Board be enjoined from paying from the current year's funds the deficiency debts created in prior years, including such debts owed to appellee Banks and John Sexton and Company; that the Board be enjoined from the construction of new buildings until proper funds are available.
We think appellees are correct in their contention that appellants are not entitled to maintain an action for injunction, or a suit for a money judgment against the Trustees for money allegedly already wrongfully spent by the Trustees. An action for injunctive relief is moot in so far as expenditures already made are concerned. And a money judgment may not be legally rendered in favor of individual taxpayers for such sums. It is the School District alone which would be entitled to be paid back the money, not individual taxpayers. Only the School District itself may maintain such a suit, which may be brought by the County Attorney or District Attorney. Art. 339, V.R.C.S.; Hulett v. West Lamar Rural High School District, 149 Tex. 289, 232 S.W.2d 669; Murray v. Harris, Tex.Civ.App., 208 S.W.2d 626. Appellants' point of error No. 4 is overruled.
We think also that appellants may not in this kind of a suit and after the lapse of more than eight months, attack the validity of the bond election of July 19, 1952. Arts. 9.03, 9.30, 9.31, 9.36, Election Code, V. R.C.S.; Bahn v. Savage, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 644 (writ ref.); Treaccar v. City of Galveston, Tex.Civ.App., 28 S.W.2d 276 (dis.); Barker v. Wilson, Tex.Civ.App., 205 S.W. 543; Moore v. Commissioners' Court, etc., Tex.Civ.App., 192 S.W. 805. The second count in appellants' petition is therefore without merit.
In appellants' third count they attack the validity of the $1.50 per $100 valuation tax attempted to be levied by appellees. The only grounds, other than legal conclusions, pled in support of their claim of invalidity have to do with the alleged irregularities in the bond election of July 19, 1952. As stated above, the regularity of the bond election may not be questioned in this proceeding. Appellants' point No. 5 is overruled.
However, under some circumstances suits may properly be brought by individual taxpayers to enjoin public officials from unauthorized expenditures of public funds. Lawler v. Castroville Rural H. S. District, Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W.2d 613 (writ ref.). For that reason, the trial court should not have sustained the School District's exception No. 2. However, the error was harmless, for appellants' petition in the face of other exceptions, was insufficient to entitle appellants to injunctive relief. We overrule appellants' point of error No. 2.
It now becomes necessary for us to examine appellants' pleadings for equitable relief in connection with the other special exceptions leveled by appellees. Was the court correct in sustaining appellees' other exceptions and dismissing appellants' entire case following their refusal to amend?
The alleged unauthorized expenditures which appellants seek to restrain are the payment of deficiency debts-that is, the payment of old debts incurred in previous years-from the current year's funds. Appellants in support of their view cite us two statutes: Art. 2749, V. R.C.S., which provides that the trustees, in making contracts with teachers, shall not create a deficiency...
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