Rawson v. Executors

• Decision Date: 30 September 1869
• Citation: 1869 WL 5385,52 Ill. 62
• Parties: SAMUEL RAWSON et al.v.MARY ANN RAWSON et al. Executors.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

52 Ill. 62

1869 WL 5385 (Ill.)

SAMUEL RAWSON et al.

v.MARY ANN RAWSON et al. Executors.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1869.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Superior Court of Chicago.

The opinion of the court contains a sufficient statement of the case.

Messrs. BATES & TOWSLEE, for the plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. SPAFFORD & MCDAID and Messrs. BECKWITH, AYER & KALES, for the defendants in error.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a bill in chancery in the Superior Court of the city of Chicago, filed by the plaintiffs in error against the defendants in error, executors of the last will and testament of Erastus Rawson, deceased, alleging that he died in July, 1863, leaving a last will and testament, and leaving the defendant, Mary Ann Rawson, his widow, but leaving no children, or descendants of a child or children, and leaving Samuel Rawson, his father, Lydia Rawson, his mother, and the others named complainants in the bill, his brothers and sisters. Rawson died leaving personal property only. It is alleged in the bill that the will was admitted to probate, and that the executors named in it, the defendants in the bill, were duly appointed, and entered upon the discharge of their duties as such.

It is further alleged that the widow of the testator did not renounce the provisions of the will made in her favor, but claims to take under it, and assumes to have the right according to law, to receive the whole of the personal property, after the payment of the debts. It is claimed by the bill that after the payment of his debts and funeral expenses, the remainder and balance of his interest of every kind whatsoever should be distributed to his heirs at law, according to the statute of this State, in such case made and provided, and then alleges, that according to the laws of this State, in such case, the widow is only entitled to one-third of the personalty, and that the remaining two-thirds thereof belong to the complainants.

And the bill further claims, that whether the deceased died testate or intestate, the defendant, Mary Ann Rawson, his widow, is only entitled to one-third of the personal estate after the payment of the debts.

The defendants interposed a general demurrer to the bill, which was sustained and the bill dismissed.

To reverse this decree the complainants bring the record here by writ of error.

The case presents for our consideration the construction of the will in question, and the construction of the statute respecting the distribution of estates.

The will was made an exhibit, and was, after the introductory recitals, as follows: “To the end that all equitable demands against, and all claims on my estate, may be settled in equity and justice, and the remainder or balance of my interest of every kind whatsoever, may be distributed to my heirs at law according to the statute of Illinois for such case made and provided, do hereby, with the consent of the persons named, appoint my beloved wife, Mary Ann Rawson, and Edward K. Rogers, of the said city of Chicago, my executors, and hereby delegate all powers whatsoever, which may be necessary to carry out the intentions and objects above expressed, and which has directed me in this last will and testament, and I further remit and avoid the necessity of said executors to procure or give bail or security, or bonds as ordinarily required of executors and administrators in the law for such case made and provided.” The plaintiffs in error rely for support of the view they have taken of the rights of the contesting parties, upon the cases of Sturgis v. Ewing, 18 Ill. 176, and Tyson v. Postlewaite, 13 ib. 731, in the former of which cases it was said the provisions of the forty-sixth (46th) section of the statute of wills, was confined to cases of intestacy only, and in the latter, where it is held that it was by virtue of this section that the widow is made heir of her husband, that when there is no will and the estate intestate, then, and then only, the widow inherits as heir at law one-half of the real estate, and the whole of the personal estate, if her husband dies childless.

And they place reliance also, upon the case of McMurphy v. Boyles et al., 49 ib. 110, where it was held that the renunciation by the widow of her rights under the will, did not make the estate intestate even as to her; that in no manner could a testate estate, devised and bequeathed by will, ever become an intestate estate, so that the widow, as heir under the 46th section of the statute could take one-half of the real estate and all the personal estate.

Let us for a moment consider those cases in the order cited. In Sturgis v. Ewing the testator made provision in his will for his widow, who was childless, and also separate demises to his relations. The widow renounced, claiming the benefit of the statute.

In Tyson v. Postlewaite, Tyson died intestate, leaving a widow, but leaving neither children nor descendants of children. His widow died intestate, leaving the complainants her only heirs at law. They claimed that the widow did not in her life time, elect to take her dower in the lands of which her husband died seized, nor did she relinquish her inheritance therein, but elected to take the inheritance, claiming that she did, on the death of her husband, inherit one-half the real estate and the whole of the personal estate of her husband. Complainants claimed as heirs at law of the widow, and demanded a partition of the real estate. The court, under the 46th section of the statute of wills, established the widow as heir to one-half of the real estate; that the title, on the death of the husband, vested immediately in her, to the same extent as did the other half in his heirs general, without any act or volition on her part.

In both these cases the disposition of real estate was involved. In one, there was a renunciation under the will; the other was a case of intestacy; in neither was presented the question raised in this case, who are heirs at law to personal estate? In McMurphy's case, the estate had been disposed of by the will.

The rule is, if there be no words in any part of a will to control, the words or terms used must be interpreted according to their strict and technical import. So construing them, the persons appointed by law to succeed to an estate, as in case of intestacy, are the persons designated. 2 Jarman on Wills 2; 2 Williams on Exrs. 808, 809; Corbitt v. Corbitt, 1 Jones' (N. C.) Eq. Rep. 114; Ferguson and wife v. Stuart, Exr. 14 Ohio 140; Baskins' Appeal, 3 Penn. 304, this last case holding that in a will making a bequest to...